Ze'ev Schiff calls the score on this moment of the game:
Not exactly quiet, but nevertheless
By Ze'ev Schiff
Three weeks after the last suicide bombing, it is
clear that Israel has been showing more caution in
its use of targeted assassinations against Hamas
and Islamic Jihad leaders. That is not to say that
the government has backtracked from its decision
to strike not only at those who carry out acts of
terror but also leaders of the terror
organizations; it seems as if the government is
not interested in being seen by the public and by
the world as being responsible for violating the
"quiet" - which is not really quiet, neither on
the Palestinian side nor the Israeli side, since
there are targeted assassinations. Nevertheless,
as stated above, three weeks have passed without
any suicide bombings.
Things are also happening in
Hamas. It has been several
weeks since any Qassam rockets
have been launched from the
Gaza Strip - a fact that does
not merit much attention
because the firing of mortars
from Gaza continues and has
even intensified. Some people
are saying that Hamas has now
made a decision to suspend attacks against what
they themselves call "Israel within the 1948
borders," and not strike at civilian targets.
Terror attacks in the territories will
continue, since Hamas does not consider the
settlers civilians, but soldiers. If what they
are saying is true, it can be seen as an
interesting development - on the condition that
it heads in a positive direction. In the
meantime, Hamas continues to smuggle arms, fire
mortars from the Gaza Strip and attempt to
smuggle explosives from Gaza to the West Bank
via Israel.
Hamas, and not only Israel, has no faith that
the partial calm will not suddenly be
shattered. Their leaders in the Gaza Strip are
looking for hiding places for fear of a sudden
targeted assassination. Among other sites, they
are looking for apartments in high-rise
buildings in Gaza. Evidently, they are relying
on Israel to exercise caution and not do what
Hamas does at every opportunity - intentionally
target masses of civilians.
Arafat's attitude toward acts of terror,
conversely, shows no change. Once again, there
are numerous reports that aside from the
diplomatic flag he is flying, the Palestinian
leader is also bearing the flag of terrorist
attacks against Israel. In so doing, he plays
into the hands of the Sharon government. Were
there to be a sudden large-scale terrorist
attack, at the same time as Arafat continued to
disrupt the stabilization efforts of the Ahmed
Qureia (Abu Ala) government after having
already brought down the Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen) government, it is a virtual guarantee
that the Israeli cabinet would take action
against him, notwithstanding the UN General
Assembly resolution that called on Israel not
to do so. One group of the Tanzim understands
that if they do not prevent terror attacks,
these will bring about Arafat's removal. But
since the Tanzim have turned from a single
organization into a cluster of armed gangs, it
is all too possible that the tone will be set
by groups from Nablus and Jenin that have been
penetrated by Hezbollah members with links to
the Iranian Republican Guards.
The current reality - in other words, the
evasion of implementing reforms or the fight
against terror, and Arafat's continued rule -
has frozen any chances for a renewal of
negotiations. There is no chance of the
government of Israel agreeing to conduct
negotiations with a leader that Washington,
several European states and even some Arab
states (albeit not publicly) consider the heart
of the problem.
Washington would be prepared to push for a
renewal of negotiations on the basis of the
road map if it were persuaded that the Qureia
government had begun to fight terror, that it
had real control over all of the security
agencies and organizations, and that it was
carrying out the reforms it is expected to
implement. Washington is no longer willing to
show patience for Arafat, but even in regard to
Qureia, Washington and the quartet are adopting
a forceful tone. While they were willing to
give Abu Mazen and Mohammed Dahlan 90 days of
grace before beginning to fight terror, they
now expect the Qureia government (which has not
even begun to function) to begin to act
immediately. Abu Ala's tactics are different
from those of Abu Mazen. He places emphasis on
achieving a consensus in Palestinian society
more than on external activity. He therefore
needs Arafat's "umbrella." He is also acting
forcefully among Israeli figures in order to
gain the support of elements of Israeli
society. For him, the protest of the Israeli
pilots provided evidence of cracks in Israeli
society that are worth trying to widen.
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