Return of the Gun Trucks by Trent Telenko
windsofchange.net
The Army Times has a subscriber only story on the Army truck drivers in Iraq. The short form, 10 of the 50(+) combat deaths since major combat ended have been truckers; there are not enough Military Police to guard truck convoys; traffic hazards, bandits and guerrilla attacks have reduced Army convoys to a single predictable main supply route; and a variety of measures including a return to Vietnam style "gun trucks" are being used to counter the security problem.
Here is a typical truck convoy run from the article:
An early decision was to quit running convoys at night. The Army also consolidated routes to avoid populated areas.
That means one route — Major Supply Route Tampa — links Baghdad and points north with Kuwait.
A paved alternative runs parallel to the west, but MSR Jackson goes through several towns, and the Army stopped using it because of the added risk. MSR Tampa stays in the desert until Baghdad.
Those measures created their own problems, soldiers said. Now would-be attackers can focus their efforts while the sun is up and on just a few roads. It is a daylong drive between Cedar II and supply bases in the north, so bandits and terrorists know when the convoys will pass.
South of Cedar II, the route is mostly a 150-mile-long, six-lane expressway where a truck’s speed is limited only by its horsepower and load. Attacks here are rarer because better roads enable the convoys to travel at higher speeds.
When northbound trucks reach Cedar II, soldiers and their cargo trailers spend the night. At dawn, a new crew of Cedar II-based drivers take the loads farther north. About 200 Army and civilian trucks hit the road north within 90 minutes of one another in processions of 25 to 35 trucks.
It takes up to nine hours to reach Baghdad and another three to four to reach the end of the line at Anaconda, a support base near Balad.
About seven miles north of here, MSR Tampa takes a turn for the worse, becoming, at best, a rutted, two-lane gravel road for the next 75 miles. Dust is thicker than fog and the maximum speed is 25 mph.
It’s on this stretch that some Iraqis, who the drivers think of more as pirates than terrorists, dig trenches across the road in hopes that a hard bump will jolt loose something from the truck. Others will hide metal stakes to flatten truck tires or use knives to cut loose restraining straps if the truck slows down.
"If a can of oil falls off the truck, their day is made," Presley said.
As MSR Tampa nears Baghdad, the road gets better, but traffic congestion increases and the slow, exposed convoys become easy prey.
"As soon as we get near Baghdad, it becomes more dangerous," said Staff Sgt. Robert Guinther of the 459th. The Army tries to vary routes around Baghdad and avoid traffic-clogged areas near Baghdad International Airport. For most 459th drivers, the route ends at supply base Anaconda. They’ll spend the night there, then run the gantlet in reverse for the return trip to Cedar II.
While many in the Defense Department and a few columnists outside it will go into chapter and verse on how Iraq is not Vietnam. It is amazing how history is repeating itself with regard to our Iraqi truck convoys. |
