I take it that valuation is a universal human trait, and that, at a certain level of civilization, there is an attempt to subject valuation to rational scrutiny.
In trying to refine and render morality more coherent, it seems to me that we abstract from moral experience. On one level, we remain tethered to moral empiricism, insofar as it aids us in contemplating actual cases. On another level, our abstraction provides principles underlying our moral judgments, more or less accurately, and allows us some latitude in moral deduction, to contemplate ideal cases, stripped of messy particulars. Now, the ability to abstract and engage in moral deduction presupposes certain axioms without which it is impossible to proceed, underlying principles that are self- evident, because essential to the sort of reasoning engaged in. For example, in ordinary logic, the principle of non- contradiction is axiomatic. In mathematical reasoning, it is axiomatic that two things being equal to a third are equal to one another. In moral reasoning, it is axiomatic that the rules apply to all persons who are similarly situated, without favoritism, in order to be just. Ipso facto, no morality claiming to be a matter of personal values can be legitimate, since there is nothing to distinguish it from whim, or to clarify one's obligations.
How does this comport with my emphasis on the moral empiricist argument that our starting point is what we learn from our parents and other authority figures? Because that is the raw data, and it takes centuries to progress adequately to a sort of science of morals. |
