The basic problem here, is that U.S. policy is being made by control freaks. They have no flexibility, no ability to compromise, delegate, share authority, build coalitions, make realistic adjustments. They insist, in every decision, that they retain 100% control.
They didn't want to co-opt the existing Iraqi army, because it would dilute the authority of the U.S. Inevitably, whoever ended up in charge of that Iraqi army, would be the ruler of Iraq. He would have his own power base, and would not be a compliant proxy for the NeoCons. That Iraqi army, and the Iraqi general in charge of it, would be the champion of Iraqi nationalism.
Because the Neocons are incapable of sharing any power, they will end up losing all power. The Islamists end up being the only champions of Iraqi nationalism left standing, and it is they who will rule, after we leave in defeat. What a sorry shambles. |