I'd say the spectre of Soviet bankruptcy was there before SDI was on the table. The strategy of confronting the Soviets in Afghanistan had a significant amount of influence on the Kremlins internal workings, and, if memory serves well, that arose from recommendations made within the Trilateral Commission in the Carter years (no, I can't cite sources, and admittedly, my memory is riddled with holes from the abuse of too many Twinkies).
Even without Afghanistan, Russia's economy was weaker than most intelligence analysts believed, till shortly before it came unglued. I think it's oversimplistic to suggest it was all ideologically crafted when the underlying assessments were critically flawed.
I think it's also oversimplifying to suggest it was all about Gandhian non-violent resistance. Historians years hence will likely indicate that it was a combination of pre-conditions, a combination of strategies, a combination of the right leaders for the right times and some plain old lucky timing.
Reagan and his advisers get a share of the credit, but so does Gorbachev, so does the Gdansk movement, so does the economic rot festering beneath the Soviet system, and more.
Gandhian resistance worked because of an established tradition of British civility beneath its empirical exterior. It would not work against a Stalin or Hitler, who could care less how many were slaughtered.
As more of the world increases in its civil practices, the odds increase that nonviolence movements can effect change. But it's not a panacea and works least in societies that put higher value on the promise of a luxurious afterlife than a on life itself. |
