Perhaps you do not grasp the significance of unilateralism as a foreign policy framework
  Actually, I do. I think I'm starting to see the difference between us. I have always been against the preemption policy the US put forward a year ago. And I said so when it was brought forth. It makes folk nervous. Previously, the US policy has always been that preemption is an exception - in this respect US policy was pretty much like that of any other country: No matter how often you might do it, it's still an exception. A convenient not-quite-lie maintained by all countries prone to preeemption and intervention (US, Russia, China, France). It was rude of the Emperor to take his clothes off in public.
  However:
  France, Russia, Germany and China did not oppose taking action in Iraq.
  Actually, they did, both before and after 9/11. Except when they were attempting to get them lifted, they said the containment and sanctions - maintained by the US, not them - were sufficient. At best, sanctions are only a stop gap when their object is a regime sitting on a huge fungible resource. And that's all the sanctions and containment were - a stop gap - they did not, could not, change the real problem which was the nature and long term goals of the Hussein regime.
  But the opportunity to resolve the outstanding UN SC Resolution issues in Iraq was never the central problem
  It certainly was. The US had a 10 year old and continuing problem arising out of its UN involvement in Gulf War and all four countries certainly were content to see the US expend both its soft and hard power in the ME for no return and negative return. The problem was compounded by the 9/11 events: existing US policy in the ME and South Asia was demonstrated as not only inadequate but dangerous to US interests.
  France, Germany, Russia and China were and are content to see the US pursue policies dangerous to its own interests. This isn't surprising: they see themselves as rivals and as inadequate rivals. Russia and China can reasonably look forward to the time when they are adequate rivals and possibly have even greater power and influence than the US. They have some problems similar to the US's and they have been far more restrained in their opposition to the US policy than France and Germany, which will never be adequate rivals and thus, unlike the other two, see opposition to US policy and activity as central, pervasive, and  instrumental.
  When countries like France are in their 'subtle' phases they see their mission as 'guiding' US action and policy. They can't get far trying to whiz such stuff past the likes of Colin Powell, never mind the sharper parts of Congress. The greatest failure they had was trying to slip the scientifically and economically dubious Kyoto protocol past the US (the Canadian government was dumb enough to buy into it): the US is supposed to subsidize European stagnation and Chinese growth at the expense of its own growth. This has been brought up as a cause celebre amongst the critics of US "unilateralism".
  Similarly, the US disinclination not to be unprepared for the possible irrational action of a country like N Korea and go ahead with developing an anti-missile defense system is seen as a case of US "unilateralism". Are the four paragons of international virtue you mention going to intercept those missiles? Is the UN?
  After the experience in the Balkans the US was not terrifically happy at the prospect of multilateral intervention in Afghanistan especially as its NATO allies, except Britain, weren't up to the task, anyway. This again, is criticized as US "unilateralism" when it was merely pragmatism.
  Unilateralism as the cornerstone of US policy was and is the central problem that our allies have with us now and had with us then, and this is what killed US progress through the UN -- not France.
  US interests with respect to Iraq were in opposition to those of China, France, Russia and Germany. Didn't you notice? They cheated on the sanctions and wanted to maintain the Hussein regime in power. The issue for them is US power in opposition to their own interests. Complaining of unilateralism is a suitable vehicle for them to oppose US interests.
  Lots of countries have legitimate beefs with the US but they're not France, Germany, China and Russia. They'r mostly 3rd world countries who take considerable damage from US subsides and tariffs but these are the same beefs they have with France, Germany, etc.
  So long as we have a unilateralist policy framework, we are isolated and on our own. Being on our own does not serve us well and is entirely unnecessary
  The US is on its own because it's the sole super power. Its rivals and near rivals wish to turn it in the direction of their own interests, which is understandable but not necessarily in US's interests or those of many others. The US should not expect constant support or even friendly behaviour from them. The countries it might consider strengthening relations with are those 3rd world and minor powers and people who aspire for a modern way of life. It can only do so by taking right action.
  It's making a start by untangling itself from the dictators in the Middle East and promoting democracy there. If it strengthens Afghanistan enough perhaps it can detach itself from the succession of Pakistani dictators. If it can eliminate its worst subsidies and tariffs, it can strengthen its connection to vast parts of the world which, if they are not hostile,  are unhappy with their US relations. 
  It is an ideological luxury that gratifies a handful of people who put their ideology ahead of our national security
  No. Wishing to get back to the quasi-solidarity of the Cold War when the US was more first among equals due to the common threat of the Soviets, is a vain wish.  Your preeminence isolates you. That is a circumstance of geography, history, and the efforts of your people. The desires of your rivals don't necessarily coincide with your interests and you're foolish to wish it so.
  It's often the case differences can be negotiated away or compromises made. But not always. It was clear by the end of October 2001 that Afghanistan was a  side show and the US was going to take a new tack in the Middle East . It was equally clear that many in ME expected it would. Given the scope and ambition of the 9/11 crimes and the size and nature of the al Qaeda organization and its various connections, what else could be expected? Al Qaeda and its ilk want to remake the world to its vision and only an equally expansive response can be adequate. Security exercises and policing are tactical. An adequate strategy leading to aQ's defeat is remaking the ME into an environment hostile to it.. At this juncture a festering  problem such as Iraq, a secular mirror image of the theocratic regimes of the area, becomes a vehicle. France, Germany, China and Russia have interests there. It's not reasonable to expect all or any of them would go along no matter how it's packaged. The US can't guarantee their interests because, in the end, that's up to the new Iraqi government which would not necessarily be sympathetic to those who did business with the former regime. |