How the Pentagon was told to change the rules
By Joshua Micah Marshall
Published: March 31 2003 19:58 | Last Updated: March 31 2003 19:58
At any time in Washington DC, there are a handful of contests and squabbles of great concern to some small community of journalists, policy-makers, and career bureaucrats. Only rarely, however, do such insider conflicts burst on to the world stage as a key factor in some world crisis. That has now happened over the Iraq war.
As US-UK forces have become bogged down in fierce skirmishing with Iraqi irregulars along the long line from Umm Qasr to the outskirts of Baghdad, criticism has focused on Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary. Against the advice of many of the country's top generals - both current and retired - Mr Rumsfeld pressed for a fighting force in Iraq that went against conventional military doctrine. It was not only much smaller but differently balanced. After 10 days of war, his concepts of fast-moving, air-dominated, high-technology warfare, which seemed visionary a month ago, appear to many like a reckless gamble.
This confrontation has been brewing for more than two years. Since Bill Clinton never got on particularly well with the US military, it has been widely assumed that civilian-military relations at the Pentagon have been better under George W. Bush. In fact, they have arguably been far worse. In terms of calling their own shots, the Pentagon top brass never had it so good as it did under the former president - particularly after Mr Clinton's first couple of years.
Senior military officers expected from Mr Bush what they had gained under his father: more or less unquestioning support for the armed forces. But they soon learned that Mr Rumsfeld and his new team of officials had taken a very different lesson from the often-fractious relationship between the military and the outgoing administration. "They thought the uniformed military had run roughshod over the process at the Pentagon," says one retired Marine with long service at the Pentagon. "They thought that the civilians really needed to take over, and that attitude became very evident in the first couple of weeks."
In addition to this critical attitude towards the top military leadership, Mr Rumsfeld and his senior deputies also brought with them revolutionary ideas about the nature of modern warfare. They believed that modern technology - particularly technology related to airpower and precision-guided munitions - had revolutionised modern warfare. Used in concert with special operations, they believed, it made large concentrations of ground troops and heavy armour far less important.
Their confidence in this vision grew after the US engagement in Afghanistan. As one defence policy analyst told me last autumn, the US Central Command responsible for central Asia and the Middle East "wanted very much to wait until the spring [of 2002] to start the operation. The civilians just said 'No. We want to start in October. We can't let 30 days pass since September 11.' "
Mr Rumsfeld and his associates did not need much convincing that they knew modern warfare as well, or better, than anyone. But success in Afghanistan buoyed them considerably. When they began planning to invade Iraq, the success in Afghanistan played a key role in their thinking. Indeed, Mr Rumsfeld and his deputies first pushed for a war plan that had considerably fewer troops than are stationed in Iraq and Kuwait even now.
Beyond their theories of modern warfare, they brought two priorities to the current war plan. First, they are committed to a vision of military world dominance that requires the US to be able to mount a number of rapid moves against hostile, rogue states around the globe. As a result, they wanted to take down Saddam Hussein in a manner than made clear that the US could act rapidly against others. Attacking Iraq without mobilising America's entire arsenal was an important part of making that that threat credible. Second, they embraced an interpretation of the politics of the Arab world that made it seem extremely likely that US and UK troops would be welcomed as liberators in Iraq rather than invaders. They discounted the likelihood of the guerrilla warfare we are witnessing now.
Still, some are wondering today why Mr Rumsfeld, an American patriot who has dedicated much of his life to public service, would take such a chance with the war in Iraq. The answer is simple: hubris. He and his deputies did not regard it as a risk. They were sure that they were right.
The writer is a contributing writer for The Washington Monthly, and runs the web log www.talkingpointsmemo.com
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