Theory versus History
brinklindsey.com
Here on the eve of war, let me put forward some final thoughts about the Iraq war debate – thoughts addressed to friends of mine who have disagreed with me.
Let me concede, once again, that there were very plausible arguments against making Iraq the next target after Afghanistan in the war against terrorism. Certainly, there were other, plausible targets. And certainly, the risks of proceeding against Iraq were and remain considerable. As I’ve said before, I can well imagine that, back in the spring of 2002, somebody could have convinced me that there was a better path than the one we’ve ended up taking.
But at some point along the way, arguments about relatively better courses of action became moot. By September 12, 2002 if not earlier, it had been decided that the next major campaign in the ongoing war against Islamist extremism and rogue weapons of mass destruction was Iraq. The debate about Iraq accordingly changed fundamentally: It quit the realm of theory and entered that of history.
The question was no longer whether we should confront Iraq and demand that it rid itself of weapons of mass destruction. That contest was over. The opponents of targeting Iraq had lost. Now the question was only whether the campaign against Iraq would succeed or fail.
Many people with whom I’m accustomed to agreeing missed the shift. They continued to argue about the risks of action against Iraq as an abstract policy matter. They didn’t confront the fact that action had really already begun – and thus that the facts on the ground were very different from when the debate started. Indeed, they hotly rejected suggestions that prior moves they regarded as mistaken should strengthen the case for taking further moves along that line. In other words, they refused to deal with the world as it was.
Since the fall, the historical plot has continued to thicken – and how. What began as an internal U.S. debate over how best to prevent future 9/11s has now been transformed into a great historical cleavage of global dimensions. On one side are the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and southern, central, and eastern Europe; on the other are the Iraqi regime and the governments of France, Russia, and Germany. A host of critical questions have come into focus, the answers to which hinge on whether the U.S. policy of confronting Iraq goes well or badly. What are the political futures of Bush, Blair, and Schroeder and the political movements they lead? Does the United Nations have any future as an institution of collective self-defense, or will some other institution emerge to fill the vacuum? What will become of NATO? Will the EU continue to take shape as France writ large, or is some other identity – or crackup – in store? What is North Korea’s next move – and how will China react?
None of those weighty issues has anything to do with the original question of whether the threat posed by Iraq crossed some threshold past which preemptive action would be warranted. Nevertheless, all of those issues are all now in play, and it won’t do any good trying to ignore them. Yet many who have continued to oppose the U.S. policy toward Iraq have tried to do just that. Once senses their frustration that these distractions have arisen to muddy the waters. But they are distractions only from the parlor game of endlessly rehashing the theoretical merits of a decision long ago made. However messy, however unwished, however unanticipated, those broader issues are the very stuff of the history now unfolding. And in the face of the coalescing historical drama, it is the parlor-game debating match that has been the distraction.
Now we go forward. If it hasn’t been clear before, it should be clear now: The best hopes for a peaceful, free, and secure world now lie in quick and overwhelming victory over Saddam Hussein, followed by the successful establishment, as soon as practicable, of a government in Iraq that is of, by, and for the Iraqi people as a whole.
Posted by Brink Lindsey at March 17, 2003 01:29 PM |
