Asia observers failing to see clearly
By David Isenberg
If the study of international relations can be compared to an eye exam, then perhaps Asia specialists in the West need LASIK (laser-assisted in-situ keratomileusis) surgery. That is a conclusion one draws from an article in the new issue of the journal International Security, published by MIT Press.
At a time when most events in the international-affairs realm seem to be one appalling disaster or future conflict after another, this is actually good news. Because the article "Getting Asia wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks" by David Kang, an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, believes that the current framework for analyzing international relations - "one that is derived primarily from the European experience to project onto and explain Asia" - is at best problematic and, in fact, have yield several mistaken conclusions and predictions about conflict and alignment for Asia.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom proffered by many analysts who see dire scenarios for Asia, Kang argues that the pessimistic predictions of Western scholars after the end of the Cold War that Asia would experience a period of increasing arms racing and power politics has largely failed to materialize, a reality that scholars must confront if they are to develop a better understanding of Asia relations. The specific predictions that have failed to materialize, more than a dozen years after the end of the Cold War, include increased Chinese adventurism spurred by China's rising power, conflict or war over the status of Taiwan, terrorist or missile attacks from a rogue North Korea against South Korea, Japanese rearmament, and arms racing or conflict in Southeast Asia, prompted in part by unresolved territorial disputes. In fact, there has not been a major war since the 1978-79 Vietnam-Cambodia-China conflict.
And, contrary to those who operate on the Kissingerian mode of the primacy of power politics and realism, Asian states do not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China. In fact, despite fears about a revisionist and destabilizing China, Kang finds that concern over a strong China may be misplaced. He writes, "Historically, it has been Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved." This is because, as Kang sees it:
East Asia international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations while allowing considerable informal equality. With China as the dominant state and surrounding countries as peripheral or secondary states, as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need for interstate war. This contrasts sharply with the Western tradition of international relations which has consisted on formal equality between nation-states, informal hierarchy, and near-constant interstate conflict.
If that is true, then right-wing fears about the implications of rapid economic growth in China and corresponding growth in military capabilities are meaningless.
Kang also finds little evidence to support the view that China has revisionist or imperial aims. In fact he finds evidence that China is making a genuine effort to join the world community. This is best reflected by China's considerable efforts to join the World Trade Organization and its active participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
Also, in the past 20 years China has resolved territorial disputes with Afghanistan, Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan and Russia. More recently, it has resolved its disputes with Cambodia and Vietnam, renounced support of the Khmer Rouge, embraced the Paris Peace Accords of 1991 that brought elections to Cambodia and normalized relations and defined its border with Vietnam.
On maritime issues, all Asian countries except Cambodia, North Korea and Thailand have signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides an institutional forum for states to resolve deputes over fishing rights, trade routes, and other matters.
While China has some unresolved territorial disputes with Taiwan and ASEAN over the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands, and with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, it is hardly the only Asian country to have them. Japan and Russia, for example, have yet to resolve their dispute over the Northern Territories, nor have Japan and South Korea resolved their dispute over Totko Island.
Perhaps the most encouraging news about China is that other Asian states feel little need to join in a balancing coalition against it. Even after accounting for the dominance of US power in the region, Kang finds that balancing is not occurring in Asia as realist theories would predict. For example, contrary to long-standing predictions, Japan has not rearmed. That is most likely due to the fact that its survival and economic health are best provided by a stable order. Since Japan does not see China threatening it militarily, Japan has not chosen, despite its ability to build aircraft carriers or nuclear weapons, to rearm extensively.
Kang's conclusion is that there is likely to be far more stability in Asia, and more bandwagoning with China than balancing against it, than most theorists expect. He also finds that there is evidence that China is likely to act within bounds acceptable to the other Asian nations. If so, then US attempts to form a coalition against China as many conservatives have advocated would be counterproductive. As countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia "increasingly orient their economic and political focus toward China, Asian nations, if forced to choose between the United States and China, may not make the choice that many Westerners assume they will. Historically, it has been strong Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved."
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