What a great article. Don't agree with all of the "opinion" expressed, but much of the info on the "planning" for the occupation was new for me - and very welcome. I certainly have much more sympathy for Garner now.
"The so-called forces of law and order [in Baghdad] just kind of collapsed," Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz said in an interview. "There's not a single plan that would have dealt with that."
is belied by the fact that precisely that was done … by others. Since, such plans were inconsistent with their (neo-con) “Plan”, they were subverted. Even though given warning by:
As fall turned to winter and U.S. troops began arriving in the Persian Gulf by the tens of thousands, a veritable library of warnings and proposed remedies was piling up within the administration, focusing on the very items that would ultimately paralyze much of the postwar effort: a lack of security, electricity, water and other basic needs.
The warnings were not heeded. Instead
Central Command officials confirmed that their postwar planning group — dubbed Task Force Four, for the fourth phase of the war plan — took a back seat to the combat planners. What postwar planning did occur at the Central Command and the Pentagon was on disasters that never occurred: oil fires, masses of refugees, chemical and biological warfare, lethal epidemics, starvation.
The Pentagon planners also made two key assumptions that proved faulty. One was that American and British authorities would inherit a fully functioning modern state, with government ministries, police forces and public utilities in working order — a "plug and play" occupation. The second was that the resistance would end quickly.
Why? Well, because after the amazing exclusion of people that had spent considerable effort on post war plans, the Petagon/neo-cons, despite protestations to the contrary, “accepted” the ideas of Iraqi exiles, and
based most of their assessments on information provided by exiled Iraqi opposition leader Ahmad Chalabi, who predicted that the regime would suddenly collapse by "decapitation," leaving the government's institutions in place, and who expected that postwar Iraq would be a country of U.S.-flag-waving citizens.
which dovetailed nicely with the neo-con plan. I was particularly gratified by
Intelligence officials, he added, were "utterly consistent in arguing that reconstruction rather than war would be the most problematic segment of overthrowing Saddam's regime. Specifically, the [intelligence community] warned prior to the conflict that Iraqis would probably resort to obstruction, resistance and armed opposition if they perceived attempts to keep them dependent on the United States and the West."
since I had a similar view. I was sure that if I could see holes in the neo-con plan, so could others.
All ignored. With people telling them ” This is a catastrophe waiting to happen", the neo-cons would not be swerved from their chance “to get Saddam”. Instead, we got the catastrophe. Baghdad, but no viable plan to keep it. No flowers, and no infrastructure.
And a troop strength insufficient to either preclude the initial chaos, or subsequently deal with the results of that chaos. Instead, just enough troops, to provide a “target rich environment”.
I expect some change on this soon, even though it will have a “political cost”, I expect the Pentagon will have no choice, but to increase the number of troops. Unfortunately, this (IMO) will have little effect, other than increase the number of American targets. I don’t expect many troops from other countries to be joining us in this Tar Baby. They may not read Uncle Remus in eastern Europe and India, but “they don’t need a weatherman to see…”
Even though dismissed at the Pentagon, I consider this a damning assessment.
It's not true there wasn't adequate planning. There was a volume of planning. More than the Clinton administration did for any of its interventions," said Rand's Dobbins.
"They planned on an unrealistic set of assumptions," he said. "Clearly, in retrospect, they should have anticipated that when the old regime collapsed, there would be a period of disorder, a vacuum of power They should have anticipated extremist elements would seek to fill this vacuum of power. All of these in one form or another have been replicated in previous such experiences, and it was reasonable to plan for them."
Given the current view at the Pentagon,
"We're going to get better over time," promised Lawrence Di Rita, a special assistant to Rumsfeld. "We've always thought of post-hostilities as a phase" distinct from combat, he said. "The future of war is that these things are going to be much more of a continuum.
"This is the future for the world we're in at the moment," he said. "We'll get better as we do it more often."
I’d say we’re still a long way from a good set of lessons learned.
JMO
lurqer |
