Strategic Analysis- Baghdad- from Stratfor Analysis(Report)
THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
03 April 2003
by Dr. George Friedman
Baghdad
Summary
From the beginning of the war-planning process, Baghdad posed the
greatest challenge. The United States does not want to fight an
urban battle, but the conquest of Iraq cannot be complete without
the fall of Baghdad. The initial U.S. action -- trying to kill
Saddam Hussein -- was designed to trigger a political
capitulation that would make a battle for Baghdad unnecessary; it
didn't. Iraqi resistance may collapse simply out from attacks and
internal weakness. But if this doesn't happen, three war-fighting
models will be available. One is the fall of Paris in 1944 -- the
favored U.S. strategy. The second is the siege of Budapest in
1944-45 -- six weeks of encirclement and bombardment, with
civilian casualties. The third is the fall of Berlin in 1945,
with the attackers losing almost 80,000 men in three days. Berlin
is out of the question. Paris is the model the United States
wants, but the danger is that it will slip into a Budapest mode.
Analysis
Any discussion of the war in Iraq has always turned on the
conquest of Baghdad. The capital city is the heart of Iraq. It is
the country's political, administrative and structural center.
The fall of Baghdad does not necessarily mean that all resistance
will immediately end in the rest of Iraq. However, without the
fall of Baghdad, this war cannot end. The fall of Baghdad has
always been the central challenge facing U.S. war planners.
Baghdad is a world-class city in terms of size and population,
with more than 5 million people. The U.S. Army has never taken a
city of this size in the face of significant opposition. Few
armies have done so. In direct assault, capturing a large city
against resistance tends to cause large casualties among the
attacking forces. In 1945, the Red Army had Berlin completely
surrounded; it had complete air superiority and massed artillery.
The city was held by the defeated remnants of the German army,
including large contingents of young boys and old men poorly
armed and ill-trained. The Soviets were battle-hardened veterans.
Moreover, the Soviets had no compunctions about nor political
liabilities attached to causing massive casualties among the
civilian population. They controlled the pattern and tempo of the
offensive. Nevertheless, in the direct assault on Berlin, the
experienced Soviet forces suffered nearly 80,000 dead and close
to a quarter-million wounded in about three days of fighting.
There are other strategies for subduing large cities. In 1944-45,
the Red Army surrounded Budapest for six weeks, pounding it with
artillery fire and aerial bombardment, before entering the city.
By the time Soviet forces entered the heart of the city,
resistance had collapsed. The siege took weeks and cost countless
civilian lives, but Soviet losses were relatively light, compared
to other battles fought.
Other battles for cities ended poorly for the attacker: The
Germans failed to take either Leningrad or Stalingrad after
investing heavily in both battles. The point is that urban
warfare is one of the most difficult exercises in warfare, and
most armies avoid direct assaults on cities, since these are
risky operations and almost invariably carry high casualty rates.
This is particularly true in large cities. Moreover, in a war in
which civilian casualties represent a significant political
consideration, an assault on a city is generally to be avoided.
The United States did take one world-class city in its history:
Paris in 1944. It took the city with very light casualties to
either its forces or to the civilian population, despite the fact
that German troops had garrisoned the city. The key was
political, not military. The German high command had ordered that
troops resist and that they carry out a scorched-earth policy, in
which defeat would mean the catastrophic destruction of the city.
The local German commanders neither resisted nor carried out the
order. Rather, they capitulated. The United States was able to
occupy the city without assaulting it. Indeed, if an assault had
been necessary, Eisenhower would have insisted on bypassing
Paris. He was not about to engage in high-intensity conflict in a
city the size of Paris.
Paris was as much about politics as about warfare. The German
commanders in Paris command were disaffected with the German
political leadership. They were certain that the war was lost.
Neither the commanders nor the troops were eager to die for a
hopeless cause, and the commanders were aware that not only would
the Allies hold them accountable for the destruction of Paris,
but that a peaceful capitulation of Paris would put them in an
excellent position in a postwar world dominated by the United
States and its allies. The negotiations that occurred took place
not between the Allied high command and the German commanders,
but between resistance leaders in Paris and the garrison
commander. However, the key decision was made autonomously by the
local German command: Officers calculated their own interests and
decided not to resist. The negotiations were more about the
script of surrender than the surrender itself.
Gen. Tommy Franks is no more eager to go into Baghdad than
Eisenhower was to go into Paris in 1944. Like Eisenhower, he does
not want to put his forces into a potential urban meat-grinder.
Like Eisenhower, he is under heavy political pressure to solve
the problem without massive civilian casualties or the
destruction of the city. Like Eisenhower, he has no appealing
choices: Direct combat, starving the city to surrender, unlimited
bombardment or a combination of the three are all unacceptable
options.
For the United States, the ideal solution in Baghdad would be for
Iraqi troops to choose not to resist. Thus far, Iraqi forces have
demonstrated minimal competence. They have not been completely
incompetent, as some had forecast, nor have they been highly
competent. They have executed no effective counterattacks by
cutting supply lines or isolating U.S. forces. They have not once
taken the strategic or operational initiative away from the
coalition. What they have done is demonstrated that, under
certain circumstances, some units -- particularly in urban
settings -- will hold their positions and return fire. In urban
warfare, this minimal competence is sufficient to pose serious
challenges to taking and pacifying a city like Baghdad.
This is why the United States has been obsessed from the
beginning with reaching a political solution. For Washington,
avoiding resistance in Baghdad has always been a primary
consideration. The decapitation strike against Saddam Hussein on
the first night of the war was intended to trigger a political
evolution in which the Iraqis would choose not to fight anywhere,
but in particular would choose not to fight in Baghdad. The
attempt failed but was certainly worth making, given what is now
at stake.
The United States is facing the very real possibility that there
will be resistance in Baghdad. Given that the troops in Baghdad -
- the Special Republican Guard -- are reputed to be highly
motivated and that they are being joined by other army and
Republican Guard units, a direct assault on Baghdad would appear
to violate just about every requirement in the U.S. war goals:
1. It could result in heavy coalition casualties.
2. It could result in massive civilian casualties.
3. It could result in massive damage to Baghdad's infrastructure,
up to and including rendering the city uninhabitable for a period
of time.
None of these are acceptable outcomes, given what appear to be
the parameters that have been laid down for the war.
For the United States, therefore, the Paris solution remains the
most attractive option -- if it is available. The problem is that
Paris was hundreds of miles from Berlin, and the local commanders
were not collocated with the political leadership. Baghdad is
more like Berlin than Paris: The ability of regional commanders
to decide not to fight is limited by the power of the political
personalities that are located only a few miles away from them.
The simple geography of power makes the Paris option difficult to
execute, even if Iraqi commanders wanted to try it.
If there is any hope of the Paris strategy working, it is
essential that the direct commanders of Iraqi divisions and
brigades -- and their troops -- conclude that defeat is certain.
So long as they retain anywhere in their minds the idea that the
United States will, in the end, negotiate a cease-fire with the
existing regime, no Paris solution is conceivable. Every
commander will know that holding back would mean his own death.
The commanders must believe that their choice is between certain
defeat and death, and managed defeat and life.
It becomes even more difficult: It is essential that the
commanders reach this conclusion by themselves, without an
internal conspiracy or communications with the coalition.
Hussein's counterintelligence and security apparatus appears to
be functioning extremely well. Any commander will have to assume
that all conspiracies will be penetrated. In Paris, what little
negotiation that occurred went on with the local resistance. More
important, some Gestapo officials in Paris had reached the same
conclusion as the military commanders and also were trying to
find exit strategies. With the security apparatus in the hands of
Hussein's son, however, that is unlikely to happen in Baghdad.
The possibility that the Iraqi president is dead appears to be
irrelevant. If he is alive, he remains a dangerous figure to
those around him. If he is dead, his son has taken over and is in
effective control. Therefore, in order for capitulation without
resistance to occur, it is essential that the security apparatus
be dismantled. That is obviously being tried, with the air
assault focusing on this apparatus -- but as we have learned, the
Iraqi infrastructure is more robust and resilient than it was in
1991.
At this moment, there is no reason to believe that there will be
no resistance in Baghdad. Undoubtedly, CENCTOM and the CIA are
working intensely to cripple the security apparatus and to
provide military commanders enough room to maneuver so that they
might save themselves. But it is not clear that this will work --
and it is not clear that if it does work, the field commanders
would opt for a Paris solution.
One of the factors on the U.S. side is time. From a military
standpoint -- and really from a political standpoint as well now
-- the United States is not under heavy pressure to end the
conflict quickly. The coalition has time to bring up forces,
continue to attack Baghdad's infrastructure and to create the
sense of doom and inevitability that was the foundation of the
capitulation of Paris. Whatever the mood is in Baghdad now, it
will evolve.
However, the United States must be careful not to slip from a
Paris strategy to a Budapest strategy. Siege and bombardment
achieved a Soviet victory, but it was in an environment in which
the political consequences of massive civilian casualties and
massive infrastructure damage were not a consideration. If U.S.
commanders slide into a Budapest strategy, they will, at the very
least, have to accept a humanitarian disaster. A Budapest
strategy is a slippery slope that could even slide into the
ultimate unacceptable outcome: a Berlin strategy.
Now, it is possible that the Iraqis are so delicately balanced
that a sudden attack by airborne, airmobile and armored groups --
coupled with actions by covert forces already in Baghdad -- will
bring the regime and the military crashing down. However, unless
there is some unique intelligence in Washington pointing to
underlying weakness in Baghdad, a "Hail Mary" pass designed to
bring the war to a rapid conclusion is something for which
CENTCOM at least has no real appetite. It could result in the
airborne forces being chewed up along with now-revealed covert
forces, while armor is blocked. The risk would be worth it if
time were not on the coalition's side, but since it is, there is
no need.
Therefore, although coalition forces are certainly on the
doorstep of Baghdad, it is a pretty high step. At the very least,
the coalition will want to lay the groundwork for any offensive
into Baghdad. In fact, the last thing that the coalition wants is
such an offensive: One look at the British forces in Basra will
reveal coalition feelings about urban fighting, even in a much
smaller city.
The United States therefore has a difficult problem. In order to
create a sense of inevitable doom, it must convince elements in
Baghdad that the coalition is prepared to go to any lengths to
secure victory. At the very least, it must completely surround
and cut Baghdad off from the world. On the other hand, it cannot
impose a Budapest-type blockade and choke off the city. It is not
clear how the United States will balance between appearing to be
utterly ferocious without creating a humanitarian crisis. And
without that humanitarian crisis, it is not clear how it will
convince Iraqi field commanders that managed capitulation will
not be signing their own death warrants.
The United States badly wants Paris and not Berlin to be the
model in Baghdad's fall. The military might have a way to assault
and subdue Baghdad that does not pose the risk of bogging down in
urban warfare and does not require the political cooperation of
Iraqi commanders. Several ways are possible, but all assume that
the appetite within the Iraqi army for resistance is minimal --
and that is simply no longer an assumption on which an operation
can be based.
We therefore expect prudence and caution from the coalition
around Baghdad. The rush to Baghdad was well-executed and
involved well-calculated and carefully thought out risks. The war
to date has been an interesting combination of audacity and
prudence, with Franks picking the time for each. In Baghdad, the
same combination will be needed. Franks needs to know whether and
how intensely the Iraqis will resist and he, as a prudent
general, must begin by working from the worst-case scenario:
intense resistance.
U.S. forces will probe the edges of Baghdad, trying to get a
sense of Iraqi intentions and capabilities. If weakness is
discovered, U.S. forces will advance -- never irrevocably, never
taking the chance of being trapped inside a hostile urban
environment. If resistance appears too vigorous, Franks has time
to execute at least a modified Budapest maneuver, surrounding the
city and pressuring it. The crisis will come when the city is
balanced between humanitarian disaster and the option of massive
bombardment. The Russians chose bombardment of Budapest from the
beginning. Carrying out an assault on a major city -- constrained
by rules requiring that massive civilian casualties be avoided --
will be an enormous challenge to Franks.
From his point of view, Paris is a much better place to be than
Budapest.
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