More at stake in northern Iraq
Sooner or later, Washington will have to choose between Turkey and the Kurds, says analyst ANDRÉ GEROLYMATOS
As if it didn't have enough to worry about, the Bush administration is rapidly having to come to terms with the psychology of the bazaar in its negotiations with the Turks and Kurds over waging war in northern Iraq. Caught between two of their ostensible allies (who fear and loathe each other), the outcome of this bargaining could have dire consequences for the future of the region.
Already, the United States has had to endure the frustration of having its invasion plans limited by the unexpected refusal of Turkey's government to allow U.S. troops on its soil. Then it was reduced to dickering over the terms by which Turkish troops might or might not join in the fighting in northern Iraq.
(An early casualty of this bargaining was the recent failure of efforts to reunify Cyprus, an effort that became intertwined with American and Turkish negotiations over the Kurdish issue. Despite indications a deal was done, Turkey's military, it seems, wouldn't part with its control over the northern part of the divided Mediterranean island unless it was promised a piece of the action in northern Iraq.)
During the Cold War, the United States viewed Turkey as critical to protecting NATO's southeastern flank. As such, Washington was willing to sacrifice Cypriot interests, among other things, to satisfy Ankara. Time after time, efforts to reunify the island were abandoned for the sake of U.S. and NATO security concerns.
U.S. deference to Turkey continued with the advance of the war on Iraq. In December, Washington practically bullied the Europeans into giving the Turks a date to begin talks concerning their admission to the European Union. Consequently, the Bush administration was stunned when the Turkish Parliament earlier this month turned down the American request to move 62,000 U.S. troops through Turkey on their way to Iraq. The troops were vital to opening up a northern front against Iraq and protecting their biggest local supporters -- the Kurds.
Nothing in this region, however, comes without a price. When the Americans requested Turkish support in the war against Iraq, the government in Ankara presented two shopping lists to Washington -- one overt and the other confidential. Openly, Ankara demanded $15-billion (U.S.) in direct aid and loan guarantees, a price the Bush administration was willing to pay.
Secretly, however, Ankara also insisted that the Turkish army accompany the U.S. forces into northern Iraq. Furthermore, the Turks demanded the right to establish a military zone in the predominantly Kurdish area.
While wanting Turkish support on the one hand, Washington can't afford to alienate Iraq's Kurds, whose support lends great legitimacy to its attack on Iraq. And the Kurds want no part of a Turkish force in their midst.
Turkey claims its interests in northern Iraq are purely humanitarian. The war will generate hundreds of thousands of refugees, who will seek a safe haven in Turkey. Accordingly, Ankara proposed to use the Turkish army only to stem the flood of refugees by providing aid to the victims of war inside northern Iraq.
Nonsense, say the Kurds, who fear the Turks' real intent in entering their territory would be to suppress Kurdish autonomy. News of Turkey's plans last week generated talk among the Kurds of forming human chains to prevent the movement of Turkish military convoys. Regardless of the advantages of the deployment of U.S. troops in Turkey, or the innocence of Turkish motives, there is a very real possibility that the presence of Turkish units among the predominantly Kurdish population of northern Iraq would result in armed clashes between Turks and the Kurds.
Which is why Washington ultimately balked at Ankara's demands, and Turkey chose not to allow the deployment of U.S. troops. The about-face by the Turkish political and military leadership was less a byproduct of Turkish parliamentary democracy than the result of the failure of the Americans to give the Turks a free hand in northern Iraq.
The haggling continues, even as the war is under way. A U.S. envoy was due to arrive in Ankara today for talks with government leaders and U.S. President George W. Bush said yesterday he had made it very clear to Turkey that its troops were not to enter northern Iraq unilaterally.
Ankara announced Friday that while it would permit U.S. military flights to traverse Turkish airspace, it also reserves the right to send Turkish troops into northern Iraq for Turkey's own security. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul noted that following the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf, "a vacuum was formed in northern Iraq and that vacuum became practically a camp for terrorist activity. This time, we do not want such a vacuum."
The government denied weekend reports, however, that it already has sent in troops.
For its part, Ankara believes it must, at all cost, prevent the creation of a Kurdish state on its border. That policy is driving all others.
Like Syria and Iran, Turkey is home to a large Kurdish population that has ambitions of its own. Ankara neither wants to yield any territory to the creation of a new Kurdish homeland, nor to have to face the possibility of a renewed armed uprising, possibly backed by autonomous Kurds in Iraq.
Undoubtedly, the haggling will go on until the outcome of the war shifts the advantage to the United States or to Turkey, while the fate of the Kurds hangs in the balance.
The United States is betting on a short war, but if the Iraqi army fights back and the conflict drags on, pressure will build to work with Turkey in opening a northern front, whatever the Kurds may think. The Bush administration is less concerned with Kurdish fears or Turkish anxieties than with defeating Saddam Hussein.
Toward this goal, the United States is faced with the exquisite dilemma of whether to placate the Turks or the Kurds.
André Gerolymatos, who holds the Hellenic Studies Chair at Simon Fraser University, is author of The Balkan Wars.
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