U.S. Supreme Court
UNITED STATES v. SEEGER, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)
380 U.S. 163
UNITED STATES v. SEEGER.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 50.
Argued November 16-17, 1964.
Decided March 8, 1965. *
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 51, United States v. Jakobson, on certiorari to the same court, and No. 29, Peter v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
These three cases involve the exemption claims under 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of conscientious objectors who did not belong to an orthodox religious sect. Section 6 (j) excepts from combatant service in the armed forces those who are conscientiously opposed to participation in war by reason of their "religious training and belief," i. e., belief in an individual's relation to a Supreme Being involving duties beyond a human relationship but not essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. In all the cases convictions were obtained in the District Courts for refusal to submit to induction in the armed forces; in Nos. 50 and 51 the Court of Appeals reversed and in No. 29 the conviction was affirmed. Held:
1. The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in 6 (j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption. Pp. 173-180.
(a) The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal moral code nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations rather than religious belief. P. 173.
(b) There is no issue here of atheistic beliefs and accordingly the decision does not deal with that question. Pp. 173-174.
(c) This test accords with long-established legislative policy of equal treatment for those whose objection to military service is based on religious beliefs. Pp. 177-180.
2. Local boards and courts are to decide whether the objector's beliefs are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious: they are not to require proof of the religious [380 U.S. 163, 164] doctrines nor are they to reject beliefs because they are not comprehensible. Pp. 184-185.
3. Under the broad construction applicable to 6 (j) the applications involved in these cases, none of which was based on merely personal moral codes, qualified for exemption. Pp. 185-188.
326 F.2d 846 and 325 F.2d 409, affirmed; 324 F.2d 173, reversed.
Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for the United States in all cases. Assistant Attorney General Miller was with him on the briefs in all cases. Ralph S. Spritzer was with him on the briefs in Nos. 50 and 51, and Marshall Tamor Golding was with him on the briefs in No. 50.
Duane B. Beeson argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 29.
Kenneth W. Greenawalt argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 50.
Herman Adlerstein argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 51.
Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance in Nos. 50 and 51 and reversal in No. 29, were filed by Alfred Lawrence Toombs and Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union, and by Leo Pfeffer, Shad Polier, Will Maslow and Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress. Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance in No. 50, were filed by Herbert A. Wolff, Leo Rosen, Nanette Dembitz and Nancy F. Wechsler for the American Ethical Union, and by Tolbert H. McCarroll, Lester Forest and Paul Blanshard for the American Humanist Association.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases involve claims of conscientious objectors under 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 456 (j) (1958 ed.), which exempts from combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons who by [380 U.S. 163, 165] reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. The cases were consolidated for argument and we consider them together although each involves different facts and circumstances. The parties raise the basic question of the constitutionality of the section which defines the term "religious training and belief," as used in the Act, as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." The constitutional attack is launched under the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and is twofold: (1) The section does not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors; and (2) it discriminates between different forms of religious expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Jakobson (No. 51) and Peter (No. 29) also claim that their beliefs come within the meaning of the section. Jakobson claims that he meets the standards of 6 (j) because his opposition to war is based on belief in a Supreme Reality and is therefore an obligation superior to one resulting from man's relationship to his fellow man. Peter contends that his opposition to war derives from his acceptance of the existence of a universal power beyond that of man and that this acceptance in fact constitutes belief in a Supreme Being, qualifying him for exemption. We granted certiorari in each of the cases because of their importance in the administration of the Act. 377 U.S. 922 .
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression "Supreme Being" rather than the designation "God," was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views. We believe that under this construction, the test of belief [380 U.S. 163, 166] "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is "in a relation to a Supreme Being" and the other is not. We have concluded that the beliefs of the objectors in these cases meet these criteria, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgments in Nos. 50 and 51 and reverse the judgment in No. 29.
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In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), a unanimous Court construed the language of the exemption limiting the status to those who by ''religious training and belief'' (that is, those who believed in a ''Supreme Being''), to mean that a person must have some belief which occupies in his life the place or role which the traditional concept of God occupies in the orthodox believer. After the ''Supreme Being'' clause was deleted, a plurality in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), construed the religion requirement as inclusive of moral, ethical, or religious grounds. Justice Harlan concurred on constitutional grounds, believing that the statute was clear that Congress had intended to restrict conscientious objection status to those persons who could demonstrate a traditional religious foundation for their beliefs and that this was impermissible under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 344. The dissent by Justices White and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger rejected both the constitutional and the statutory basis. Id. at 367.
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