A lot of time the State Department response is to pretend that both sides have performed equally, no matter the actuality, and to judge equally between them, thus preserving "evenhandedness". I don't regard this approach as productive. It tends to reward behaviors that were better not rewarded.
It's not productive usually, but saves the face and sometimes the careers of those who advanced the program.
Fact of the (eg) Oslo arrangement is that both sides didn't abide by it but that one side abided in it even less than the other.
Arrangements between adversaries that are imposed, or at least initiated, by powerful outsiders won't work unless the outsiders have the power to significantly both penalize and reward the parties.
If this isn't built into the arrangement in a formal manner so there is little ad hoc-ery on the part of the outsider, then favouritism charges will be made. Also, as you mention, the bureaucrats will get the chance to pretend there is equal performance.
In the case of the newest arrangement the US and others are attempting to impose on the Israeli-Palestinians, there are strong players outside the arrangment both speaking and acting against it. It doesn't appear the Palestinian PM can deliver in the face of this opposition.
It seems if he is to deliver, he first has to fight and defeat the opposition -Hamas, etc- and so far, this looks like he'll have to win a civil war and stay alive doing it.
I'm not saying that's impossible for him but it looks very difficult right now, even though the majority of Palestinians outside Gaza (and maybe even a majority inside) probably would like to see the arrangement be successful.
The existential nature of the Israeli-Palestinian disagreemnent has to be dealt with before any reasonable arrangement either imposed or mutual has any chance of success however it's designed.
A Martian observer would say, "The Israelis and Palestinians need each other because they are surrounded by people who don't have their best interests at heart: People who are quite willing to fight to the last Israeli and Palestinian to perpetuate the disagreement. They also need each other for economic and security reasons. In these circumstances, how do you get the Israelis and Palestinians together and cut out the outsiders?"
Can this road map do this even if the participants follow it? What in it pulls the Israelis and Palestinians together and what in it cuts out the outsiders? What in it pushes the I-Ps apart and brings in the (negative) outsiders? What is not in the road map but which has the effects mentioned above.
Given how far the bitterness of the dispute has developed, I don't think any arrangement which is not very detailed and has specific rewards and penalties, (and with means for delivering them), for both parties and the outsiders at every step, can be successful.
My own opinion, which is probably not worth spit, is that no arrangement will show signs of success until the Palestinian negotiators have behind them the authority of a new election, cleanly campaigned and voted. That can't happen, I expect, until parties are not also para-military organizations - too many candidates or prospective candidates would be murdered or not run because of the threat of assassination.
So, who goes in and gets the guns, etc? That's the first question that needs be answered, along with what are their rules of engagement? Traditional UN peace keepers, targets for whomever, are not what I have in mind. Relatedly, the armed Israelis in proximity to the Palestinian population would also be an issue which must be dealt with at the same time.
I think a "road map" which simply leads to a clean Palestinian election would be a remarkable achievement. Such an election could also have a couple of straight forward referenda attached. |
