Again, from The Washington Post:
CIA Director George J. Tenet Discusses the National Intelligence Estimate
Sunday, August 10, 2003; Page A10
On Oct. 1, 2002, the U.S. intelligence community completed a highly classified, 90-page National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Most NIEs are initiated by administration policymakers, but this one was undertaken at the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, whose Democratic members wanted the community's judgments on the eve of voting on the resolution authorizing President Bush to take military action against Iraq. It also provided a basis for administration statements on Iraq's intentions. The Washington Post presented CIA Director George J. Tenet with a series of oral and written questions about the NIE. Here are excerpts from his written responses:
How was the NIE put together?
The process by which we produce NIEs -- including the one on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction -- has been honed over nearly 30 years. . . . This process is designed to produce coordinated judgments -- but not to the exclusion of differing views or without exposing uncertainties. During coordination, [intelligence] agencies send representatives who are actively engaged and change NIE drafts to reflect better the views of the experts in their respective agencies.
It is an open and vigorous process that allows for dissent to be registered by individual agencies in the final product. Indeed, alternative views are encouraged. Finally, the NIE is reviewed by the directors of U.S. intelligence agencies composing the Director of Central Intelligence-chaired National Foreign Intelligence Board, including, in this case, CIA, DIA (the Defense Intelligence Agency), INR (the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research), NSA (the National Security Agency), DOE (the Department of Energy) and NIMA (the National Imagery and Mapping Agency).
There have been reports that hard, new intelligence on Saddam Hussein's weapons programs has not been available since United Nations inspectors left that country in 1998 and that the NIE is thus based upon old information.
The history of our judgments on Iraq's weapons programs is clear and consistent. On biological weapons and missiles, our data got stronger in recent years. We have had a solid historical foundation and new data that have allowed us to make judgments and attribute high confidence in specific areas. And we had numerous credible sources, including many who provided information after 1998. When inspectors were pushed out in 1998, we did not sit back. Rather, we significantly increased our collection efforts throughout the intelligence community. In other words, despite what many read in the media that the NIE is based on nothing -- no sources, no understanding of complicated procurement networks, etc. -- the fact is we made significant professional progress.
Before the United States attacked Iraq last March, what was the assessment of Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons programs?
The NIE points out that by 2002, all [intelligence community] agencies assessed that Saddam did not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient fissile material to make any, but never abandoned his nuclear weapons ambitions.
Moreover, most agencies believed that Iraq's attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors, magnets, high-speed balancing machines and machine tools, as well as Iraq's efforts to enhance its cadre of weapons personnel and activities at several suspect nuclear sites, indicated that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam's personal interest in some of these efforts was also considered.
DOE agreed that reconstitution was underway, but assessed that the tubes probably were not part of the program. INR assessed that Baghdad was pursuing at least a limited effort to acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities, but not an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons; INR was not persuaded that the tubes were intended for the nuclear program. All other agencies, including DOE, assessed that Iraq probably would not have a weapon until 2007 to 2009, consistent with the decade-old judgment of Iraq needing five to seven years to develop a weapons-grade uranium enrichment capability if freed from constraints.
What should people look for now since no weapons have yet been found?
As with any other topic addressed in an NIE, the acquisition of further evidence may confirm some of our judgments while calling others into question. Operation Iraqi Freedom obviously has opened a major new opportunity for learning about the WMD activities of Saddam Hussein's regime. We have no doubt, however, that the NIE was the most reasonable, well-grounded, and objective assessment of Iraq's WMD programs that was possible at the time it was produced.
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