<<< . . . Before the troops moved out March 28, Diaz said, the soldiers had begun to ask themselves fresh questions.
"We were wondering why these guys would take on tanks with small arms and RPGs. We were also getting suicide bombers trying to get to the tanks. But they just didn't seem to realize how powerful these tanks are," he said. "By this time we were all pretty jittery. We were on edge all the time" . . .
. . . "Basically we were all saying the [intelligence] sucked," Diaz said. "They told us there would be parades. They told us whole units would capitulate. But we had people shooting at us when we were told there would be no opposition. People were ready then for this to be over because we had been in pretty heavy contact for nearly a week."
By the start of the war's second week, the soldiers began to believe none of the intelligence assessments would come true.
And the closer they drew to Baghdad, the more fanatical the resistance became.
"It was almost like a joke," Diaz said. "I didn't get it. You see a tank coming and you get away from there. But these guys would jump behind something, then come out firing with an AK-47."
After a series of combat patrols over a few days, including a sweep along Highway 8 south of Baghdad to prevent reinforcements from reaching the city, the task force was ordered to drive into central Baghdad in a "thunder run" show of force. The idea was to link up with other 3rd Division forces at Baghdad International Airport to show American troops could go where they wanted, when they wanted.
That day, April 5, turned into one of the worst of Diaz's life.
No sooner had the task force cleared the last American checkpoint on Highway 8 than the volume of enemy fire accelerated beyond a level anyone had dreamed. Iraqi soldiers and Fedayeen fired from bunkers, alleys and rooftops. They fired from behind trees and from every cranny . . . >>>
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