MoD OFFICIALS SLAM DOSSIER SPIN Aug 12 2003
By Paul Gilfeather
THREE Ministry of Defence intelligence officials complained about the spin in Tony Blair's Iraq war dossier, a probe heard yesterday.
They were worried about the language and "level of certainty" in the dossier's spy claim that Iraq could deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes.
An official document which noted their concerns declared: "The personnel did not share its judgment."
Disturbingly, it was revealed that the 45-minute allegation WAS added later to the dossier, as claimed by critics.
The inquiry also heard that Dr David Kelly, dismissed as a Walter Mitty fantasist by a No10 spokesman, was in fact Whitehall's leading expert on Iraqi weapons programmes and one of the world's most respected microbiologists.
Lord Hutton is heading the inquiry into how Dr Kelly, 59, came to commit suicide after being named as the possible source of a BBC story that No 10 "sexed up" intelligence to strengthen the case for war on Saddam Hussein.
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Secrets and Lies
Whitehall attempts to discredit suicide weapons expert Dr David Kelly took a double hammering yesterday.
Three intelligence officials reinforced the scientist's fears that intelligence was 'sexed up' as Tony Blair struggled to convince the nation of the need for war on Iraq.
And allegations that Dr Kelly, 59, was a Walter Mitty fantasist were trashed by the revelation that the "superb and impressive" expert was about to lead the hunt for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
The disclosures came on the opening day of Lord Hutton's inquiry into Dr Kelly's suicide after he was outed as the source of BBC claims that No10 "transformed" a dossier on Iraq's weapons to beef up the case for war.
Martin Howard, MoD deputy chief of intelligence, told the London hearing two officials "expressed concern about the language" used in the discredited claim that Iraq could deploy WMD within 45 minutes.
Mr Howard said: "There wasn't a difference of view about whther the intelligence should be included or not. It was more about how the intelligence should be described."
A third official, recently retired, wrote to make a similar complaint.
Inquiry counsel James Dingemans read from an official document noting officials' concerns about the "level of certainty" in the way the 45 minute claim was expressed in the dossier's foreword by Tony Blair and in the summary.
Officials complained the summary said intelligence "shows" Saddam attached great importance to possessing WMD while they believed it only "indicated" it.
The document said: "The summary expressed the point differently as a judgment. The personnel did not share its judgment. But it was agreed by the Joint Intelligence Committee."
Cabinet Office mandarin Julian Miller admitted the 45 minute claim did not appear in any drafts of the dossier until September 10 or 11 because of late intelligence. The dossier was published on September 24. The BBC says the claim was inserted at the last minute to strengthen the case for conflict.
But Mr Miller added: "Changes such as the inclusion of the reference to 45 minutes were nothing to do with No 10."
Foreign Office chief Patrick Lamb said Dr Kelly was so revered that even facts committed to text were checked again with him.
He was backed by former UN weapons inspector Terence Taylor who described the leading scientist's work in Iraq as "remarkably successful".
But MoD personnel director Richard Hatfield said Dr Kelly had "gone outside the scope of his discretion" in briefing BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan. Gilligan gives evidence today.
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RICHARD HATFIELD
MoD PERSONNEL CHIEF
THE personnel boss at the Ministry of Defence struggled to hide his contempt for Dr Kelly's actions.
But his nervy performance failed to overshadow the glowing tributes made by Dr Kelly's admirers.
He admitted it was "effectively part of Dr Kelly's job description" to brief the press but attacked him for going too far with the BBC's Andrew Gilligan.
The weapons expert should have been aware of Civil Service rules dictating behaviour with the media, including not commenting on or disclosing classified information and not discussing "politically controversial issues".
Mr Hatfield said: "He appears to have had on his own account two meetings with Mr Gilligan, which took place off Ministry of Defence premises, with nobody having any knowledge of them.
"Even on Dr Kelly's account of what took place at that interview, he clearly had strayed beyond providing technical information." He added: "My interpretation, I'm afraid, of thinking back over his history, is that he could not have done that without realising he had gone outside the scope of his discretion."
But asked whether Dr Kelly had breached security in those interviews he said: "There is no security breach. My concern relates to the basic breach of confidence as to how he is supposed to behave towards his employer and the Government, since he works for the Government.
"There was never any suggestion of a security breach on any of the information provided by Dr Kelly or indeed, as far as I can see, on Mr Gilligan's account of the interview."
Mr Hatfield grudgingly conceded that Dr Kelly was the Government's leading expert on chemical and biological weapons. But he made clear that Dr Kelly was not considered the main man on all weapons of mass destruction.
Significantly he revealed that at the time of his death the scientist expected to return to Iraq "within days" to hunt for weapons.
TERRY TAYLOR
FORMER UN WEAPONS INSPECTOR
TERRY Taylor, Dr Kelly's friend and fellow weapons hunter, blew apart the Government's "Walter Mitty" slur on the dead scientist.
Mr Taylor, president and executive director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in the US, said Dr Kelly had done "superb" work in exposing Saddam's biological weapons programme.
"His work in Iraq was remarkably successful," added Mr Taylor. "He carried the inspection system through during a very difficult period."
Other projects of Dr Kelly's - making safe a Scottish island contaminated by anthrax and assessing the Russian biological weapons programme after the fall of the Soviet Union - had impressed experts from both sides of the Atlantic.
Mr Taylor stayed in the Kelly home about four weeks before his death last month. He recalled: "He seemed to me to be in a normal state of mind, someone I had known for 16 years. I did not detect any discernible difference."
Mr Taylor said he was "looking forward" to the challenge of going to Iraq again to aid the current WMD search.
In 30 minutes of testimony, Mr Taylor made sure the world was aware of Dr Kelly's expertise and demolished the smear campaign against his reputation.
Talking to the inquiry from Australia via a video-link, he painted his friend as one of the leading experts on Iraq's chemical and biological programme.
On Dr Kelly's planned return to Iraq, he said: "He was clearly thinking about that, thinking about going to Iraq. We discussed that, not in any great detail, but in general.
"He said that he was probably going out in little more than a week's time, but nevertheless we could probably meet.
"He was clearly thinking and was focused on that during this particular conversation."
PATRICK LAMB
FOREIGN OFFICE
THE deputy head of the counter-proliferation department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was a great admirer of Dr Kelly's knowledge and professionalism.
Although employed by the Ministry of Defence, Dr Kelly worked alongside Patrick Lamb, who remembered him as a key and popular member of the team.
Mr Lamb said the microbiologist advised him on the preparation of a vital section of Tony Blair's September war dossier.
He added that Dr Kelly was so revered for his expertise as a weapons expert that he would query facts already accepted in documents with him.
He said: "If I had to make a choice between a textual source and Dr Kelly, I would often back Dr Kelly ahead of the textual source ... such was his expertise and such was our confidence in him."
Mr Lamb said that Dr Kelly's attitude throughout the drafting of the section, which documented the Unscom weapons inspections in Iraq, was that he was "very supportive of it, as were we all".
Dr Kelly, he said, contributed a history of Saddam's arsenal and worked on "other elements which figure elsewhere in the document". He said Dr Kelly's advice was sought at every stage of the investigations.
He added that none of his colleagues could recall any occasion when Dr Kelly indicated that he had any concerns, questions or scepticism about any element of the dossier.
Just before completing his evidence, Mr Lamb said he and his colleagues had worked in a happy and relaxed atmosphere on the dossier which they considered to be "extremely important".
He added that they continued to believe that.
But he said: "I am only very saddened that that happy atmosphere has the shadow of Dr Kelly's death hanging over it."
MARTIN HOWARD
DEPUTY CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, MoD
THE deputy chief of intelligence at the Defence Ministry scored a spectacular own goal by revealing that three senior MoD officials complained about the use of spin in the dossier.
Mr Howard told the inquiry that two members of the Defence Intelligence Staff had written formally to him, expressing concern about the way intelligence was presented in the dossier.
He said they complained about the inclusion of the discredited claim that Saddam Hussein could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes.
A third official, who had recently retired, wrote to him to make a similar complaint.
But Mr Howard said their concerns had related to the use of language and added that "this sort of debate is quite normal".
Downing Street would have been hoping that Mr Howard would redress the balance following evidence from Mr Taylor and Mr Lamb.
But his admission that members of his own team - and one retired member - supported Dr Kelly's apparent concerns would have left Alastair Campbell holding his head in his hands.
Mr Howard went on to say the claim that Iraq could use its weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes had come from a single Iraqi military source, "a well established and reliable source".
He added that he did not believe reports that Downing Street had included the claim despite knowing it was false, or that Alastair Campbell was responsible.
Mr Howard said Dr Kelly knew several intelligence analysts - two of whom had raised concerns about the language of the dossier - and would probably have known their opinions of it.
JULIAN MILLER
CABINET OFFICE JOINT INTELLIGENCE
JULIAN Miller, a senior official in the Cabinet Office's joint intelligence organisation, referred to the alleged "45-minute" capability of Iraq to launch WMD - a major controversy surrounding the Government's dossier.
He told the Hutton inquiry this was inserted into the draft dossier on September 10 or 11 (2002), after intelligence was received in August. Publication was on September 24.
Mr Miller added: "In the course of discussions with the Defence and Intelligence Staff, the question was raised about whether the 45 minutes material supported the use of the word 'judgment' as against indication or suggestion."
He went on: "It did not support the specific timing, but it supported the picture of Iraq having established command and control arrangements for the use of these weapons." Other intelligence supported that picture and he was unaware of any unhappiness among intelligence service personnel relating to the dossier.
Counsel to the inquiry, James Dingemans QC, asked Mr Miller: "It has been said that Dr Kelly told journalists that Downing Street knew that the (45 minutes) claim was wrong. If he did say that, would that have been true?" "It would not have been true," Mr Miller replied.
Mr Dingemans asked: "And it has been said that Dr Kelly told journalists that the transformation in the week before publication came about because of Campbell. If he had said that, would that have been true?"
Mr Miller responded: "No, it would not have been true in either sense, in that I don't think that there was a transformation in the week before publication."
No10 has denied that the 45-minute claim - based on a single source of information - was inserted at the last moment. |
