The "Day After" in Iraq: Lessons from Afghanistan (part):
Much of the current debate on the crisis in Iraq focuses on the "day after" the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. What will Iraq look like and how will the United States and the international community rebuild the country and fulfill its promise of "reshaping" it into a bastion of democracy for the entire region?
An examination of current efforts to rebuild Afghanistan provides some insight and a basis for speculation on how the challenge of rebuilding a post-war Iraq will be confronted. Comparisons between Afghanistan and Iraq should not be overemphasized as they simplify and conflate what are complicated and highly specific situations. Yet one cannot ignore the striking commonalties that can already be detected between the reconstruction approach implemented in Afghanistan and that which is being envisaged for Iraq. In recent weeks, U.S. officials have, on several occasions, referred to Afghanistan as a "successful" model for reconstruction and nation-building that should be emulated in Iraq. Similarly, United Nations (UN) planning for post-war Iraq has drawn heavily on the Afghan experience.
In a move with tremendous symbolism, a UN planning committee has chosen Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Afghanistan, to fulfill the same post in Iraq. If he accepts the appointment, Brahimi will lead the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), a structure intended to mirror its Afghan counterpart, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
UN and U.S. veneration of the Afghan nation-building experience contrasts sharply with its track record. Rising insecurity, slow economic development, and growing public dissatisfaction with the government currently threatens the post-war order in Afghanistan. Without delving into the debate over the merits and legality of the impending war in Iraq, it is important to ask why the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is faltering and what can be done to avoid such an eventuality in post-war Iraq.
Afghanistan's Lessons
Afghanistan has made remarkable progress since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001. However, achievements such as the establishment of a new currency, the Afghani, and the return of two million refugees, have diverted international attention from a rapidly expanding security vacuum that threatens to envelope the nascent government. The Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) holds little influence outside the confines of Kabul; tellingly, President Karzai is referred to in some quarters as the "mayor of Kabul." The bulk of the country outside the capital is the domain of the warlords, who, by controlling private armies, can defy the central government at will. The resilience of spoiler groups, such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami party, has presented an additional challenge to the post-Taliban order. Rising levels of violence across the country have illustrated the failure of peace-buildingpeace building efforts and the precariousness of the government's position. In the past ten months there have been 400 rocket attacks on coalition military forces, scores of terrorist attacks, factional clashes that have claimed hundreds of civilian lives, the murder of a prominent cabinet minister, and a narrowly averted assassination attempt on President Karzai.
Efforts to strengthen the national government, build effective security forces, and stimulate economic development have failed to stem the tide of insecurity. In particular, programs to rebuild a national army and police force have been slow and ineffective. As of March 2003 only, 1,700 troops had graduated from the U.S.-supported army training program and the bulk of the country's 50,000 police officers remain untrained and loyal to regional warlords rather than the central government. Unable to enforce its writ outside the capital, the ATA has had to rely on the good will of warlords and the strength of coalition military forces to maintain a semblance of legitimacy and control. Unfortunately, personal ambition rather than goodwill has driven the actions of the warlords and the military strategy adopted by coalition forces has been motivated more by short-term military expediency in the ongoing war on terror than the long-term interests of Afghan security and stability.
Donor Failure in Afghanistan
While the life of the average Afghan has improved slightly over the past year, economic development has proceeded at a much slower rate than previously hoped. Unable to collect tax revenue due to warlord intransigence and allotted only a 16% share of the international reconstruction budget in 2002, ATA development initiatives have been paralyzed. The "Marshall Plan" for Afghanistan, which President Bush alluded to on numerous occasions in the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban, never materialized. At a donor conference in Kabul on 13 March 2003, President Karzai admitted, "the needs of Afghanistan...are much greater than what was estimated…at the Tokyo Donors conference." He went on to affirm that an additional $15-20 billion of aid was required to put the reconstruction process on track. Shortfalls in funding, combined with the slow pace of aid disbursements, the short-term duration of donor aid pledges, and the lack of labor-intensive investment in infrastructure, have rendered the ATA unable to deliver on its promises to the Afghan people. Deprived of their peace dividend, the Afghan populace has become increasingly restive. With donor fatigue growing and international attention shifting to the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula, the window of opportunity for rebuilding the country may be on the verge of closing.
The anticipated humanitarian crisis in Iraq will likely be even more severe than that which has gripped Afghanistan. After 23 years of almost continuous warfare, the Afghan population, which is primarily rural and agrarian, have developed highly advanced coping mechanisms. In contrast, the Iraqi populace, predominantly urban and dependent on government support, is much more vulnerable to the affects of war.
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