Russia and the Creation of 'Greater Europe' May 07, 2003 stratfor.biz Summary
Russia and Europe appear to be joining forces to counter the United States' increasing global presence through attempts to create a "Greater Europe," consisting of the European Union and Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia has changed the vector of the post-Soviet region's integration process from pro-Moscow to pro-Europe. And having Russia as its most important ally, Europe likely will encourage former Soviet states to unite and join the group in an attempt to create a new world power.
Analysis
In the wake of the U.S. victory in Iraq, Russia and Europe appear to be joining forces with the goal of creating a "Greater Europe" -- a union consisting of both the European Union and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). And Moscow's newfound willingness to sacrifice some of its control over former Soviet states will make this union possible, Stratfor's sources in the Russian government say.
Having abandoned dreams of Russia as a superpower, President Vladimir Putin and his associates appear to be pursuing a more realistic goal: for Moscow -- together with Berlin and Paris -- to become a leading voice within a united Europe, a potential superpower.
Among other things, Russia is offering to lead the CIS nations in Europe. And with Russia a major ally, Europe likely would encourage the integration of post-Soviet states so that it could emerge as a greater world power.
The major fear in Europe, though, is that if CIS states are not integrated with Russia's help, they quickly could fall under the U.S. sphere of influence -- something that already has happened to some new EU members and aspirants from Eastern Europe.
It is within this context that a recent statement by Putin must be viewed. After concluding a visit to Ukraine, Putin said May 4 that said he would devote a "significant portion" of the May 31 Russia-EU summit to the discussion of forming a common European marketplace to include both the EU and CIS. "Along with harmonizing our legislation with Europe's, we intend to work with our colleagues toward creating a common economic space together with Greater Europe," Putin said at the end of a five-day visit to Yalta, where he met with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.
Kuchma, head of the second-strongest CIS country, has supported Putin's desire to bring former Soviet states into the European fold, according to a source in the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. This -- as well as information Stratfor has gathered from sources within government circles in other CIS countries -- suggests that an aligment of European and former Soviet states now is more likely than ever to succeed, due to Moscow's willingness to relinquish some control.
By virtue of its size, military and political and economic power, Russia is the obvious choice to lead the integration process for CIS states. Government sources in the former Soviet Union say that Moscow previously insisted on dominating other CIS states -- and that the fear of returning to Moscow's control had deterred several of them, including Ukraine, from joining forces with Russia. But with Moscow's new push for a Greater Europe -- rather than attempts to unite CIS republics around a Russian core -- that fear is subsiding. Knowing the poor condition of their states' economies and aware of their relatively small geopolitical weight, many CIS officials realize that with Russia they have a better chance of becomiong part of Greater Europe. Therefore, Putin has changed the vector of the former Soviet region's integration process from pro-Moscow to pro-Europe.
What caused this strategic shift in Moscow? Putin probably realized that making Russia a superpower again would not be feasible -- hence, an alliance with other powers was in order. Second, Russia needed allies to help restore its prominence, especially since Putin believes that Washington's drive for global hegemony requires a weak, rather than strong, Russia.
Rather than choosing between Europe and great Asian powers China and India, Putin has opted to collaborate with both -- but more weight is being given to Europe. Putin's circle and many in the Russian elite say Russia identifies more with Europe than Asia, both culturally and geopolitically.
Most importantly, though, Putin's change of heart comes on the heels of the U.S. war in Iraq.
The war demonstrated two things for Moscow. First, no matter how much Russia cooperates with the United States, Washington will not go out of its way to accommodate Moscow's interests; it is willing -- and able -- to act unilaterally. Second, Washington can reach its goals at the expense of Moscow and other world players much more easily than its opponents previously feared. This realization has prompted Russia to act now rather than later, amid growing U.S. power. And one of the tools Russia can use to counter a growing U.S. presence in Eurasia would be to integrate the post-Soviet states with Moscow and then lead them to Greater Europe.
There have been four major attempts in the past to integrate parts of the former Soviet Union into a single bloc. The only one that combines all 12 former Soviet republics -- except the Baltic states -- has been the CIS, an inter-state formation that has neither real power nor the ability to promote unity among these nations.
Thus, Moscow recently has turned its attention to other -- and heretofore ineffective -- organizations. During a series of meetings in late April, the heads of CIS states finally agreed to beef up and give some practical meaning to two groups: the Collective Security Treaty Organization (ODKB) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc).
The ODKB consists of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia. On April 28, the group created a joint military command for a rapid reaction force to manage security threats in Central Asia; it also now has a joint staff to coordinate the actions and training of all six member states' armed forces, as well as some elements of the joint air defense command.
The EurAsEc is comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia as observers. Its goal is to foster economic cooperation within the CIS.
However, none of these organizations has included Ukraine -- the most important CIS nation after Russia -- as a full member. Ukraine has resisted past integration efforts because of its fear of coming under Moscow's thumb -- and without Ukraine, the groups are doomed to be ineffective.
The idea of more equal cooperation and full political independence of participants appeals to Kuchma and, to a large part, the Ukrainian elite. Kuchma himself recently proposed the creation of a new organization called Common Eurasian Space, which would include the four CIS nations that really matter in a geopolitical and economic sense: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. While in Yalta, Putin and Kuchma agreed that a common market linking the four should be established by September 2003. Now Russia's main hope for a successful integration of post-Soviet nations -- and a follow-on integration with Europe -- is linked to this project. Putin will promote it energetically during the coming EU-Russian summit, sources in his administration say.
Meanwhile, the stance of major European states -- Germany, France and others aligned against the U.S. camp -- toward a post-Soviet integration seems to be changing, too. Again, this is likely due to perceived political and economic threats stemming from the U.S. victory in Iraq.
Although the EU prefers to negotiate its relations with each non-EU state individually, there is a widespread fear that without Russia's unified and pro-Europe role, smaller CIS nations quickly will join the U.S. camp and serve as the U.S. fifth column -- as new EU members are currently doing, French diplomatic sources say.
Thus, Europe wants to encourage CIS nations to integrate with Moscow and eventually join Greater Europe. With Europe's prodding, some CIS countries, including Ukraine, likely will draw closer to Moscow.
Europe still has some differences with Russia regarding the integration process, but Belgian and French diplomats say these differences are not insurmountable. In fact, Europeans are pleased that Moscow has called off its earlier objection to Brussels' habit of treating CIS countries individually rather than as a bloc. Meanwhile, European leaders have promised the Russians through diplomatic channels that efforts to integrate the post-Soviet nations into Europe now will take a two-pronged approach: through individual contacts and through negotiations between the EU and organizations representing CIS nations such as Common Eurasian Space, Stratfor's German government sources say.
The war in Iraq doubtless has generated a sense of urgency for Europe and Moscow to iron out their differences on these and other issues. In fact, there is a growing perception that the unification of Europe in all forms -- economic, political and military -- should come about much faster, since increased U.S. power would allow Washington to interfere with Europe's integration more boldly than before.
Still, by virtue of its complexity -- and the number of participants involved -- efforts to form a Greater Europe likely will be a torturous and slow process. We expect that the EU and Moscow will cooperate more easily on political and security issues than economic aspects of the process.
The prospects for both the integration of post-Soviet states and the creation of Greater Europe currently are distant and unclear. U.S. policy will serve as a major deterrent, since it is not in Washington's interest for integration proceed -- and succeed.
As a result of U.S. pressure, some CIS states might well choose to side with Washington rather than with Europe and Moscow, with pro-U.S. groups in those countries' elites becoming increasingly vocal. On the other hand, the proximity of Moscow and Europe to those states, their own economic dependence on Russia and the existence of numerous pro-European and pro-Russian populations in those countries will act as a counterweight. Hence, the integration process in the former Soviet Union and the EU likely will experience ups and downs for years to come. |