Second Intelligence Report: "No Reliable Information" Iraqis Stockpiling Chemical
Weapons
By David E. Kaplan and Mark Mazzetti
U.S. News & World Report
Friday 13 June 2003
In October 2002, a classified National Intelligence Estimate prepared jointly by U.S.
intelligence agencies concluded that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons. But one
month later, the Defense Intelligence Agency issued a report stating that there was "no reliable
information" showing that Iraq was actually producing or stockpiling chemical weapons, U.S.
News has learned.
The DIA's classified November assessment mirrors a Sptember analysis that the agency made
on the same subject. That report was first disclosed by the magazine early this month, fueling a
controversy about whether President Bush and top aides overstated the threat posed by Iraq in
making the case for war. Administration officials deny manipulating intelligence on Iraq's
weapons programs and say they are confident that the Defense Department eventually will find
weapons of mass terror.
The newly-disclosed DIA report, classified "secret,'' is entitled, "Iraq's Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Weapon and Missile Program: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities.'' Its
existence raises more questions about the quality of U.S. intelligence before the March
invasion. In one section about Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities, the report says: "No reliable
information indicates whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where the
country has or will establish its chemical agent production facility." The report cites suspicious
weapons transfers and improvements on Iraq's "dual-use" chemical infrastructure. Nonetheless,
says a DIA spokesman, "there was no single piece of irrefutable data that said [Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein] definitely has it."
In recent days, President Bush has tempered his rhetoric about Iraq's terror weapons
capabilities. "I am absolutely convinced, with time, we'll find out that they did have a weapons
program," he told reporters this week. This departs from language used by his senior advisors
before the war. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld perhaps was the most expansive:
"There's no debate in the world as to whether they have those weapons. There's no debate in the
world as to whether they're continuing to develop and acquire them. There's no debate in the
world as to whether or not he's used them. There's no debate in the world as to whether or not
he's consistently threatening his neighbors with them. We all know that. A trained ape knows
that."
Yet, the DIA reports indicate that Rumsfeld's own analysts were more cautious in their
conclusions about the threat posed by Iraq. "The DIA can be more conservative in their
assessments, because they have a greater detachment from the policy makers than CIA does,"
says Patrick Lang, who worked as a top Iraq analyst for both agencies. The administration's
handling of its intelligence dossier on Iraq, before the war, is under scruntiny by congressional
committees. Those inquries could lead to public hearings.
CC |
