The problem with the suggestion that we punish the buyers of the weapons is that the truly dangerous ones are shadowy.
The only ones who would dare risk buying an untested nuclear weapon from N. Korea (and thereby risking their entire existence on that device) are those regimes which have nothing to lose economically or politically. And fortunately, there are few such regimes currently in place that I can see at this time.
Kim Jong Il can't sustain his economy on heroin smuggling when it's evident that various nations (other than the US) will raid their ships searching for such drugs (as the Australians did recently).
What I believe we need to remember is that in any totalitarian regime there are rivals to the primary leadership. But they are living in complete subjugation to the regime, and often only its whim. Kim might be clinically insane (there seems to be some dispute about this), but the odds are that most of his generals and those soldiers who constitute thier powerbase in NK society, are not insane.
Thus, the only way to "win" this battle of wills is to call Kim's bluff and refuse to negotiate unilaterally, or under threats of blackmail. Kim is playing his hand by emphasizing the threat from the United States. The US simply cannot permit him to limit these negotiations since the threat is implicit against the entire region.
But neither should we provide him any excuse for attacking S. Korea due to the presence of US troops on the border. The "tripwire" defence, IMO, no longer serves our strategic goals. The south has more than sufficient resources to defend itself from an invasion from the north. Thus, US troops (not strategic equipment stores) should be either pulled back towards Pusan, or depart completely. Such a move might provide Kim a sufficient "face saving" opportunity that he can claim "victory", and lead to his "honorably" dismantling his nuclear weapons.
But nothing will truly change. US forces can still rapidly deploy from stateside to reinforce the South. US aircraft can immediately commence operations (defensive and offensive), targeting leadership just as we did with Saddam.
But such a strategic withdrawal, without requiring a bargaining chip in return, would send the signal that the US will refuse to give the North any pretext to attack the south. In addition, it should send the signal that the US is confident that the South can defend itself and that we can readily aid them without the need for 37,000 troops remaining there.
And again, it's ALL important that future negotiations are aimed at including more nations in the region.
This could take some time (maybe a year or two) but Kim Jong Il must be made to realize that he's charting a very dangerous course.
Hawk |
