I think what Pollack would have had in mind was something a bit different than going up to the brink and then pausing. something like the following would have been consistent with his analysis:
--start a significant diplomatic campaign in 02 to revive containment.
--if that campaign works, keep tightening the ratchet until Saddam kicks over the traces, then go after him--like Desert Fox, only this time you don't stop.
--if the attempt to revive containment doesn't work, during 03 set out very cleary what your problems with Saddam are and what he has to do to overcome them. Set the goal posts pretty far out there, but make them behavioral. That is, make it clear to the world that there are ways that he could satisfy you, but make those ways so painful to him that you are 99% certain he won't do it.
--if he doesn't meet the goals by the date specified, start moving your troops out to the region at that point. Then just keep going, and strike when ready--say, spring 04 rather than spring 03.
--throughout, rely on real and defensible arguments, not cooked up ones. also, don't hype the rhetoric and make it look like you want war--just be deadly calm and serious. and seek cooperation from others, being willing to give in on some small things as necessary (whether Iraq-related or in other areas) to help build the coalition.
none of this guarantees the operation would be cheered by all and sundry, but it certainly would have been far less bitterly opposed, and with very little cost or risk to the US other than diplomatic effort...
tb@yup.com |
