I think that we had to have strong, but not necessarily conclusive, evidence to go to war. However, I think that we would have been morally justified merely on the basis of the hideousness of the regime, so it is a question how strong the evidence had to be.
I myself do not feel we yet have grounds to conclude that the intelligence was so weak, first of all. I can imagine scenarios where Saddam gets rid of stockpiles and hides delivery systems, almost up to the brink of war, so that the original intelligence was sound enough.
The other matter is suggesting that the very faultiness of intelligence is a reason for pre- emption. I think that may be true in cases where the apparent threat is large, and you cannot get the intelligence to reassure yourself of a tolerable threat level. In other words, there should still be plenty of reason to be concerned on the basis of best available information. On the other hand, realizing limitations in verification, one cannot afford to wait and see if it is, for example, a question of a nuclear device. Policemen, in the line of duty, are not asked to verify if the perp has a gun and the intention to use it, they merely have to have a reasonable belief that they are about to be shot. Thus, if the perp has been ordered to keep his hands up, and suddenly reaches for something in his pocket, it is a "clean shoot" if the police officer wings him, because the gesture is inherently threatening under the circumstances.
In the case of Saddam Hussein, the problem was that inspections could never have been conclusive, unless the regime showed a willingness to capitualate to demands. Even if we were sure of the elimination of all stockpiles, it would have taken little to have started everything up again. That was the point of the recent unearthing of documents and instruments related to a nuclear program, in the backyard of one of the Iraqi scientists. Hussein was just biding time, and if he thought he finally had to dump some stockpiles, it was no great matter, he could be up and running in a short time.
The danger was that the inspections would wrap up, everyone would lose interest, and there would be pressure to step down our presence in the region. Given his propensities, ideological and personal, and his obvious determination to get WMDs, particularly nukes, we could not afford to let him get away with cosmetic change, he had to go....... |
