<will be exporting oil within three months>
Assuming he is speaking of the Rumuila fields as the survival of Kirkuk is still up in the air.
War expectations comment from Price Headley based on Saddum's tenure. The quick war expectation is gone (note the TOHOE spike last week), but 74% still expect him gone by end of April.
63.147.211.35
The April end game may also be optimistic unless we see signs that coalition forces are willing to seriously fight (shed blood) and engage the Iraqis in cities like Karbala (holy city)(*), and Basra (two million people facing humanitarian disaster) (**) and finally Baghdad. The jury seems to be out on that score?
(*) Stratfor analysis of Karbala situation
Karbala's Holy Sites Complicate Allied Air Strikes
Mar 25, 2003 - 2105 GMT
Summary
The U.S. Army needs to push through Karbala and a division of Republican Guards to get to Baghdad, and for that it needs a heavy air bombardment. But with Iraqi troops deploying around the city's multiple holy sites, air strikes will be a difficult and dangerous task.
Analysis
The U.S. 3rd Infantry Division is facing a major line of Iraqi resistance at Karbala, where much of the Republican Guard's Al Medina Division is thought to be dug in. The road through Karbala is one of three major thrusts that coalition forces appear to be making toward Baghdad, with the Marines leading the other two thrusts farther east from An Nasiriyah -- one to the northwest through Ad Diwaniya and the other heading north through Al Kut.
The Army's 3rd Infantry now has halted south of Karbala and is waiting on tactical and strategic air strikes to diminish the fighting capabilities of the Al Medina Division, which purportedly is among the toughest and most loyal of Iraqi troops. But Army commanders could be facing a tough dilemma as they call out those strikes.
U.S. military planners say troops and tanks from the Al Medina Division have dispersed in and around Karbala and have taken positions close to homes, schools, mosques and numerous ancient Shia shrines. Though allied commanders are hesitant to order air strikes near homes and schools, they face an even greater problem when it comes to Karbala's mosques and shrines. Karbala is one of Islam's holiest cities -- home to a number of revered and ancient tombs, including the twin shrines to al-Hussein and al-Abbas in the center of the old city. And Karbala's main mosque is the top site for pilgrimages for Shiites from all over the world.
Republican Guards recognize the massive global outcry that would result if these holy sites were bombed by coalition forces -- making them tremendously valuable locations to place tanks and troops, and also to station artillery with which to bombard U.S. troops trying to make their way through the city.
Karbala is not just holy to Shiites worldwide. It also is holy -- in a very different sense of the word -- to coalition military commanders. Unlike other cities such as Basra and An Najaf, allied forces cannot simply bypass Karbala on their way to Baghdad. It is bound by Lake Razahah to the west and the Euphrates River to the east -- and the major highway west of the Euphrates goes straight through the city. Simply put, Karbala is strategically vital and must be taken to allow the 3rd Infantry to continue on to Baghdad and to secure the supply lines from Kuwait.
Saddam Hussein's forces recognize Karbala's importance, and also the advantage that the city's shrines offer them in terms of shields. The real question is whether coalition forces can take Karbala while inflicting no, or at least minimal, damage to the holy sites.
The ramifications of allied air strikes destroying Shia holy shrines are hard to fathom. It could immediately turn thousands of Iraqi Shiites in the south -- who are no fans of Hussein and who the allies need on their side -- against U.S. and British troops. This would unnecessarily complicate both the war and the rebuilding effort. More widely, Al Jazeera beaming video of Karbala's burning holy shrines across the Muslim world would be a public relations nightmare for the United States and United Kingdom that could do untold damage to the countries' already soiled reputations.
For the allies, they're damned if they do and damned if they don't. Karbala must be taken, but its shrines must be preserved. That fine line will test the precision of coalition air capabilities and the discipline of U.S. and British military commanders, and will slow the western thrust to Baghdad.
(**) Stratfor on Basra situation:
Basra: Major Battle Still Ahead
Mar 27, 2003 - 0058 GMT
Summary
The Iraqi counteroffensive on March 26 -- and indications that earlier reports of a civilian uprising in Basra were false -- suggest that coalition forces will continue to face serious resistance in the south. But Iraqi forces advancing from Basra to launch an attack could be engaged in the open, which raises the chances for a coalition victory there. The major battle for Basra still lies ahead.
Analysis
Conflicting information circulated on March 26 about fierce fighting around Basra, Iraq's second-largest city. It has become increasingly evident that Iraqi forces around Basra are capable not only of mounting a stubborn defense, but also of launching major attacks. U.S. Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks, speaking for CENTCOM, said, "It is a very confusing situation, to say the least."
Leaving Basra under Iraqi control would open the possibility of coalition forces being attacked from the rear, which would delay their advance on Baghdad. And for Iraq, losing the battle for Basra would be a major military and political loss. British forces on the ground in Basra, if not reinforced by ground reserves, risk being bogged down in fighting in and around the city for quite some time.
As of now, Iraqi forces outnumber British in the area. Britain has the 7th Armoured Brigade, the Desert Rats, semi-circling Basra from the west. 3 Commando is at Al Faw and spread toward Basra. The 16th Airmobile is southwest of Basra, and the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade is just south of Basra. The 1st Armoured Division is northwest of Basra, but it is engaged around Al Qurnah and cannot help in the battle for Basra.
The Iraqis reportedly have at least 50,000 troops in Basra, a city of 1.7 million people. This includes the army's 51st Mechanized Division, some unidentified Republican Guard units, some special operations forces, several thousand Fedayeen commandos, Baath Party armed units and numerous so-called "People's Army," or urban community, units. Stratfor's sources say that the Iraqi southern command remains firmly in control of Basra.
Evidence suggests Iraqi military leaders will count on their superior manpower to change the situation in the south. But we believe that both the superior British ground fire capability and the coalition's domination of the air will counter any manpower advantages Iraq enjoys. We believe these factors will allow coalition forces to defeat Iraqi forces in Basra -- especially if they leave the city to launch an attack, opening the possibility for air strikes.
It appears the Iraqi southern command has decided to launch a multi-directional counteroffensive from Basra, with the goal of defeating and partly encircling British forces in southern Iraq -- including those around Basra and all the way down to the Iraqi maritime border in the Persian Gulf, sources in the Russian and German intelligence communities say. Al Jazeera TV reports that Iraq's March 26 offensive out of Basra succeeded in encircling some British units.
This strategy has resulted in several attacks from Basra on March 26. During the fighting, some unidentified Iraqi infantry units reportedly regained control over one of three Basra airports. At the same time, the 51st Mechanized Division launched two battalion-sized attacks on the British positions at Az Zubayr. But the main offensive came southeast of Basra, where the 25th Mechanized Brigade -- also of the 51st Mechanized -- moved swiftly through the darkness toward Al Faw Peninsula. Their apparent aim was to join the Iraqi forces still engaged in fighting there.
The 25th inflicted an unknown number of losses on the British units at Abu Al Khasib and reportedly broke through their positions. The British units called for air support. This Iraqi column has come under heavy bombardment on March 26.
But our understanding is that this venture out of the city has been a tactical -- and perhaps even operational -- mistake. In venturing forth, Iraqi forces exposed themselves to harsh coalition bombing. In Stratfor's opinion, an Iraqi counteroffensive has few if any chances outside Basra. By the same token, British forces could make an equally costly mistake by going into the city if Iraqi forces continue to offer resistance. |
