The French and Germans assumed, as did Blix, that there was substantial stockpiling and attempts to upgrade delivery systems, and our allies also agreed that Saddam was trying to develop a nuclear capacity. This was on the basis of their own intelligence assessments, which is why they have not gloated over the difficulty in finding what they themselves knew to have been there. Where there were differences were on the acuteness of the threat.
There was disagreement on occasion within our intelligence services on assessing the data, generally about limited allegations. In general, the State Department tended to soft- pedal, while the CIA was more aggressive. That is not the same as to say that anyone knew better, or that political spin was necessary. The Administration had to resolve disagreements, and after 9/11 it makes sense that they would not want to be accused of ignoring warnings.
Inspection were worthless. We had to be threatening to Saddam to get cooperation, and even then he would drag things out. Even if we had accounted for everything currently stockpiled, it is probable that, once we left, production would resume. We were doing the heavy lifting to contain the regime, and we had had it. We were not going to wait until summer (current temperatures 135 degrees) to decide whether to overthrow Saddam. We went on our timetable, because that was the prudent thing to do.
After all, the Congress had called for Saddam's overthrow in 1998, and had voted to support the President in the run up to this one, as well. The time was ripe....... |
