Some comments made last month by General Wesley Clark...
leadershipforamerica.org
To stay in, we've got to define our exit strategy
By General (ret.) Wesley K. Clark
Times Of London Online
July 1, 2003
The deaths of US and British soldiers, the continuing violence and economic sabotage, and the rising popular resentment at the Western presence are just the first cracks in the facade of postwar American-British occupation. Every student of Iraq issued a warning about the aftermath of war: deep fault lines between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, with additional tensions caused by Islamic extremists, Baathists and Arab nationalists, would make it difficult to hold the state together. The questions are, is this effort "winnable?" If so, how? And at what cost?
Let's be realistic: measured against the objectives, we haven't done so well yet.
Weapons of mass destruction have not yet been found - but the intelligence suggested, at a minimum, that Saddam Hussein had some chemical and biological capabilities. Weapons may have been hidden in Syria, buried underground, or given to terrorists - or perhaps the intelligence simply overestimated the threat. We must continue the search - we have most of the resources we need to be successful in place already - but each week increases the likelihood that some of these weapons may end up in the wrong hands.
As for regime change, Saddam and his sons no longer occupy their palaces or control the Government. Yet their survival feeds fears of a Baathist return, sparks continued resistance, and undercuts efforts to establish new institutions.
Efforts to locate and track the Baathist leaders must continue. But this requires deep penetration into Iraqi society. We have radio and telephone listening devices and are working to recruit additional agents, but there are no guarantees of success. Each unsuccessful week of effort reveals the limits of US intelligence and influence, and each week is likely to see the Baathist resistance grow.
Meanwhile a deeper, private struggle is ongoing between various factions in the Shia community. Will they secure dominance over their Shiism from the Iranians, and re-centre the sect on Najaf? Will they succumb to pressures from Iran? Will they demand a fundamentalist theocratic state, or some form of "modern" theocracy that combines Islamic law with limited democratic forms? The Shia issue is potentially the most explosive. If they are able to move together, they will dominate Iraq. But in the press here we see only the barest surface ripples from the major movements underneath.
Shia leaders know the threat of the Baathists. Even now they must be assessing the options. They could help the coalition to defeat the Baathists, and then ask the coalition to leave; remain neutral, and wait for both the Baathists and the coalition to exhaust themselves; or work with the Baathists, on their own terms, seeking control inside the Baathist organisation and building pressure against the Americans and Brits. Right now, some of this is likely occurring.
Regardless of the twists and turns of internal Islamic activities, the outcome seems clear - the US and the British will utimately be invited to leave; how soon depends upon our effectiveness in the occupation. The manner of our departure may follow from a quiet series of meetings with Iraqi clerics, it may be in massive street protests that shut down commerce and traffic; or it may be punctuated by violence on a scale far greater than yet seen against Americans and the Iraqis who have co-operated with the coalition.
And in the north are the Kurds. They are armed and largely self-governing. Independence will be the next step, should Western nation-building efforts falter.
And unless other measures are taken, independence will be accompanied by internal violence and possible conflict with Iran or Turkey. As for all those other grandiose dreams - transforming Arab society, inspiring democracy, finding the key to peace in the Middle East - well, it comes down first to whether we can handle the challenges of dealing with the here and now in Iraq.
Success is not impossible, but it will be difficult, and it grows more so with each passing day.
It is simply not possible to maintain this occupation by force, even if we doubled the forces committed there. The actions against the Baathists - the sweeps, strikes and searches - risk the kind of popular ire that resulted in six British soldiers being killed near al-Amarah.
So what can be done now? A successful outcome would be to solve the mystery of the WMD, suppress the Baathist resurgence and hold Iraq together, leaving it self-governing in some semblance of secular democracy, secured by its own armed forces, free from domination by other regional powers or terrorists. Winning in Iraq requires working with the existing forces in that society, not against them. Representative Iraqi institutions - national, regional and local councils - need to be established to work with the US and UK civilian administrators. These institutions must leave no one out, including former Baathists, who should be given an opportunity to renounce their former loyalties.
The internal squabbling and scheming must be forced out into the open and the press invited in. We must propose responsibilities, procedures for decision-making, and standards for protecting the rights of the various factions in the councils, and retain the authority to admonish, remove or hold accountable leaders who don't follow the rules.
The art will be to govern fairly, to create common interests and to lay in these early institutions the seeds for democratic, tolerant and limited government.
There should be no democratic elections until much later. Incidentally, let's make no mistake about oil revenues, impounded Iraqi funds, or profiteering by US and British companies. We must continue to set aside any idea that this occupation could be Iraqi-financed.
The US and UK must also recruit and equip tens of thousands of Iraqis to handle the security and reconstruction responsibilities of the occupation. Yes, they must be trained and vetted - but this must be done quickly. Iraqis must be put in uniform and on to the streets alongside the US and British Forces as soon as possible, and thousands of translators must be brought in. Iraqi faces must be seen to carry out some of the tougher chores like the searches for weapons, responses to complaints, guarding facilities and pursuing criminals. And there should be a prohibition of searches in the absence of translators.
Communications with the Iraqi public is crucial. Western forces must take extraordinary measures to combat rumours, fears and suspicions. This means more transparency in decision-making and complete reporting on the results of the patrols and searches. Why can't we have our own 24-hour news channel in Arabic? Military forces must find new ways to provide this transparency without it hobbling operational methods and aims.
Do we have the staying power for what we're facing in Iraq? First, let's be honest with ourselves. We went into this mission with a myopic focus on the Iraqi threat - we underestimated the strength of the Baathists, inadequately anticipated the resistance during the fighting, underresourced the force required to deal with military "success" and failed to plan fully how to create "regime change". The American and British public need to hear it from their leaders; they need to understand why these mistakes were made and see that those responsible are held accountable. And then we've got to persuade others to help us to shoulder these burdens - the mission is simply bigger than the US and UK can handle. We should be asking the UN and other international institutions to take a greater role.
While the civil administration in Baghdad would likely agree with most of these ideas, it has not implemented these programmes with the required urgency nor has it specified the end state it seeks.
If we are successful, the cost of this mission will be measured in years, tens of billions of dollars and dozens more soldiers' lives lost. But failure will be more expensive, and a premature pull-out will exacerbate regional conflict and undercut the War on Terror. So, we need to lock in a defined exit strategy, as we've done in Bosnia, to bring the British and American people and the international community on board: we need to create a matrix measuring progress in political development, economic reconstruction and security, and to announce the report card quarterly. But above all, honesty, and remember, when the Iraqis ask us to go, the mission is over. |
