we see no alternative but for China to use its substantial economic leverage, derived from North Korea's dependence on it for fuel and food, to press, hard and immediately, for a change in regime.
China has some leverage over North Korea, though not as much as is sometimes supposed. I do not believe that China has the power to force regime change in N. Korea. Kim Jong Il is not going to step down because the Chinese tell him to go. That’s unfortunate, but true. No point in deluding ourselves on that issue.
The U.S. and South Korea must instead come together and begin to assess realistically what it would take to conduct a successful military operation to change the North Korean regime.
This comment, and the entire military analysis that follows it, is based on the assumption that the South Koreans are willing to devote their armed forces to an attack on North Korea, and to give the US unfettered access to bases within its territory. I’ve seen no evidence to suggest that any serious support for such a course exists among either the government or the people of South Korea. That’s the flaw to all this talk of munitions and task forces: if the South Koreans don’t want a war, there will be no war, no matter what the Americans want to do. So far, the South Koreans don’t want a war, which makes all the joyful talk of weapons and tactics pretty irrelevant.
The U.S. should begin planning immediately to deploy the Patriot tactical ballistic missile defense system plus Aegis ships to South Korea and Japan, and also to reinforce our tactical air forces by moving in several air wings and aircraft carrier battle groups, together with the all-important surveillance aircraft and drones.
Much of the military analysis in the essay boils down to two points: the balance of military power on the peninsula now rests with the North Koreans, but could be reversed if the US moves more forces into the theater. Saddam did not attack during our buildup, simply because he had no capacity to do so. The North Koreans do have a first-strike capability, possibly a nuclear one, and what incentive would they have to sit and watch us pile forces into the area? Once we commit to a buildup, the likelihood of preemptive attack from the north becomes very high.
I’m surprised that an essay that overlooks such obvious points is getting so much attention. I do hope it doesn’t represent official doctrine. |
