Afghanistan's Future, Lost in the Shuffle
"Why are the Americans helping President Hamid Karzai
and helping his enemies, the warlords, too?"
By SARAH CHAYES
The New York Times
July 1, 2003
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan
Ten miles outside this dust-blown city, the historical capital of Afghanistan,
gunmen belonging to the local warlord guard the airport, which
American forces use as a base. The hefty fee the guards
get from the United States has allowed them to build
a marble-faced barracks nearby.
Kandaharis, baffled, keep asking me,
"Why are the Americans helping President Hamid Karzai
and helping his enemies, the warlords, too?" To
them the problem with this practice is clear: United States
policy is in danger of failing because America won't stop hedging its bets. At stake is not
just the future of Afghanistan, but a whole region's hopes
of escaping a 30-year nightmare. And ultimately, what happens in Afghanistan will shape
relations between the Muslim world and the West.
The hedging of bets has taken many forms since the fall
of the Taliban a year and a half ago: a dizzying succession of officers at the United State
Embassy for the first six months; the lack of any reconstruction
projects outside Kabul until after the grand council chose Mr. Karzai as
transitional president; and later, international donors' obsession
with quick-impact projects, known as quips, that didn't cost much and wouldn't be
much of a loss if they failed.
Afghans, meanwhile, have been waiting for major reconstruction
that would make a real difference. The Kabul-Kandahar road, on which work has
only just begun, has become a cause célèbre. What was
once a six-hour trip to the capital to deliver, say, Kandahar grapes, and the exquisitely
fragrant raisins they dry into, is now a three-day trek - and 72 hours on
the road means grape mash. A good road to Kabul would make all the
difference to Kandahar's merchants, and jumpstart a whole region's economy.
And what about other projects that would substantially improve Afghan lives?
There's the road to Urozgan, an isolated town that is easy prey to
Islamic extremists and is at minimum a nine-hour drive from Kandahar
along a ribbon of iron-hard dirt. The Helmand Province irrigation system,
built by American engineers in the late 1950's, now lies crippled
after years of neglect and Soviet sabotage. Donors, however, are loath to commit
their money to big projects like these.
But the most dangerous form of bet-hedging has been American
support for local strongmen. Eager for Afghan forces to help fight the Taliban, the
United States brought these warlords back from exile after 9/11.
What began as a relationship of convenience was cemented in a brotherhood of
arms, as United States troops fraternized with the exotic fighters
they had bivouacked with. Because they had reaped weapons and cash in the
bargain, the warlords were able to impose themselves as provincial governors,
despite being reviled by the Afghan people, as every conversation
I've had and study I've done demonstrates.
Their positions have been reinforced by international donors who,
for convenience's sake, distribute much of their reconstruction assistance
through the warlords. The donors' reasoning sounds plausible:
"So-and-so is the governor," numerous United States officials have told me. "The day
President Karzai removes him, we will support that decision.
But until then, we have to work with him." It's a bit disingenuous, since this
explanation ignores the way these men became governors.
It also begs the truth. In late May, President Karzai summoned
to Kabul the 12 governors who control Afghanistan's strategic borders.
For the previous fortnight, Afghan and international officials say,
he had been preparing to dismiss the most egregious offenders: four or five governors who
are running their provinces like personal fiefs, who withhold vast
customs revenue from the central government, who truck with meddlesome
foreign governments, who oppress their people, who turn a blind eye
to extremist activities while trumpeting their anti-Taliban bona fides. United
States officials, saying they were taken aback by the scope
of the Afghan government's plan, discouraged him. The plan was scrapped, and the
Afghan government made do with an agreement in which the recalcitrant
governors promised to hand over customs revenue owed the central
government.
Washington, in other words, wouldn't stop hedging its bets.
The United States backs Mr. Karzai, but it can't relinquish
its alliances with the
enemies of all he stands for.
But President Karzai bears part of the blame. He, too,
has been hedging his bets. His endlessly polite interactions with his predator governors are
confusing his constituents. Although Washington thought firing half
a dozen governors was too much, it would have supported the dismissal of one
or two, and Mr. Karzai wasted a golden opportunity by refusing to do that.
The problem is, no matter what they say, these warlords aren't going to behave.
They are not reformable, because it is not in their interest to
reform. The warlords' livelihood depends on extremism and lawlessness.
That's how they draw their pay; that's what allows them to rule by the gun
in an unofficial martial law, looting villages under the pretext of mopping-up operations,
extracting taxes and bribes, crushing opponents.
The American alliance with warlords also discourages ordinary Afghans
from helping rebuild their country. And without the people, the process is
doomed.
Afghans I have met and worked with share a fierce desire to live
in a normal country. They have demonstrated that desire. In the face of
tremendous adversity, they have managed to open schools,
clean irrigation ditches, plant trees and dig sewers. But seeing warlords regain power is
making people waver. I have found in my work that more and
more Afghans are withdrawing to the sidelines, subtracting their life force from the
battle to reconstruct Afghanistan.
They are also increasingly wary about the elections next year.
At a recent meeting here with representatives from the commission that's drafting a
new constitution, a nursing student asked, "How can we freely
elect our representatives with warlords controlling the countryside?"
Despite American officials' misgivings, it would not be so difficult
to remove the warlord-governors. Their lack of popular support means no one
would fly to their defense were they dismissed. The mere display
of American backing for a plan to oust them would be enough to cow their paid
liegemen. In the interest of offering Afghanistan a chance at a future,
and opening the door to a new kind of relationship with the Muslim world,
the United States should back any future decision to remove the warlord-governors.
For despite the rocky start to reconstructing postwar Afghanistan,
an ember of hope for the country's future is still burning. Several high-caliber
diplomats are now at the American embassy. American military commanders,
who by training focus on battle plans, have begun to realize that their
activities can have unintended political consequences if they
do not have intimate knowledge of the people they are dealing with. These officers
have grown more alert to the ways in which local warlords may be using them.
In Kandahar, the base commander has begun meeting with tribal
elders to forge links with the population. In other words, the United States
is finally positioned to do a good job here.
When President Bush decided to invade Iraq, he promised that Afghanistan
would not be forgotten. If that promise is to mean anything, America's
accumulated experience in Afghanistan must be acted upon, unequivocally.
It's time to stop hedging bets.
Sarah Chayes, a former NPR reporter, is field director of Afghans for Civil Society,
an organization that sponsors democracy initiatives.
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