Encouraging Proliferation
By Jose Goldemberg
Wednesday, May 28, 2003
In a way it is a miracle that the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was ever adopted, because it divided the world into two categories of states: nuclear-weapon "haves" and "have nots." This was done over the objections of nationalists in many developing countries, who argued that their countries were submitting to a "new colonialism." It helped somewhat that joining the treaty allowed for nuclear material for reactors to produce electrical power and for medical and industrial uses -- and also for some dual-use technologies that could in fact be used to produce nuclear materials for weapons if a country changed its mind. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the logic that led some countries to join and others to refuse.
Most countries that joined the treaty as non-weapons states in the late 1960s had neither the interest nor the wherewithal to acquire nuclear capabilities of any type. For three other categories of countries, however, the decision was a serious one:
• Large industrial nations, such as Germany and Japan, could have easily built nuclear weapons but decided that it was in their security interests to remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
• Other countries, such as Pakistan, North Korea and Israel -- as well as South Africa during its apartheid period -- decided to acquire nuclear weapons because they were not closely allied with the United States or the Soviet Union and faced serious threats to their survival.
• Finally, countries such as India, Brazil and Argentina were influenced in their decisions as much by considerations of prestige as by perceived threats to their security.
Efforts by the United States to prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons failed, but they succeeded with South Africa, which dismantled its nuclear weapons program after building a small arsenal. After civilian government was restored in Brazil and Argentina, they also abandoned their nuclear weapons programs and established a mechanism of mutual inspections that was later coordinated with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.
These successes were due to mature decisions by governments that realized that their national interests were best served by not pursuing nuclear weapons. Sweden made the same decision in the 1960s.
In 1990, when Brazil and Argentina made their decision, most people believed that nuclear states would use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack. This belief was supported by the fact that the United States had not used nuclear weapons in Vietnam, nor had the Soviet Union used them in Afghanistan. So possessing nuclear weapons was seen as more of a danger than a protection, because it could put a country on another nuclear country's target list. No one expected countries outside Latin America to target Brazil and Argentina, but the two countries were considered likely to end up targeting each other. A bilateral agreement of mutual inspections therefore seemed much safer than a balance of nuclear terror. Furthermore, acquiring nuclear weapons would have required diversion of scarce resources at a time when both countries faced enormous social problems.
Unfortunately, the United States seems unwilling to encourage the same logic in North Korea by offering nonaggression commitments and suspending sanctions in return for North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program.
Moreover, when the United States announced it reserved the right to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear Iraq, leaders in the newly democratized nations of Latin America and other continents were faced with a more difficult political situation. Remnants of the old nationalistic and military groups are reviving their advocacy of national nuclear weapons programs.
The United States must abandon nuclear threats. It must also join with the four other nuclear states that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- Russia, Britain, France and China -- in renewed efforts "to pursue negotiations in good faith" on nuclear disarmament. This would strengthen the hands of sensible national leaders, such as those of Argentina and Brazil, who know that acquisition of nuclear weapons is not in their countries' interests. Unfortunately, current U.S. policies are instead reinforcing those who would attach the "neo-colonialist" label to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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The writer was minister of science and technology of Brazil at the time the agreement with Argentina was reached to phase out the two countries' nuclear weapons programs. He is currently secretary for the environment of the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil.
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