Echoes of an old Iraq disaster
Have The US And Britain Learned The Lessons Of 1915
3/29/03 1:59:48 PM
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UPI
Analysis: Echoes of an old Iraq disaster
By Richard Sale
UPI Intelligence Correspondent
From the International Desk
Published 3/29/2003 6:55 AM
Reading in this week's newspapers that the supply lines for U.S. troops "have been stretched," that some units are "alarmingly low on water and also in danger of running out of food" and that some military officials believe there are not enough "boots on the ground" in Iraq conjures eerie parallels between criticisms of the current U.S. war there and the flaws in the disastrous British campaign in the same country nearly 90 years ago.
In November of 1914, after Britain had declared war on Turkey, the British Arab Bureau in Cairo tried to foment an Arab rebellion that would topple the Ottoman Empire. But what actually followed was a horrible catastrophe, much of it having to do with overextended supply lines and not having enough effectively massed troops.
In 1914, as the war began, there were small numbers of British troops in Iraq (or Mesopotamia as much of the country was then called) stationed there to protect British oil supplies in Iran. Soon several thousand more British forces appeared to occupy the southern Iraqi city of Basra.
The Turkish response was feeble: Basra was miles distant from the main Turkish forces collected at Baghdad. But in April 1915, an ambitious new British commander, Sir John Nixon, had arrived on the scene, and he was quick to send his best operational officer, Maj. Gen. Charles Townsend, in search of new victories. Despite Townsend's reluctance, Nixon sent him marching up to Baghdad.
As one historian noted, such a march would have required for its success large numbers of troops, hospital equipment, river transport, artillery and supplies plus a mastery of logistics to have any chance at all. The country was mosquito infested and there were no roads.
More importantly, the troops would need tons of ammunition and food, because they were marching rapidly away from their secure supply line in the south.
Townsend furiously fought his way through to Ctesipon, only 25 miles from Baghdad. But the Turks had a new, very capable German commander, Field Marshal Coleman von der Goltz, who quickly marshaled 40,000 new Turkish troops to confront Townsend's force of 4,500, which was running increasingly short of food and ammunition.
Townsend suddenly knew he was in trouble.
Townsend wanted to retreat 250 miles south and make a stand, but his troops were worn out, and he dug his force in at al Kut, then a mere mud village in a loop of the Tigris river. Goltz moved to besiege him and sent more troops south to block any escape or rescue.
Townsend had food to last until April (chiefly because his force had suffered a thousand casualties), but he played a disastrous card, telling superiors he could only hold out until January of 1916. This meant that instead of putting together a relief force that could deal a single, massive blow to the Turks, the British rescue forces were rushed in piecemeal and were destroyed piecemeal.
They suffered 25,000 casualties.
In April, Townsend finally surrendered after a siege of 146 days. By then he was mentally unbalanced, but the Turks allowed him to live in luxury in captivity at Constantinople.
His men were less fortunate.
Between the beginning of the campaign until Townsend's surrender, he had lost 10,000 men. Those that lived to surrender all died as captive slaves on Turkish railway gangs.
To David Fromkin, a prominent Middle East historian, the tragedy lay in trying to go too far with too little, and with the fact Townsend kept moving to the very end of his supply line while his enemy waited, well-supplied, well- led, at the very beginning of his.
Only time, and the skill and tenacity of the U.S forces and their commanders, will tell if they have learned the lessons of Iraq in 1915.
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