Taliban refine guerrilla tactics
27.04.2003 [12:27]
On April 20, United States Special Representative to Afghanistan and Washington's
man-Friday in the region, Zalmay Khalilzad, made clear that the US wanted good relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and that "the new Afghanistan's stability is in America's interest ... " Without naming Pakistan, Khalilzad warned Islamabad, saying "any effort that undermines that stability, that threatens it, is a challenge to America's interests".
Khalilzad's admonition follows growing allegations of the Pakistan army's direct involvement on behalf of Taliban remnants flexing their muscles in eastern and southern Afghanistan to unseat the US-backed Hamid Karzai regime in Kabul. With the approach of warmer weather, it is expected that the rebels will become more active, challenging the weak system over which Karzai presides.
Recent reports from the Taliban-infested areas in Afghanistan indicate that this has already begun. Clashes between the rebels and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), US Special Forces and Afghan government forces are happening daily. Bombs are exploding daily in and around Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Jalalabad and other eastern Afghan cities bordering Pakistan, and grenade and rocket attacks on US bases in eastern and southern Afghanistan are reported regularly.
Since the US-led campaign in Afghanistan began in November 2001, there were indications that the Taliban rebels and al-Qaeda were taking shelter within Pakistan along the difficult terrain of the border areas. US Special Forces carried out raids, along with Pakistani regulars, to smoke out the rebels. These operations met with limited success, and all available information suggests the rebels and terrorists are very much there now. With the advent of spring, these rebels are now making forays into the Afghan cities, causing disruption and spreading fear.
As of now, the forays have remained mostly unorganized, dominated by small bands of raiders carrying out violent acts. Syed Ishroq Husseini, head of the Department of Political and Religious Affairs at the Afghan Interior Ministry, said that he believes that "the Taliban is not an organized and powerful group with a strong leadership". But, says Husseini, they continue to "have connection with drug traffickers and international terror networks that now finance the group".
The Taliban's military strategy
Today the Taliban rebels are fragmented and without a chain of command. But when the Taliban came to prominence in 1995, it was also without a chain of command; in fact, the group never really developed into a battle-fit militia that could take on a disciplined military. It was Pakistani regulars, and the indoctrinated Taliban militia under the watchful eyes of former Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence officials Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul and Lieutenant-General Javed Nasir, that made the Taliban into a well-knit fighting group. The failure of the Taliban to put up an adequate resistance against the advancing US-led troops, heavily manned by the Northern Alliance militia, in the fall of 2001 underscores the point: without the Pakistani army support, the Taliban never was and never could be a force to reckon with.
Today's situation is somewhat different: the Taliban's relative political isolation forces it to fight as a guerrilla outfit. Remember, the Taliban is not only an enemy of the Americans and other foreigners protecting the Karzai government, but they are also at odds with the Iranians to the west and the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara ethnic groups that form the core of the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance is militarily and materially backed by the Russians and Indians. Because its old protectors cannot openly operate with them in Afghanistan, the Taliban cannot possibly take on such an overwhelming opposition and expect to survive in frontal warfare.
So today the Taliban fighters, in groups of 20 to 25, are ensconced along the borders within Pakistan and make forays into the border cities and roadways of Afghanistan to harass the well-trained foreign troops guarding these cities. The strategy is more or less similar to the one the Vietcong adopted in Vietnam during the three decades of war in Indochina: that is, to hit and vanish, to cause injury and damage, to make the guerrillas' unseen presence felt every day, and to capitalize on the despondency that sets in in the minds of the occupying forces. If allowed to continue, this Taliban strategy will prove highly effective for several reasons.
The first is the fact that the Karzai regime remains a puppet one whose existence is premised on meeting the demands of those who put it in power, and only coincidentally, if at all, meeting the requirements of the Afghan people. In eastern and southern Afghanistan, where the Kabul regime's presence is hardly felt at all, the B-52 bombers and the US Special Forces-ISAF have managed to maintain a modicum of law and order. The moment these forces get tired - and the Pakistani army believes that the Americans will get tired of occupying and reoccupying the same territory over and again - they will leave, and the Taliban will move in. What the Taliban would not like to see is stability restored in Afghanistan.
Political problems
The Taliban militia of yore in Afghanistan were mostly of Pashtun ethnic origin. While Karzai is himself a Pashtun, he is considered a puppet of the Americans. Moreover, the arrangement he got himself into as interim head of the Afghan government forced him to accept the domination of the Northern Alliance made up of Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara ethnic groups. As a result, the Karzai regime remains a "foreign" regime to the Taliban, and it is not difficult to organize the ethnic-majority Pashtuns against it.
In addition to the conditions of office that make the interim Afghan president an easy target for the Taliban guerrillas, Karzai has made two moves that identify him distinctly with the West and, in at least one case, against Muslims. Under Karzai's stewardship, Afghanistan has sought membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). This action, motivated by the Americans, is not terribly controversial domestically, but will do little to improve Afghanistan's weak financial health.
Of greater political consequence are the Karzai government's overtures toward Israel. According to press reports, Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah has informed Israeli Foreign Minister Sylvan Shalom that Afghanistan is interested in working together with all "peace-loving countries". It has also been reported that in informal talks in Kazakhstan last June, Karzai told then-Israeli housing minister Nathan Sharansky that he supported Israel's battle against "terror groups". Identifying Israel as a "peace-loving country" and the Palestinians as "terror groups" may cut the mustard elsewhere, but not in Muslim countries. Already a furor has been created in Pakistan and Afghanistan. For what it's worth, the Karzai government sought an escape hatch, stating subsequently that Afghanistan has no plans to recognize Israel.
What needs to be done
Early this week, Karzai visited Pakistan. The visit was dominated by a recent incident reported in the Pakistani media alleging that Afghan government guards accompanied by US Special Forces intruded deep into Pakistani territory, ostensibly to raid Taliban dens along the border areas and lure the tribals into Afghanistan.
The group retreated after being challenged by Pakistani forces, reports say. Pakistan is upset, officially, over the incident, offended by the affront to their sovereignty and trustworthiness by the Americans. Karzai, for his part, sought an assurance from Islamabad to stop harboring and arming the Taliban militia trying to destabilize his regime. This assurance was promptly given by the Pakistan government. Certainly, however, Karzai must realize that such an assurance is easy to give out, but that implementation of the policy is highly unlikely. In reality, Islamabad has been offered no real incentive by the contending forces in the region to give up control of the Taliban - possibly the Pakistanis' only remaining card in Afghanistan. And Islamabad has a perfect alibi in the claim that the tribal-dominated border areas are impossible to administer.
At the same time, the Karzai administration can weaken the Taliban over the long term, providing it has the stomach to do so. The administration will have to bite the bullet and aggressively pursue the development of Afghanistan's basic infrastructure - roads and water supply system for starters. The Taliban will sabotage some of these projects, but over the long run, Kabul could win this battle if it widens these developments to create employment and bring in trade from all around.
Secondly, Kabul should pursue a policy of bringing more land into cultivation to grow basic cereals, thereby weakening the drug mafia network. This means bringing water to agricultural land, protecting farmers from armed drug dealers and compensating farmers for at least a few years so that they can survive to usher in better days. In taking on the drug mafia, Karzai will not only be fighting the Taliban rebels but also some of his foreign friends who are protecting the drug warlords.
These are difficult tasks and the Karzai regime has shown no capability so far to address them. As a result, the guerrilla strategy of the headless and virtually powerless Taliban may - at least at this point in time - work. In coming days, the Taliban rebels can be expected to harass government troops and the Karzai regime more and more. At what point the despondency may set in among the foreign troops, and in Karzai himself, is anyone's guess. But, one can be sure that the Pakistan army will be watching with keen interest
Ramtanu Maitra
www1.iraqwar.ru |
