e) the perception (fostered by 20 years of weak responses) that America was a paper tiger, seemingly strong but with a glass jaw, unable to take casualties, which led to f) the perception that AQ et. al. were strong and on the rise.
Doesn't the 20 years of weak responses justify the perception or make the perception correct? I don't refer to now, but during that 20 years, were we, in our choices, a paper tiger?
I'm amused by a couple of things about 'responses'. In the past tense, I regularly hear 'Black Hawk Down' and 'Mogadishu' mentioned by Righties as the cause of that perception. Yet the two biggest walkaways in the past 20 years were the abrupt pullout from the last Gulf War and the Marines pulling out of Lebanon.
In the future tense, it's largely a given that superpowers can get weaker nations intimidated by shows of strength. But a country that subsequently chafes at economic disadvantages that arises from the hands of the same superpower still has options:
- negotiate from a position of weakness
- kiss ass and deal with it
- build strength covertly to improve its negotiating power
And within those weaker ntions, or within the superpower, if it becomes evident to marginalized groups and individuals that they cannot compete with multimillion dollar lobbying efforts or campaign contributions, and they cannot compete militarily, the choices often boil down to:
- kiss ass and deal with it
- snipe, via acts of terrorism
Whether dealing with nations, groups or individuals, the show of force doesn't eliminate WMD development nor terrorism.
And especially with groups and individuals, if sufficiently marginalized with few prospects to overcome that, history suggests most will choose one of the two unhealthiest responses: despair to the point of unproductive passivity or terrorism to the point of suicide.
I see no evidence that shows of power have ever caused a decline in terrorism. If we achieve that, great. But there's cause for skepticism. |
