>>War Diary: Wednesday, March 19, 2003
STRATFOR ^ | Mar 19, 2003 | Staff
Posted on 03/19/2003 9:09 AM EST by Axion
War Diary: Wednesday, March 19, 2003
Mar 19, 2003
"It was a night of watching." That phrase keeps coming to mind now. It seems appropriate.
The diplomacy is behind us, with the recriminations still echoing and occasional charges and counter-charges still heard. Hans Blix, about to become one of the many footnotes to history, announced that he did not think it likely that Saddam Hussein would use chemical weapons. The Associated Press quoted Blix, speaking as to whether Iraqi forces would use chemical weapons against the United States, as saying, "I think they would be able if the weapons were there -- and I'm not saying they are. And I'm not saying that they have means of delivery -- but they could have it. ... But I doubt that they would have the will to do it." When asked why Hussein wouldn't use the weapons if he were about to be defeated, he replied, "Some people care about their reputation even after death." With that, we can let poor Mr. Blix depart to well-earned obscurity.
Now the question is when. Hussein has rejected the U.S. ultimatum, so the United States is technically ready to attack when it wishes. Reports from the battlefield describe troops making last-minute preparations before deploying to their jumping-off points. Iraqi troops are all in position -- they are unlikely to be able to move very much after the war begins. The Fedayeen, irregular forces, were mobilized on Tuesday. Both sides are as ready as they are going to be.
There has been much speculation on when the air war might begin. There has been an assumption that the war will begin around midnight, as air campaigns since 1991 have begun during the night. But there is no inherent reason for this, particularly if a layer of dust makes visibility for Iraqi gunners that much more difficult. Moreover, if we assume that the United States will still want the cover of darkness for its initial ground assaults, beginning the campaign in the morning would make some sense. It would by 12 daylight hours of bombing to add to any night ground assault, whether on Day 1 or Day 2. The ultimatum expires at 0415 GMT on March 20, early Thursday morning in Baghdad. Hussein is assuming that he will have at least until the next night -- nearly 24 hours -- before the attacks begin. Perhaps not.
The goal of the air war will be shock and awe. The problem is that many of Hussein's assets, fixed and mobile, are located within populated areas. There is another goal, which is few civilian casualties. As Hussein completed his final deployment of troops in particular, their collocation with population centers was marked. This is not simply a matter of the Iraqi leader's ruthlessness, although that plays a role; it is also a matter of geographic reality. In order to defend the country, Iraqi forces must be in populated areas. That's where the defensive positions are. There is no practical way to deploy Iraq's forces away from populated areas.
This poses a real dilemma for U.S. planners. Attacks on fixed facilities can be carried out without major collateral damage, perhaps. Even mobile facilities like radar systems can be attacked. But infantry forces concentrated in populated areas can be attacked from the air only if you are willing to attack civilians as well. As for tanks, the notoriously poor performance of the U.S. Air Force against tanks in Kosovo -- particularly camouflaged tanks -- remains a concern to the Air Force.
Attacking Iraqi forces, whether autonomously or in close air support to ground forces, is going to be the first tip-off on how aggressive the air campaign is actually going to be. That in turn will be a function of how well Iraqi ground forces resist. If they resist effectively, air power will be needed, and then a decision will have to be made very quickly about shock and awe versus civilian casualties.
As the air campaign begins, there will be two things to watch for. First, will the Iraqis set the southern oil fields on fire to provide cover for the forces deployed there? Second, will the Iraqis use chemical weapons early in the war, particularly against logistical centers in Kuwait? They will not have long to do this, as their forces will be cleared out of range quickly. Attacking logistical targets is more effective strategically than attacking troops, as slowing the logistical flow dramatically can have a multiplier effect on capabilities. Hussein knows this; therefore, these will be the first indications of how vigorously Iraq will pursue the war: Will the oil fields go up and will chemical weapons be used.
We will also get an early indication of how U.S. forces will fight. Will the air attack be accompanied by multiple airborne and air mobile operations? Will there be a delay in launching these? Will ground forces move out first to test the Iraqi forces before airborne and airmobile troops are put at risk? These decisions have now been made. They will be implemented shortly.<<
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