New Nukes? No Way
William M. Arkin, William M. Arkin is a military affairs analyst who
writes regularly for Opinion. E-mail: warkin@ igc.org.
SOUTH POMFRET, Vt. — Earlier this month, more
than 150 nuclear scientists, war planners and
policymakers met behind closed doors at Strategic
Command in Omaha to discuss the U.S. nuclear
posture. Strategic-arms reductions were debated. The
health of the existing nuclear stockpile was discussed.
And the possibility was raised of creating a new
generation of nuclear weapons suitable for combat
against terrorists or rogue states possessing weapons
of mass destruction.
American proponents of "mini-nukes" argue that the
country needs a new weapon that can attack facilities
deep underground or burn up bioweapons with less
harm to civilians. They say that a new generation of
limited-use nuclear weapons could be an important
deterrent in dealing with rogue states, that opponents
would be less likely to build underground facilities or stockpile bioweapons if
they knew the U.S. had a nuclear weapon it would be willing to use.
The Bush administration is on the record supporting the concept of new, more
usable nuclear weapons. But the idea is both unnecessary and dangerous.
The long-term consequence of developing new nuclear weapons might well be to
push Iran, North Korea and other states to work harder and faster in developing
and manufacturing their own nukes. Moreover, as we witnessed in March during
the "shock and awe" phase of the Iraq war, the country's latest-generation
bombs and other "smart weapons" seemed more than up to the tasks at hand.
We don't need to further alienate the rest of the world by rejoining the nuclear
arms race.
This is not the first time that bomb makers have proposed more specialized and
usable weapons of mass destruction.
On numerous occasions in the last 30 years, nuclear weapons advocates have
pushed their point of view with sympathetic administrations or when it seemed
possible to turn world events to their advantage. Early in the Reagan
administration, the nuclear faithful attempted to revive interest in the neutron
bomb, first proposed during the Carter administration as a way of providing
"enhanced radiation" with reduced blast that could be used to kill Soviet troops if
necessary without destroying European cities.
During the administration of George H.W. Bush, the keepers of the nuclear flame
scrambled to formulate a new rationale for developing a next generation of nukes
absent the threat of the Soviet Union. A Strategic Deterrence Study Group
organized by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff predicted that "more
nuclear weapons states are likely to emerge" and warned of American combat
with a nuclear-armed nation such as Iraq. "We are not comfortable that we can
count on deterrence to deal with many lethal Third World threats," the group
stated. It proposed that the U.S. should "retain an option to leave ambiguous
whether it would employ nuclear weapons" in retaliation against a variety of
nonnuclear provocations.
But despite near-constant urging from the nuclear constituency for at least the last
20 years, no new tailored nuclear weapons have been produced. All that could
change now. Or not.
It certainly looks like the U.S. is closer than it has ever been to building a smaller,
more usable nuke. The administration's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review found a
new rationale for using nuclear weapons in the unstable world revealed by Sept.
11. And the nation's fears of terrorism and of an increasingly hostile
nuclear-armed North Korea may make such an extreme step more politically
palatable.
But there is one powerful force that could keep a new nuclear genie in its bottle:
the uniformed military. Men and women in uniform have, from the beginning,
been the truest skeptics and the most important power passively opposing
neutron bombs and mini-nukes.
After the 1991 Gulf War, then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Carl E. Vuono wrote of
the "preeminence of conventional forces" despite Iraq's chemical weapons and its
nascent nuclear potential. "It was America's conventional forces, not its nuclear
arsenal, that defined President Bush's response to the crisis and ultimately
decided its outcome." Today, the conventional military (which is by far the
dominant force in the American military) not only believes that it has the tools to
deal with any threat; it also recognizes the long-term benefit of not fanning the
flames of proliferation. Senior officers are privately shaking their heads about
how, while they are on the front lines winning the war on terrorism, the rest of the
government does little to deal with the roots of the problem. And many of them
see a renewed nuclear focus as likely to aggravate the situation.
It's not hard to understand why nuclear scientists would love to get a crack at
incorporating the enormous advances that have transformed conventional
weaponry into a new generation of nuclear bombs. But it is these very
technologies that have made nuclear weapons largely unnecessary. In Iraq, the
U.S. military avoided many dangers, leapfrogging over them, going around them
when necessary, employing special forces and covert ops and cyber-strategies.
Many bunkers and other tough-to-get-to targets were left standing: The U.S.
military found other ways to neutralize any advantages they provided the Iraqis.
The Defense Department's official position is that it "has not identified any
requirements for new nuclear weapons," according to a briefing paper prepared
by the office of the secretary of Defense. "Cost and feasibility studies related to
possible nuclear modernization," the paper says, "in no way represent a decision
to proceed with development of a new warhead."
But this is pure evasion. The administration's interest in nuclear tools to fight the
war on terrorism is about more than just keeping options open. And the
administration needs to understand that even contingency planning for the
development of new nuclear weapons is threatening and can encourage other
countries to join or escalate the arms race.
The conventional military needs to stand up and be counted. The Iraq war plan
was constructed with the possibility that Iraq might use chemical or biological
weapons. Saddam Hussein had underground bunkers galore. At the top, the
nuclear establishment pushed prudent contingencies just in case, but in the field,
where commanders were responsible for their troops and the real war was being
waged, no one wanted anything to do with something that ultimately would
dishonor the American military and America.
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