How US lost the diplomatic war
Delay in consulting the UN over war plans
Constantly changing justification for war
Failing to explain the invasion's urgency
Its propaganda campaign contained big errors and did not address its image problems in the Middle East
By Jonathan Eyal
LONDON - US President George Bush and Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair are determined: If Iraqi President Saddam Hussein does not accept immediate disarmament, war will follow swiftly.
Yet, behind all the bluster and official display of steely resolve, both the US and British governments realise that their propaganda campaign on Iraq has been a failure.
Seldom before have these two governments - among the slickest of media handlers - stumbled so badly.
Persuading the world that military action against Iraq is necessary should have been easy.
Mr Saddam is, after all, hardly a popular international figure.
All of Iraq's neighbours consider him a menace.
The elimination of weapons of mass destruction is also a popular cause, world-wide.
But the result? Almost without exception, overwhelming majorities in nations around the world are against the war.
And in some countries, Mr Bush is viewed as just as big a problem as Mr Saddam.
Some of the major errors that Washington and London made in explaining their case are relatively easy to pinpoint.
In dealing with Middle Eastern issues, the US is saddled with a huge disadvantage. Most Arabs regard US policies as duplicitous and hostile to their interests.
America's unstinting support for Israel - and seeming indifference to the plight of the Palestinians - is also overwhelmingly resented throughout the wider Muslim world.
As the sole superpower, the US is generally viewed with a mixture of admiration and apprehension, and a tinge of instinctive anti-Americanism therefore lingers around the world.
Its penchant for justifying its actions in often subjective but invariably sanctimonious terms such as 'democracy' or the 'common good' does not help either.
But this does not mean that such obstacles cannot be overcome.
Suspicions about US policies in the Middle East could have been addressed by combining military pressure against Iraq with political pressure on Israel to return to the negotiating table.
This, after all, is what many of America's allies have long suggested.
However, Mr Bush ignored this advice; for much of the current Iraqi crisis, he remained silent on the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.
The US has now revealed its future peace plan for the Middle East - a classic example of doing too little, too late.
Latent anti-Americanism and the superpower's bully image could have also been addressed by patiently building a coalition of countries against Iraq.
It is now a well-known secret that plans for the war against Iraq started more than a year ago in Washington.
But for many months, the administration stubbornly refused to discuss the subject in the United Nations.
The delay was fatal, for it deprived the US of the moral high ground and virtually precluded the creation of a solid pro-American coalition.
Many countries - particularly in Europe - could have been privately persuaded on the merits of the American case, if this was made gently and persistently.
Few were able to accept Washington's line when it was declared with little international consultation.
The biggest public relations mistake that Washington and London made was to constantly change their official justification for the war.
It is now usually forgotten that America's first position was to accuse Iraq of harbouring Al-Qaeda terrorists.
Precious little evidence was ever produced, and this argument faded away with little explanation.
Washington then quickly shifted to a demand for 'regime change' in Iraq.
When some of its allies - particularly the British - privately pointed out that this was hardly a justification under international law, the argument shifted to weapons of mass destruction.
And as international opposition grew, all three arguments were blended together: Mr Saddam had to be removed because if he remained in power he would develop terrible weapons as well as nurture future terrorists.
And, yes, in between there were various claims that the war would bring democracy to Iraq.
The cardinal rule in any successful propaganda campaign is to decide on one simple message and to stick with it all the way. This is what Washington did not do.
There were two other important mistakes.
The US failed to realise that it was engaged in the most difficult exercise of all: changing public opinion on the need for war against a supposed danger which has existed for decades but which has not materialised.
At no point did the Americans manage to explain the urgency of their task. As the French repeatedly asked in the Security Council, if Mr Saddam was allowed to exist for years, why the urgency of tackling him today?
And even if tackle him we must, why does it have to happen immediately?
Washington could have provided answers to these questions from the start, but did not.
The second error was to ignore the fact that the international electronic media has now slipped away from the control of the US and Britain.
Even as late as a few years ago, two satellite news television stations - CNN and BBC World - had a pre-eminent role in putting forward the viewpoint of their nations to the world.
Today, many more international satellite stations fight for this market in local languages, particularly in the Arab world.
This required a different media strategy - the old technique of holding daily press conferences at the Pentagon or the White House and expecting them to be beamed around the world in their entirety does not work.
US and British politicians duly tried to appear on other media networks.
But their language handicaps and their inability to tailor their message to much smaller yet more specific audiences were palpable.
None of these considerations will prevent the war from starting.
But they will make the management of the war much more difficult for Washington and London. |
