Yes, it is a bucket of worms as they say...
I've tried to write about this paradox a few times, I define it as being part of "the law of diminishing return".
We could have killed hundreds of thousands of civilians in Iraq by carpet bombing the Sunni triangle. We may have done something like that 50 years ago and the population would probably have been largely passive. We could have also sent in a couple of hundred thousand more troops. However, what I believe we tried to do was balance taking out the Hussein regime, and doing it in a way which was both humane, and able to quickly move toward self-governance. Rumsfield explained this rather well I thought.
Life parallels this theme. If we sharpen a saw it will cut wood better, but if we sharpen a saw too much it becomes brittle and breaks. If we work out an hour or two a day, our bodies perform and feel better, but if we work out 15 hours a day, our bodies break down. At some point the law of diminishing return kicks in and the good we were trying to achieve reverses itself. We've seen this in social systems, in natural systems, and in man made systems.
Knowing where and when this law begins to reverse itself is one of the most difficult things to determine as a leader. It cannot be derived at by qualitative nor quantitative methods. It comes to a leader who is listening to the subtle clues of the system. It comes to a leader who is in-tune with the signals of the system under his stewardship. It comes to a leader who is consciously aware of the law and doing everything he can to be on the lookout for its effect.
This is the main reason I have been reluctant to criticize the post war strategy. Many pundits on both sides of the aisle have been clammering for more troops, more money, more of everything as if the law of diminishing return never existed. We must balance these forces and work within the constraints of the paradox. Having too much of a footprint (as Mr Rumsfield described), can create a negative backlash. Doing too much in the way of rapid democratic governance (forcing it on the Iraqi people), can have negative consequences as well.
I understand the urge to criticize and become an arm-chair general. But we really are not in tune with the signals of the signals the way Rumsfield can be. We simply do not know if we have enough troops, if we are providing the right amount of assistance, or if we are balancing the law of diminishing return accurately.
History will be the judge. |
