The Unprofessional and Unreliable
FBI "302" Interview Procedure
The purpose of interviews during criminal or civil investigations is to objectively determine everything the person interviewed knows - and doesn't know - about the matter and properly document it in the best possible way to avoid any later dispute about exactly what was said by the person interviewed and the person(s) conducting the interview.
The best way to do that is to conduct the inteview at the earliest possible time and record the interview in its entirety. The fairest way to do it is to use 2 or more recorders, keeping in mind that opposing counsel has the right to listen to the tape, have it examined for possible tape tampering and to a transcript in the event a duplicate original isn't made for that purpose during the interview. An added benefit to duplicate recordings arises when one of the tapes becomes damaged, as sometimes happens. Keep in mind that the investigator's job is to expertly gather evidence - and preserve it.
The FBI 302 Form Interview Procedure
Routinely, two agents conduct the interview, usually one asking the questions while the other takes notes on a pocket pad and sometime later dictates a summary of the interview which dictation is sometime later transcribed on a 302 form which is eventually returned to the agent for review and signature (or any corrections, additions or deletions he might consider appropriate).
Few if any of the FBI agents who interviewed the Flight 800 witnesses were qualified by experience or training for that role. The NTSB Witness Groups were created to expertly, properly and thoroughly conduct that kind of interview. The adverse consequences of the FBI elbowing the NTSB Witness Groups aside at the outset and unqualified FBI agents conducting those interviews with the 302 form procedure was inevitable.
ntsb.gov
[excerpt][quote]
" . . . . . the FBI did not make any transcripts or recordings of these interviews. Documents are written in the words of the FBI agents who prepared them. Some of the documents contain incomplete information or are vaguely worded. In other words, the documents may not always say what the witness said."
[end quote]
law.emory.edu
[excerpt][quote]
"Thus, when a government agent interviews a witness and takes contemporaneous notes of the witness' responses, the notes do not become the witness' statement- - despite the agent's best efforts to be accurate- - if the agent "does not read back, or the witness does not read, what the [agent] has written." Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 110- 11 n.19 (1976). And a government agent's interview notes that "merely select[ ] portions, albeit accurately, from a lengthy oral recital" do not satisfy the Jencks Act's requirement of a "substantially verbatim recital." Palermo, 360 U.S. at 352.
[end quote]
In short, the FBI 302 form interview summaries are not "witness reports" or "witness statements" or "witness declarations" and that interview procedure has been previously repeatedly publicly criticized for that reason. At best, the FBI interview summaries are the agents' understanding of what the witness said. But that procedure is routinely destined to result in uncertainty about what the person interviewed actually said - aside from being an invitation to skullduggery - and should have been abolished decades ago.
Trial lawyers dealing with cases involving FBI 302 form interview summaries instead of recorded interviews and the transcripts of those recorded interviews routinely raise hell about it for the obvious reason that they can neither hear for themselves everything both the witness and the interviewer actually said nor read everything both the witness and the interviewer actually said.
The press is not ignorant of it either, as the following reflects.
usdoj.gov
[quote]
QUESTION: Ms. Reno, an off-the-wall question here.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: After the Nichols trial, there was some concern on the part of some of the jurors there about the fact -- and this comes up from time to time -- that the FBI does not transcribe interviews, it does this form 302. And every once in a while somebody says, you know, that it is not the best evidence, 302's are summaries of what something thinks somebody said. And people, every once in a while, look at whether the FBI should change that.
Is that anything that is being looked at? During the time you have been Attorney General, has anyone ever suggested that the FBI ought to change that practice?
ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I have heard it on occasions and have discussed it with Director Freeh. I cannot discuss it in the context of this particular case.
QUESTION: But as a general matter, is that something that is pretty much a dead letter now?
ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: As always, we continue to review each issues, the circumstances of the issue in the context it arises, to see what is appropriate. But, again, with respect to this matter, in this case, I cannot discuss it.
QUESTION: Yes, but as a general matter, does it strike you as a good idea, the way the FBI does the 302's? Do you see any need to change that?
ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I think, each case, you have got to look at it on a case-by-case basis, and I think that is what the Bureau does.
QUESTION: Are you saying that they sometimes use a tape recorder?
ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: Again, I think you have to look at the specific examples of each case and make the best judgment of what is right in that case.
QUESTION: (Off microphone) -- some have suggested the FBI should no longer use this form 302, and should go to a transcription of interviews. Would that be a good idea, in your view?
ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: Again, you are going to have to look at the whole matter: each case, when you interview, who you interview, what the circumstances are.
QUESTION: But the FBI has a policy that applies to all cases all the time, that they do not tape record their interviews.
ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: I will be happy to check with Director Freeh and clarify anything that I have said. But, again, I cannot comment on this particular case. And I think you have got to look at the larger picture.
[end quote]
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Janet Reno obviously chose to engage in wiggleworming when publicly confronted with the indefensible FBI 302 form interview procedure.
UPDATE:
Los Angeles Times 7-31-2001
Hearings Open on Mueller
Senate: Bush's pick to head the FBI tells panel his "highest priority" is to restore public's trust in the battle-weary bureau.
[excerpt]
" . . . . . he said he would consider expanded tape-recording of FBI interviews to give its investigations greater credibility--another idea the bureau has resisted through the years."
UDATE 2: The United States has been at war since 11 September 2001. Thousands of Americans have already died and everybody is in potentially great peril as evidenced by the terrorist tactics employed by the enemy - including the lethal anthrax letters. This is clearly not the time for the FBI and other government investigators to be using the horrendously unreliable "302 form" interview procedure.
___________________________________________
The inept "302" interview procedure was made even worse in the investigation of the TWA Flight 800 disaster by the inept and clumsy way the FBI agents, inexperienced and unqualified in such matters, questioned the witnesses, as documented in the following:
NTSB Witness Group Study Report
[excerpts]
The witness interviews conducted by the FBI were done in support of its criminal investigation. During the September 30, 1998, meeting, FBI Special Agent Otto told the witness group that in the initial days of the investigation, the FBI began to suspect that a missile might have been used against flight 800 because so many eyewitness accounts included descriptions of a flare-like object or fireworks in the sky prior to the appearance of a large fireball. Consequently, rather than recording a complete accounting of the visual and aural events described by the witnesses, Special Agent Otto indicated that FBI agents tended to use the witness documents to capture information that appeared relevant to its criminal investigation.
It appears that during some interviews the questions asked by the FBI agents were framed in a manner that emphasized aspects relevant to the missile investigation. In fact, some suggested interview questions are included in document CC-5, which pertains to Witness 32. Some of these include:
What was the timing of events? How long did the missile fly, etc. What does the terrain around launch sight look like? Were scorch marks visible? Where was the sun in relation to the aircraft and the missile launch point? The witness group and the document readers found that a number of other aspects of the witness documents make it difficult to extract accurate and reliable information from them.
These include possible interviewer and interviewee bias, ambiguous clock-point and angle references, potentially inaccurate distance estimates, combined accounts, reporting of witness speculation and conclusions, imprecise or vague language, internal inconsistency, and errors concerning the origin streak of light. Each of these issues will be discussed along with an example or two.
Possible interviewer and interviewee bias. As mentioned previously, FBI witness interviewing was focused on the possibility that a missile had been used against the accident airplane. This focus may have resulted in bias on the part of some the interviewers. For example, the document (CC1-628) pertaining to Witness 590 (10.4 nautical miles slant range from flight 800, interviewed July 20, 1996) describes an ascending red ball. 10,11 The document further states, "Upon impact, [redacted] observed a large fireball." Neither the document nor the attached interview notes states that the witness saw anything other than the red ball in the sky; thus, it is unclear what the "impact" mentioned in the document is. Although this incongruity could be due to other reasons, the witness appears to have described an ascending red ball and a large fireball, which the interviewer related using the word "impact."
For a similar example, see document CC1-382, which pertains to Witness 411 and Witness 412 (both of whom were 8.2 nautical miles slant range from flight 800, interviewed July 20, 1996). These witnesses describe seeing a flare-like object, but "they did not see what [the] flare struck, but it exploded in air into a large orange fireball." This characterization may suggest that the interviewer and/ or the interviewees believed that the flare-like object was a missile, which must have struck something. Beliefs concerning the possibility of a missile attack may have biased or colored the word choices used in reporting the witness accounts; therefore, these accounts must be interpreted carefully.
The presence of missile experts at some interviews may also have influenced these biases.
One document pertaining to Witness 243 (CC4-146, interview date not provided) states that the witness saw an ascending object and then an explosion. However, another document pertaining to this witness (CC1-28, interviewed July 18, 1996) states that the witness (12.0 nautical miles slant range from flight 800) noticed something similar to a flare and "the flying object was relatively slow in flying up and took about four or five seconds before hitting the airplane." Though the document implies that the witness saw an airplane, the document does not specifically state that the witness actually saw an airplane. The interviewer or the interviewee may have used these words to convey that the witness observed an explosion after seeing the flare-like object.
Some documents noted that the witness did not realize what he or she was observing, and some documents specifically state that the witness made conclusions about what he or she observed after learning about the accident in the media.
For example, the document pertaining to Witness 326 (CC-368, 13.2 nautical miles slant range from flight 800, interviewed July 24, 1996) states that this witness did not think much about what was observed until watching the evening news.
The document pertaining to Witness 271 states that she did not realize that she had observed an airplane crash until about an hour later when family members told her that TWA flight 800 had exploded.
The document pertaining to Witness 166 (CC1-374, 31.0 nautical miles slant range from flight 800, interviewed July 26, 1996) states that this witness concluded that he had observed a missile after hearing news accounts about the crash.
Clearly, some witnesses discussed the crash with each other and/ or learned about it from the media before they were interviewed. It is likely that media coverage about the crash and the associated criminal investigation may have led to bias on the part of some the interviewees.
Ambiguous clock-point and angle references. Sometimes direction or position is described using clock-point references that do not appear to be those generally used in aviation. It is not always readily apparent whether "o'clock" is referring to the observed object's path of travel, its position, or its elevation angle.
For example, the document pertaining to Witness 533 (CC-371, interviewed July 19, 1996) describes "the trajectory of the smoke trail initially as verticle [sic] (approximately 11: 00 direction)." Without knowing the orientation of the clock face in space, this type of description is difficult to interpret. The clock face could be parallel to the line of sight of witness such that 11 o'clock is almost directly above the witness, perpendicular to the line of sight of the witness such that 11 o'clock describes a trajectory that is nearly perpendicular to the horizon, or the clock could be parallel to the horizon such that 11 o'clock is just to the left of being directly in front of the witness (8.1 nautical miles slant range from flight 800).
In another example, the document pertaining to Witness 216 states that he "observed to his right, at about forty-five (45) degrees, a flare vertically going 'down'… [and] saw a horizontal explosion about one-half (1/ 2) way down from where he first observed what he believed was a 'boat flare'" (CC1-261, interviewed July 23, 1996). From this description, it cannot be determined with certainty where the witness first observed the flare. It appears that the witness (10.3 nautical miles slant range from flight 800) said that he first observed the flare at 45 degrees above the horizon; however, the description could also be referring to the direction in which the witness first observed the flare. The flare may have been first observed 45 degrees to his right. Because the initial position is ambiguous, the description of an explosion half way down from that point is also ambiguous. [end excerpt.
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Keep in mind that it is not routine for investigators employed by government to properly conduct or document interviews. Even the NTSB Witness Groups don't always do it as evidenced in the following:
David Mayer: "When we conduct an interview of an eye-witness, as I said, we do so under group process. Group members would assemble with the eye-witness and each of them, as interviewed, each member would take notes [of] what the witness reported. We would ask questions such as, what did you see, tell us about your experience. Sometimes, if we felt it was prudent, we'd ask for a tape recorder or ask a court reporter to be present at the interview". Source.
Note: Tests for certification of Court Reporters require only about 85% - 90% accuracy.
Update
Los Angeles Times 12 March 2003
Members of the 24th Marine Expeditionary United interrogate an Iraqi prisoner north of Nasiriyah.
Note the list of questions to be asked in the hands of the military interrogator on the right and that the military investigator on the left is taking notes on a pocket pad - the "302" interview procedure.
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