A good 4GW site:
d-n-i.net
Fourth Generation Warfare
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Roughly speaking, "fourth generation warfare" includes all forms of conflict where the other side refuses to stand up and fight fair.
What distinguishes 4GW from earlier generations is that typically at least one side is something other than a military force organized and operating under the control of a national government, and one that often transcends national boundaries.
If we look at the development of warfare in the modern era, we see three distinct generations … Third generation warfare was conceptually developed by the German offensive in the spring of 1918 … Is it not about time for the fourth generation to appear? Lind, Nightengale, Wilson, et. al., Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989
The attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center are horrific examples of operations as part of a campaign conducted according to fourth generation principles. They dispelled forever the notion that 4GW is just "terrorism" or something that happens only in poverty-stricken Third World countries. But it is a strange form of warfare, one where, for example, military force plays a much smaller (though still critical) role than in earlier generations, often supporting initiatives that are more political, diplomatic, and economic. As important as finding and destroying the actual combatants, for example, is drying up the bases of popular support that allow them to plan and then execute their attacks. Perhaps most odd of all, being seen as "too successful" militarily may create a backlash, making the opponent's other elements of 4GW more effective.
The authors of one of the first papers on the subject captured some of this strangeness when they predicted:
The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear.
Is 4GW Just Another Word for "Terrorism"?
"Terrorism" (defined as seemingly gratuitous violence against civilians and non-combatants) can occur in all generations of war. Until recently, in fact, most wars killed many more civilians than military and not all of this was accidental - recall the Rape of Nanking, the London Blitz, and the firebombing of Dresden. As 4GW blurs any distinction between "military" and "civilian," we can expect more activities that the general population will regard as terrorism.
Similarly, because practitioners of 4GW are often transnational groups without territorially-based armies as such, much of their activity will resemble "guerilla warfare" or "low intensity conflict." These highly irregular practices have deep roots in the history of war. The word "guerilla" itself, for example, dates back nearly 200 years to Napoleon's campaigns in Spain. Until recently, however, such "special" operations harassed but rarely decided—"sideshows" (as T. E. Lawrence once termed them) in wars fought mainly along 1st, 2nd, or 3rd generation lines. Examples could include operations by colonial militias and guerillas during the Revolutionary War, Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry raids, Sherman's March, and the tactics practiced in the early stages of most "national liberation" wars in the 20th Century.
Is 4GW Simply Using Military Force in New Ways?
The premise of 4GW is that the world itself has changed, so that terrorism and guerilla warfare—and other elusive techniques that are still being invented—are now ready to move to center stage. It would be a mistake, however, and perhaps a goal of our opponents might be to encourage this mistake, if we were to focus on the techniques and not the nature of 4GW itself. The place to begin is with fundamental differences between 4GW and earlier generations.
As Col T. X. Hammes eloquently argues in "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," social and political changes are driving this evolution. You can construct your own list of what is different about today's world than that of, say, 1950. Here are some ideas to get you started:
explosion in drug trafficking, with associated money flows and corruption to the extent that trafficking organizations are the de facto governments in a growing number of areas
worsening income inequities combined with a general decline in standards of living in many Third World countries, particularly in Africa and Central/South America
continued exponential increase in the world population
a growing "demographic youth bulge" in Third World countries, where un- / underemployment is already severe [cited in recent CIA testimony]
escalating sectarian violence as evangelizing religions (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc.) clash over influence in rapidly growing Third World countries
survival of non-representative governments in the Third World that use religious and ethnic animosities and anti-American sentiments to distract from their own corruption and economic mismanagement
accelerating AIDS epidemic in parts of the Third World [~30% of adults in Botswana are HIV-positive]
rise of Third World mega cities with populations exceeding 20 million
growth of worldwide connectivity (CNN and the Internet, for example)
ease of global transportation (24 hours between any two points)
increasing scarcity of arable land and water
disintegration of the Soviet Union and continued instability in that region
end of the bipolar world order and of the interpretation of events through a Cold War filter
ready availability of small arms and other weapons from the end of the Cold War
growing use of pre-adolescent children as combatants
resurgence of violent transnational ideological groups
safe havens for these groups in areas of Africa, Asia, and South America where any effective government (even if corrupt and incompetent) is lacking
continued growth in wealth and influence of transnational corporations that sometimes have incentives to perpetuate corrupt, non-democratic regimes
emergence of US as the only conventional / economic superpower
If these or similar factors are indeed driving the evolution of conflict, then solutions must lie primarily in this arena, that is, within the realms of economics, diplomacy, and law-enforcement. Military force will play a smaller role, performing specific tasks to solve problems that are intractable through other means. A coherent "grand strategy" is needed to ensure that military (destructive) actions harmonize with our overall objectives and do not undermine the public support needed to prosecute a fourth generation war to its successful conclusion. Technology is not unimportant, and may provide options, but the fact is that lack of suitable technology cannot explain our less-than-stellar track record in fourth generation warfare.
Editor's Note: Any discussion of 4GW, since it involves conflicts of culture and religion, is likely to generate a high degree of emotion. In the articles that follow, some may find the authors' views to be simplistic or even offensive. For the record: Defense and the National Interest does not endorse any political, cultural, or religious viewpoint. These papers, however, raise many important questions about the nature of future conflict, and we are publishing them to stimulate thought and debate.
10/6/2003 4GW and the Moral Imperative, LTC Greg Wilcox, USA (Ret.) To a great degree, 4GW is moral warfare - understanding this is a key to success for both sides. (256 KB PDF)
10/6/03 Judo of Fourth Generation Warfare, Col GI Wilson USMCR (Ret.) Presented at INFOWARCON 2003. (1.8 MB PDF)
4th Generation Warfare and the Dangers of Being the Only Superpower A Warning from Clausewitz by William S. Lind, Counterpunch, March 8, 2003.
Introduction to Asymmetric Warfare, Fourth Generation Warfare, and Maneuver Warfare, GySgt Bob Howard, USMC. Teaching 4GW concepts to the folks who are actually going to have to do it. (43 chart, 547 KB MS PowerPoint briefing - would not convert to PDF, as sometimes happens with PPT files)
Fourth Generation Warfare, LTC Greg Wilcox, USA Ret., and Col. GI Wilson, USMCR, Ret. A concise introduction to the subject and brief assessment of our operations in Afghanistan. Presented at the 2002 Boyd Conference at Quantico. LTC Wilcox's (USA, Ret.) 4GW experience includes three tours in Vietnam, and Marine Col. GI Wilson is co-author of the original paper on 4GW. 75KB PDF document.
Military Response to Fourth Generation Warfare in Afghanistan, LTC Greg Wilcox, USA, Ret., and Col. G. I. Wilson, USMCR, Ret. A companion to the above briefing offering more detail on our successes and failures in Afghanistan from a 4GW perspective.
Fourth Generation Warfare Today - Remarks by H. Thomas Hayden, USMC, Ret., July 18, 2003.
Joint Inquiry Staff Statement on September 11.
Asymmetries and Consequences, Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Ret. National leaders have insisted, correctly in our view, that we must take the offensive against terrorism. With few terrorist havens remaining to bomb, however, and with the majority of active al-Qa'ida operatives likely already in the US, western Europe, or in countries we are not going to attack, what does this mean? In this paper presented at the Global Strategy Conference in Priverno, Italy, May 2002, Richard Szafranski offers some concrete answers. Ultimately we can prevail: "My belief," he writes, " is that the September 11, 2001, attacks were unwise. Monumentally unwise." (55KB PDF file.)
e-Jihad Against Western Business. British consultant and war correspondent Giles Trendle warns that as participants in 4GW become more sophisticated, they will expand their battlefields to include western businesses, their Web sites, and their e-commerce infrastructure. Now available are some of his more recent articles, The Colonel's Network Warfare, The ‘Swarm’ Factor in the Arab-Israeli Conflict and Omen In The Ghetto.
Fighting Stupid, Defending Smart, Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Ret. If the attacks on September 11 were meant to cripple our economy, what role can aerospace power play in preventing or defending against such attacks in the future? In other words, is there a mission for the Air Force in 4GW? 103KB MS Word document; originally published in Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 2002.
When David Became Goliath, MAJ Christopher E. Whitting, RAAOC, Australia. Masters Thesis at the US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001. 393 KB PDF File. A thorough look at the problems that 2nd and 3rd generation armies (even very good ones) face in conducting 4GW.
"Tactical Notes from Afghanistan," anonymous note commenting on the quality of both sides and the way the fighting is evolving. Posted 4/02
"The Next War? Four Generations of Future Warriors," Eric Walters, Professor of Land Warfare, Military History, and Intelligence at the American Military University. Professor Walters has prepared this sweeping look at trends in modern warfare from materials used in his courses at AMU. Rather than extrapolating from trends in war itself, Prof. Walters approaches the question of future warfare by looking at what is happening with the people - the warriors - who will be fighting it. A spectacular PowerPoint briefing (2.5 MB) and great introduction to 4GW. For those with slower connections, we also have a .pdf version (714 KB) with the speaker notes. Bibliography in MS Word (26 KB).
Fourth Generation Warfare: What Does it Mean to Every Marine? Col Michael D. Wyly, USMC, Ret. The source of our advantage over fourth generation opponents lies not in the superiority of our technology or even of our ideology. In this prescient paper, Mike Wyly maintains that it lies in the very bedrock of our society - the Constitution. Those would would wage 4GW must read, ponder, and understand this remarkable document, to which all members of the military have sworn to protect from all enemies, foreign and domestic. [As a colleague of then-Commandant Al Gray, Col Wyly was one of the prime movers behind the Marines' adoption of third generation - maneuver - warfare in the late 1980s.]
New Order Threat Analysis: A Literature Survey November 2, 1996. Fred Fuller, Reference Librarian at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Comprehensive survey of the basic concepts of 4GW as they appeared in the literature in 1996. Good introduction to the field.
The Introduction to Spirit, Blood and Treasure, Ed. MAJ Don Vandergriff. Why 4GW is the type of warfare we should be preparing for, and what this means for doctrine, personnel policies, training, and force structure. (Presidio Press, June 2001.)
The strange battle of Shah-i-Kot, by Brendan O'Neill. How a battle that should have been over in 24 hours lasted a week and hundreds of bodies turned up missing. Only the absence of CNN kept it from becoming a second Mogadishu. More troubling, did Shah-i-Kot demonstrate that our commanders still have a fascination with "destroying infrastructure," and so fail to grasp the nature of fourth generation warfare? Link to the article at Spiked.com.
"Fourth Generation Warfare is Here," By Harold A. Gould and Franklin C. Spinney. Why the attacks of September 11 are not simply acts of "terrorism" but represent the opening shots in true 4GW.
For those new to 4GW, this is probably the best place to start: "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," by LtCol Thomas X. Hammes, USMC. LtCol Hammes observes that "generations" of warfare are not defined primarily by the technology employed since, to some degree, each generation can use any available technology. Rather, generations are better categorized by political, social, and economic factors. After buttressing his case with examinations of China, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and the West Bank (Intifada I), LtCol Hammes concludes this important paper with the prediction that, "By using fourth generation techniques, local antagonists can change the national policy of Western democracies. Then once the Western forces have gone, they can continue to pursue their local objectives using earlier generation techniques." Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, September 1994.
"The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," by William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR). The classic article on why there really is something that should be called "fourth generation warfare," and why we should be paying very close attention to it, whatever it turns out to be. Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989.
"Is The U.S. Military Ready To Take On A Non-Conventional Terror Threat?" Elaine M. Grossman, Inside the Pentagon, October 18, 2001. Another in ITP's comprehensive look at the changing nature of warfare and how the US military is - and is not - shaping the war against terrorism in Afghanistan.
The Transformation of War, Martin van Creveld (Free Press, 1991). An essential reference for fourth generation warfare. Required reading, at some point, for every serious student of the subject. Study it until you can say "non-trinitarian" with conviction.
"A New Kind of War," Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, September 27, 2001. Best evidence yet that when it comes to 4GW, our top leaders do get it.
"Terrorism Battle Like Drug War All Over Again," Hal Kempfer. Once money began flowing into the War on Drugs, it, and not narcotrafficantes, became the focus of attention.
"Key Review Offers Scant Guidance On Handling '4th Generation' Threats," Elaine M. Grossman, Inside The Pentagon, October 4, 2001, Pg. 1. Well executed analysis of the new (2001) Quadrennial Defense Review. Briefly, the parts dealing with 4GW were pretty much bolted on after September 11, and it shows.
Paradoxes of War, (500 KB PDF file) Grant T. Hammond, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for Strategy and Technology at the Air War College, originally published in the Spring 1994 Joint Force Quarterly; republished with permission of author. The techniques and philosophy of 4GW applied to nation-vs.-nation conflict. Strangeness persists: war and peace blur and intermingle, decisive wars are fought with little or no armed conflict, and operations on the moral and mental battlegrounds determine victor and vanquished. When it must be used, military force adds to the confusion and despair of the opponent, rather than simply bludgeoning him into surrender. Dr. Hammond is the author of The Mind of War, a recent biography of John R. Boyd.
"Letter From the Middle East (I)" Exclusive to DNI - how the attacks of September 11 played to a wide cross-section of Egyptians. A first-person report from the region. Letter from the Middle East (II) - an update from three Arab countries on the mood in January 2002. Letter from the Middle East (III) - After Israel's Campaign: Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, May 31, 2002. |
