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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group

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To: FaultLine who started this subject4/30/2003 12:47:24 AM
From: Nadine Carroll  Read Replies (1) of 281500
 
As usual, Barry Rubin sums up the situation with Arafat in a nutshell: to keep himself in power, now Arafat has a job of sabotage to do. And boy, is he good at sabotage!

The man who never gives up, By Barry Rubin

Yasser Arafat is facing the most serious internal challenge of his 40-year-long career as a Palestinian leader. This time it is many of his closest colleagues who are revolting against him, and Arafat himself is physically isolated and his personal powers are waning.

But anyone who counts Arafat out has not studied his career. Arafat never gives up. He has powerful allies in harder-line forces who want to continue their losing war against Israel, as well as strong prestige, European support and several other assets. Moreover, his current political task is the one at which he excels: sabotage.

As has happened so many times before, the main cause of Arafat's problems is his own behavior. Palestinian Prime Minister-designate Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen as he is known, and the others are most reluctant rebels.

Make no mistake: The cause of the current attempt to render Arafat irrelevant was his rejection of both the Camp David proposals and the Carter plan in 2000, coupled with his launching of an initially popular but increasingly disastrous war on Israel.

Refusing to implement a cease-fire, despite numerous opportunities to do so, was a prime example of Arafat's well-established technique of political suicide bombing.

Arrayed against Arafat are the following forces:
Many of the best elements of the Fatah and Palestinian Authority leadership, including Abu Mazen often called the number-two man in the PLO whom Arafat was forced to accept as prime minister; Abu Ala, head of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and Muhammad Dahlan, a former Arafat prot g whom Abu Mazen wants to put in charge of the security forces.

The key point is their acceptance of the idea that the Palestinians can never achieve a state, an end to the Israeli presence, or even a stop to the current disastrous war as long as Arafat is their total leader.

The Egyptian government, which forced Arafat to make a deal with Abu Mazen on the PA cabinet. Omar Suleiman, the powerful head of Egyptian intelligence, acted as President Hosni Mubarak's envoy in twisting Arafat's arm.

While not saying so publicly, the Egyptians have become increasingly disgusted with Arafat's behavior. Their return to influence over him is also a result of the fall of his preferred patron, Saddam Hussein.

The US government, which has adopted a policy of weakening Arafat as the only way of not just resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, but of even diminishing it at all. Secretary of State Colin Powell, the closest thing Arafat has to a protector in the US government, told the Associated Press on April 24: "We do not believe that Mr. Arafat has shown the kind of leadership that is needed to take us through this crisis."

In a recent interview with NBC News, President George W. Bush made the most cogent statement ever of his attitude: "I looked at the history of Mr. Arafat. I saw what he did to President Clinton. There was no need to spend [political] capital unless you had an interlocutor who could deliver the Palestinian people toward peace. And I believe Abu Mazen is a man dedicated to peace, and I look forward to working with him for the two-state solution."

Israeli policy combined toughness toward the Palestinians (giving them an incentive to end the war and change their policy) and Arafat (isolating him) with a flexibility toward negotiations. Many foreign observers ridiculed Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's declared intention to make Arafat irrelevant, but it has worked to a remarkable extent.

By restricting Arafat's movements, Israel also made it harder for him to rally his forces. Now it is prepared to give significant benefits to an Abu Mazen regime which would hopefully strengthen its resolve and support among Palestinians.

Arafat does not enjoy strong support from any Arab state. Saddam is gone, the Egyptians are fed up, the Saudis prefer to fund Hamas, and the Syrians still hate the PLO leader. This does not mean, of course, that Arafat is defeated, or that peace is around the corner. There is, though, a greatly increased chance of obtaining a real cease-fire and serious negotiations.

The biggest difference is that Arafat no longer holds all the cards on the Palestinian side. But he still holds quite a few:

The cabinet negotiations were a good example of Arafat's long-successful style of wearing down adversaries, getting concessions from them and negotiating until the last possible moment to get far more than his power warrants.

Arafat did make real gains in watering down the cabinet and getting his own trusted people in. He has also succeeded in keeping a large element of control over the security agencies, the negotiations with Israel, and the money.
Again, though, it is vital to remember that Arafat no longer has the 100-percent control he has enjoyed up until now.

Arafat can still appeal in demagogic terms to the Palestinian public and to activists. He can hint the reformers are traitors, simultaneously stirring up public opinion against them and intimidating his adversaries.
Abu Mazen, who is flexible on some issues but a hard-liner on the demand for a "right of return," knows that any concession whatsoever will be used by Arafat against him.

Perhaps the most important point one analysts and journalists usually miss is that Arafat's base of support is not merely personal and populist but also institutionalized. Many officials, including the most corrupt ones and many in the security forces, know their careers rest on Arafat's patronage.
Even more significant are the militant forces in Fatah, like those still carrying on terrorism, who want to wreck any cease-fire and have been funded by Arafat all along. They need to keep Arafat in power.

Even Hamas and Islamic Jihad, not Arafat supporters as such, will support a pro-Arafat and anti-Abu Mazen line for their own interests.

Most astonishing of all is the European attitude of protecting Arafat. While Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair has played a positive role, several countries have demanded that Arafat's position be protected and that he be freed to travel as he wishes, even though this means he will be more effective in sabotaging Abu Mazen and any hopes of a cease-fire.
The Arab countries have abandoned Arafat, but many European governments seem ready to defend him to the end.

It's a complex political situation, though surely an improvement on the past; but how long the challenge to Arafat will last and how far it can go are still very open questions. Abu Mazen must first prove himself and the new system by creating a real cease-fire.

Even this first step could mean a confrontation with the radicals that he might not be willing or able to undertake. That has to be the first stop on any road map.
jpost.com
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