<<what price now.. >> ... apparently not a lot ;0)
Shared Control: The Price for Turkish Troops in Iraq
Oct 13, 2003
stratfor.biz
Summary
Following tough negotiations on a Turkish deployment to Iraq, it appears likely that Ankara will join Washington in exercising control over the occupied country. Though this will not halt attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, it could aid the United States in attempts to gradually extricate itself from the main burden of fending off the guerrilla war.
Analysis
Under pressure from the government and despite significant public opposition, the Turkish Parliament recently passed a motion in favor of sending troops to Iraq. Ankara now has a green light to negotiate with the U.S.-led coalition authority on conditions for the deployment -- initially planned for about 10,000 troops. U.S. and Turkish officials likely will begin talks on the details in the coming days; officials in Ankara say the negotiations could take up to two weeks, according to the Turkish Daily News.
In the weeks leading up to the U.S. attack against Iraq, Turkey refused to send troops into the conflict or to allow U.S. forces to use its soil as a staging point. So what has caused the policy reversal? This analysis, drawing on the statements of Stratfor sources within the Turkish government as well as from the public statements of U.S. and Turkish leaders, will examine that question, as well as what Ankara seeks from Washington in exchange, and how the negotiations might end.
Turkey: At Geopolitical Crossroads
These are fascinating days for Turkish decision-makers: Since the Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power late last year, the nation has been in the process of reinventing its geopolitical course and priorities. And when a nation is at a crossroads, it can take any -- even the most unexpected -- path if that is best suited to its national interests.
The last such instance for Turkey came after World War I, when Kemal Ataturk founded the modern state. Forging a geopolitical direction, however, took several years: First, Ataturk turned against entente -- the alliance of Western powers to which the United States belonged -- and defeated British-Greek intervention between 1919 and 1922 with some military help from another fledgling state, Soviet Russia. However, Ankara later formed a long-lasting association with the West -- first with Germany and, since the end of World War II, the United States.
Ankara is now re-examining its path again. What distinguishes this Turkey from that which existed until the end of last year, however, is that the current government no longer is restricted to the role of junior ally in its relationship with foreign powers. Ankara feels the time has come for Turkey to follow a course defined by its own national interests, regardless of how that fits with or detracts from the goals of other powers.
Thus it was that Ankara denied Washington permission to base combat forces on Turkish territory in March: The government did not see such a move as benefiting national interests. But seven months later, the situation has changed. Officials in Ankara realize that, for all the risks involved, it would be better for Turkey to intervene militarily in Iraq than to continue bowing out. Ironically, as it strikes a more independent geopolitical stance, the new government is finding it beneficial to again drift closer to Washington.
Turkish Forces in Iraq: What's at Stake
Several major national interests make it imperative for Ankara to intervene militarily in Iraq on the side of the United States -- and foremost among these is to ensure that nothing can threaten Turkey from the south. From the Turkish perspective, this requires several steps.
First, officials in Ankara believe, the new government in Baghdad should be either pro-Turkey or at least friendly toward Turkey. This means the Turkish government should exert some influence in Baghdad -- something that would be easier to do if its troops were deployed in significant numbers to Iraq. Ankara fully understands that the United States intends to wield controlling influence in Iraq for years to come -- and this will be no problem for Ankara if Washington agrees to give it "second in command" status.
Second, Turkish leaders fear that Iran could become a dominant power in Iraq or share that role as the main ally of the United States. In either case, this would exclude Turkish influence: Turkey and Iran have struggled over what is now Iraq for centuries, including through bloody wars. It now appears that Iran is better positioned to win this game, given its strong ties with and influence over the Shiite majority in Iraq. To reverse the odds, it seems Turkey must put troops on the ground in Iraq.
Third, Turkey feels it must resolve the Kurdish question. Though Ankara limits this goal officially to the elimination of the PKK guerrilla group (now known as KADEK) operating in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, its larger strategic goal likely goes much further than that. It appears Ankara seeks to weaken all Kurdish militant forces in Iraq, by military defeat if necessary. If Iraqi Kurds stand idly by while U.S. and Turkish units crush KADEK units, Kurdish control of northern Iraq would be diminished. However, if Iraqi Kurds intervene and launch attacks against Turkish troops as they have threatened, Ankara would have an opening to wage a military campaign against all Kurdish militants in Iraq. Moreover, it is almost certain that U.S. troops would intervene on the Turks' behalf -- which would play nicely into Ankara's hand.
Fourth, Ankara wants a share of the energy wealth found in northern Iraq, including obtaining a major say for Turkish companies in the country's energy sector. Again, putting troops on the ground will aid this endeavor. Though Turkish troops initially would be deployed outside Kirkuk and other northern oil fields, Ankara possibly could expand its military presence on the pretext of escalating violence.
Fifth, Turkey needs to strengthen itself economically and militarily to meet its geopolitical goals in Iraq and elsewhere. If Ankara sends troops to Iraq, lawmakers reason, Washington might return the favor in the form of loans -- both from Washington and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -- as well as military hardware.
Finally, being able to pursue its own agenda without alienating the United States is certainly an attractive opportunity for Ankara in Iraq, where officials believe -- likely correctly -- they can reinvigorate the erstwhile alliance by sending forces to help relieve embattled U.S. forces.
Turkish troops almost inevitably would come under repeated attacks in Iraq, but from Ankara's point of view, this strategy might be less risky than standing idly by while other powers gain influence over the country. Moreover, it appears to us that Turkish leaders, though speaking of the deployment as that of peacekeeping forces, would not really mind if they become embroiled in combat: The more Turkish soldiers are fighting in Iraq, the better Ankara's chances for influencing future developments in the country and region.
The Payoff: Ankara's Demands
In accordance with these goals, Ankara is laying out the following negotiating points in its dialogue with Washington, Turkish government sources tell Stratfor:
?Certain eradication of PKK/KADEK units and their infrastructure in Iraq, either through U.S., Turkish or joint action.
?A U.S. guard for Turkish supply lines through Kurdish areas to the Sunni Triangle. This would be in addition to an absolute guarantee from Washington that the Kurds would never receive de facto or de jure independence.
?Iraq should be a united state with a pro-U.S. and pro-Turkish government, and the role of Turkomen in the Iraqi government should be increased.
?Assurances or cooperation from Washington to ensure that power will not be transferred to Iraqi Shiites as proxies of Iran, and no role for Tehran in Iraq. Ankara will ask Washington to abandon its strategy of relying on Iran and Iraqi Shiites as its main ally against the Sunni resistance movement, arguing that Turkey should fill that role.
?A slice of the Iraqi oil industry, second only to that of the United States. In particular, Turkey should have a major say on how Iraqi oil in the north is treated and where revenues go. By the same token, Turkish firms should become major participants in oil deals in the north.
?No role for Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the future Iraq -- a goal that Ankara believes Washington seeks itself.
?More financial aid from the United States and IMF.
?New deliveries of large amounts of modern military hardware to the Turkish army, at significant discounts.
?A green light for Turkish forces to combat and defeat Iraqi Kurds if there are any attacks against Turkish supply lines in northern Iraq. This is a non-negotiable point from Ankara's position, sources tell Stratfor. If supply lines are attacked, Turkish military control of Iraqi Kurdistan -- perhaps shared with the U.S. military -- should be established, Ankara is likely to suggest.
?Turkish forces in Iraq should operate under Turkish command, though it is possible that Ankara will coordinate with the U.S. command on counterinsurgency operations.
Though Ankara understands its demands are bold, it sees the United States as desperate to get Turkish troops in Iraq, believing that no one else -- not even a coalition cobbled together from dozens of nations -- will really be able to aid U.S. troops on the ground, given the inherent divisions between goals and languages of participating countries and the Turks' prior experience in the Iraqi climate and terrain. If Washington accepts these conditions, Ankara will renew its full alliance with the United States, but on a more equal footing than before. In exchange, Ankara will fully commit itself to pacifying Iraq, up to the point of completely but gradually taking over the counterinsurgency war from Americans, thus releasing U.S. troops for their force projection goals in Iraq. Basically, Turkish forces would do all the fighting and U.S. forces would be stationed in Iraq for strategic purposes. But this would be the case only if Washington accedes to Turkey's demands.
Washington's Viewpoint: Turkey or U.N.?
Turkish negotiations with Washington over the Iraq deployment will be difficult indeed. Washington has its own vision for Iraq, and an overly strong (from its perspective) Turkish role and full accession to Ankara's demands does not fully fit in. However, the Bush administration is likely to agree to most of Turkey's negotiating points, for several reasons.
For one thing, the time for Washington to decide how to defeat the Iraqi resistance movement is rapidly running out, before U.S. President George W. Bush's re-election chances diminish beyond repair and before the financial costs of operations in Iraq become economically unbearable. Who would be able and willing to make a timely difference on the ground in Iraq? Surely not Honduras. In Stratfor's mind, it appears that only the Turkish army, which is strong in both numbers and training -- as well as familiar with the war theater and local guerrillas' tactics -- is a viable option.
That would require much more than the initial 10,000-strong deployment -- but the Turkish General Staff has a follow-on plan to rapidly expand its military presence in Iraq. The end goal also would require significant and continued human sacrifices, but the tolerance among the Turkish army and public for these are higher than those of Americans.
Another reason Washington is likely to accept most of Ankara's demands is that a Turkish deployment would largely extricate American forces from the war, allowing them to serve the goal they came to Iraq with in the first place: To project force against other countries in the region that are deemed to be potential U.S. foes, such as Syria, Saudi Arabia or Iran.
Moreover, if Washington makes a deal with Ankara quickly, the United States would stand a chance of outmaneuvering its opposition within the U.N. Security Council over Iraq: With a massive deployment of skilled Turkish soldiers on the ground, Washington could simply cancel its draft resolution requesting U.N. authorization for foreign troops. This would keep the Bush administration from having to cede control over Iraq to the United Nations -- though that control would have to be shared with Ankara.
It would seem that in Washington's eyes, this is the lesser evil.
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