Operation Iron Hammer: Shock and Awe II
Nov 13, 2003
stratfor.biz
Summary
U.S. forces in Baghdad launched the second consecutive night of counterinsurgency operations Nov. 13. Dubbed Operation Iron Hammer, the offensive has thus far relied on the physical and psychological use of overwhelming and technologically superior force to try to quell the guerrilla activity and the support for it. But the operation is only one piece of a larger puzzle to effect a mindset change both in Iraq and back in America.
Analysis
Explosions were heard again during the night in Baghdad on Nov. 13, but this time, U.S. forces engaging in counterinsurgency operations caused them, rather than militant mortar rounds landing in the U.S. administrative compound. It was the second night of Operation Iron Hammer, a pre-emptive counterinsurgency offensive in and around Baghdad that has thus far been characterized by overwhelming technology and forces. This is in contrast to earlier counterinsurgency operations that relied mostly on search and seizures and raids of suspected militant hideouts.
Operation Iron Hammer is part of a larger overall plan to regain the initiative in Iraq and effect a mindset change both in Iraq and the United States. Washington is accelerating discussions with the Iraqi Governing Council, calling on it to take more administrative responsibility. The United States also is mulling the formation of an Iraqi counterinsurgency team. Iron Hammer, intended to demoralize and destroy Iraqi insurgents and their potential support bases, offers a clear demonstration of U.S. forces. But the operation, like most other plans in Iraq, has its risks -- in this case, collateral damage.
On Nov. 12 at around 9 p.m. local time, a U.S. AC-130 Spectre gunship opened fire on an abandoned dye factory in southern Baghdad. The beginning of fire followed more than a week of monitoring the site, which U.S. forces believed served as a meeting point and weapons cache for insurgent forces. Earlier in the day, U.S. forces warned locals in the area to stay clear of the building, subsequently leveled by the U.S. attack.
On the same night, U.S. forces deployed Apache attack helicopters to track down a van carrying suspected insurgents seen firing a mortar in the city. All the insurgents were killed or captured in the attack.
The more aggressive tactics of Iron Hammer differ from previous counterinsurgency operations that relied primarily on raids of suspected hideouts and weapons caches. In addition to infantry and light armor, U.S. forces are now adding airpower and heavier weapons, such as the AC-130's 105mm cannon. This seemingly disproportionate force response is, in some respects, a psychological tool to send this message: If you fire a mortar at U.S. forces, expect to be hunted down and killed with some of the world's most advanced weaponry.
But the message is intended for more than the militants or potential militants. The destruction of a building using an AC-130 certainly leaves a lasting impression on people who may be thinking about offering sanctuary or material support to insurgents -- U.S. forces hope they think twice.
In essence, the new operation is a tactical application of the strategic reasoning for going into Iraq in the first place. In part, the invasion of Iraq was a way to signal the rest of the Arab world -- or any country in fact -- that any thought of hosting or supporting al Qaeda or other anti-U.S. militants would be met with a swift and overwhelming response from the United States. On the tactical level, this is now being implemented in the form of Operation Iron Hammer.
The strategy was previewed in early November when U.S. F-16s dropped 500-pound satellite-guided bombs on targets near Tikrit and Al Fallujah in response to the downing of two U.S. helicopters.
How successful it will be as part of the broader campaign remains to be seen, however. Without a solid intelligence network in place, U.S. forces will have few high-level targets to strike in and around Baghdad. Further, the chances for collateral damage is, in some respects, proportional to the size of weapon used. A few miscalculations, misguided bombs or strikes relying on faulty intelligence could undermine Washington's attempts to demoralize potential insurgents and their supporters, strengthening resolve against U.S. forces.
And this is why it is so important for Washington to accelerate the transition of some authority -- or at least responsibility -- for Iraqi security to Iraqis themselves. Using Iraqi intelligence assets will allow for more nuanced and better-vetted information, and may avoid many of the cultural and language mix-ups that slow operations. Deploying indigenous Iraqi forces -- something that has already been done in coordination with U.S. forces and independently on a small scale -- may open the way for more effective counterinsurgency operations in sensitive areas that are difficult for U.S. or other foreign coalition forces to enter.
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