as if the Middle East debacle isn't enough:
Free Intelligence Briefing
Originally Posted on November 17, 2003
Latin America: Racial Revolt in the Making
Summary
Racially based popular revolts among poor indigenous and peasant
groups are spreading throughout Latin America. Four South
American presidents have been toppled in the past four years, and
more forced regime changes are likely in the coming months,
endangering U.S. economic and security interests in several
countries.
Analysis
Slightly more than a decade after Latin American reformist
governments enthusiastically embraced free-market economic
policies advocated by the United States, popular revolts against
those policies are erupting across the region. In the past four
years, popular uprisings have ousted four democratically elected
presidents in Ecuador, Peru, Argentina and Bolivia -- where
former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada resigned and fled the
country on Oct. 17 after month-long riots in which 60 to 80
people were killed and more than 400 injured.
In recent weeks, violent popular demonstrations against free-
market policies also have rocked Central American and Caribbean
countries such as Honduras and the Dominican Republic. The most
recent violence broke out Nov. 11 in the Dominican Republic,
where at least six people were killed and more than 100 injured
in clashes between poor protesters and government security
forces. If the violent protests continue in Santo Domingo and
other Dominican Republic cities, they could destabilize the
government of President Hipolito Mejia and possibly force his
resignation. Moreover, it's possible that over the next six
months new popular revolts could force the ouster of Ecuadorian
President Lucio Gutierrez and interim Bolivian President Carlos
Mesa.
All of these popular uprisings share a common theme: Poor
indigenous, black and "mestizo" or mixed-race Latin Americans are
revolting against elected governments that seek to implement the
free-market economic and trade policies included in the so-called
"Washington Consensus." The popular uprisings against these
policies, which are called "neo-liberalism" across the region,
also coincide with a rapid increase in anti-U.S. sentiment that
appears to cut across all classes, from poor to rich.
A new poll of nearly 19,000 Latin Americans in 17 countries by
Chilean-based Latinobarometro, one of the most accurate and
respected polling organizations in the region, found that anti-
American sentiment among middle-class and poor people has more
than doubled in the past three years, from 14 percent in 2000 to
31 percent as of mid-2003. A separate poll by U.S.-based Zogby
International found recently that only 18 percent of Latin
American leaders in government and business believe that closer
economic engagement with the United States will benefit the
region. Moreover, 87 percent of the leaders surveyed by Zogby had
a negative opinion of U.S. President George W. Bush.
These gloomy numbers -- and the popular revolts gaining momentum
across the region -- suggest that many Latin American democracies
are at risk of imploding and being replaced by authoritarian or
populist governments with an anti-U.S. agenda. The polls also
indicate that the region's leaders do not trust the Bush
administration's policy prescriptions for Latin America. In fact,
many increasingly view some U.S. foreign policy priorities in the
region -- such as the drug war and unfettered free-market
policies -- as major contributing factors to the growing turmoil.
However, the Bush administration appears oblivious or indifferent
to these trends, perhaps because Washington does not perceive any
immediate and direct threats to U.S. homeland security coming out
of Latin America. In effect, at several recent meetings between
senior U.S. and Latin American officials in Miami and Trinidad
and Tobago, the official U.S. message has been that Latin
America's troubles are not economic, but rather political and
institutional.
Senior U.S. officials -- like Roger Noriega, the assistant
secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere -- have urged Latin
American leaders to accelerate pending economic and trade
reforms. However, most poor Latin Americans are convinced that
the economic and free-trade policies that the United States has
promoted aggressively since the end of the Cold War are
responsible for growing regional poverty and unemployment.
The region's poor also have linked the implementation of U.S.-
promoted economic policies with the huge surge in corruption the
region has experienced since the end of the 1980s. From Mexico to
Argentina, the poor perceive that the greatest beneficiaries of
privatized state enterprises have been corrupt bankers, business
cronies and relatives of whoever is in power. Though this isn't
historically unique in Latin America, where government corruption
has been a fact of life since the Spanish Conquest 400 years ago,
populist political leaders and radical groups with an anti-U.S.
agenda have persuaded the poor that the free-market policies
advocated by Washington also fueled a new era in corruption that
benefited the dominant rich elites and foreign companies at the
expense of the poor.
However, as an adviser to the U.S. administration's core Latin
America policymaking team told Stratfor recently, "There isn't
any viable alternative model to free-market economic and trade
policies." In effect, with the exception of Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez, all of the supposedly left-leaning presidents
elected over the past year in Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and
Paraguay have run for election on anti-market platforms, but have
steered orthodox economic courses once in power. Even Bolivia's
Mesa is trying to stay on course with free-market policies --
despite threats from indigenous and peasant leaders that he will
be overthrown in a new popular revolt if he doesn't abandon these
policies quickly in favor of big-government socialist schemes.
The Racial Politics of Popular Revolt
The biggest popular revolts in Latin America have erupted in
recent years in countries with large indigenous and poor
populations, such as Ecuador and Bolivia. This has fostered the
perception among some observers that these revolts are mainly a
clash of cultures between traditionalist indigenous peoples and
modernist dominant ethnic groups descended from European
immigrants. These perceptions are not entirely accurate, however.
It's true that there are major cultural differences between
indigenous peoples and long-ruling white elites in many Andes
region countries. As a result, there are elements in these
revolts that could be described as a clash between civilizations.
However, the main reason there have been popular revolts in
recent years in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador is that the
poorest citizens -- who happen also to be indigenous -- are
rebelling against governments that implement policies which the
poor believe have made poverty worse.
Moreover, while indigenous people may be among the poorest in the
region, the majority of the black and "mestizo" or mixed race
populations in Latin American countries are also poor.
Increasingly, indigenous leaders, populists like Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez and radical groups seeking to oust
capitalist democracy in favor of centrally-planned authoritarian
governments also are linking poverty to race. This linkage is
particularly effective in Latin America, where indigenous people,
blacks and mestizos have occupied the lowest rungs of the
socioeconomic ladder for centuries.
Since the 18th century, race has been a causal factor in popular
revolts against governments in countries such as Haiti, Bolivia
and Mexico. However, the twin forces of globalization and
regional leftist groups seeking to reinvent themselves since the
end of the Cold War have turned race and ethnicity into a core
factor in the popular revolts the region has experienced in the
past four years.
>From southern Mexico to Bolivia, indigenous groups have been
taught how to organize politically, using their race or ethnicity
to differentiate themselves -- and their political agendas --
from central governments ruled by white elites. In some cases --
such as the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in the
southern Mexican state of Chiapas in 1994 -- they have taken up
arms to press their cause. With the aid of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) that have legitimate humanitarian or
environmental agendas, many indigenous groups also have developed
extensive regional and international networks to promote their
political agendas, which basically include demands for political
autonomy and titled land ownership.
Indigenous groups in areas rich in natural mineral or energy
resources also are demanding a substantial share of the profits
derived from extracting and exporting those resources so that
they can fund their own economic and social development
independently from the control of central governments dominated
by white and mestizo elites. This is the case in countries such
as Ecuador and Peru, for example, where indigenous groups oppose
the environmental destruction they claim is caused by foreign oil
mining companies, yet at the same time they also demand deals
guaranteeing them royalties and other income derived from
whatever resources are taken out of areas the indigenous groups
consider their ancestral or tribal homelands.
Coca, Neo-Marxism and Identity-Based Politics
Before Sanchez de Lozada resigned as Bolivia's president on Oct.
17 and left the country for the United States, he condemned his
opponents as "narco-terrorists" seeking to establish an
authoritarian leftist regime based upon the international
narcotics trade. Senior U.S. State Department officials have
since dismissed Sanchez de Lozada's accusations. Stratfor also
believes that his allegations of a narco-terrorist plot against
his government were greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, Bolivia's
former president did make a valid point.
The Aymara and Quechua indigenous groups that make up 70 percent
of Bolivia's population -- and were at the core of the popular
revolt that toppled Sanchez de Lozada -- have legitimate
grievances in terms of their centuries-old exclusion from
mainstream Bolivan society. However, there is also substantial
evidence that organizational input and funding for some of the
groups that participated in the revolt that ousted Sanchez de
Lozada came from international drug traffickers and radical
leftist groups that are seeking to end Bolivia's 18-year-old
free-market democratic government.
For example, Bolivian indigenous leaders like Evo Morales and
Felipe Quispe became nationally prominent over the past 20 years
by embracing indigenous identity-based politics and symbolism.
They wear the traditional clothing of Aymara Indians, and have
established local and regional political organizations based upon
centuries-old indigenous traditions. They also advocate core
indigenous spiritual and social values rooted in tradition.
Quispe calls himself the Mallku, which is Aymara language for
high-flying Condor. The Condor is the largest predator bird in
the Americas, and is also a centuries-old symbol of Aymara
leadership and ethnic pride. While this symbolism means little or
nothing to nonindigenous white Bolivians or U.S. policymakers, it
is a vital component of Bolivia's identity-based indigenous
politics.
However, Morales and Quispe also advocate the creation of a
socialist or Marxist regime in Bolivia. Morales wants to follow
Chavez's example and win the presidency in democratic elections
so he can implement his version of a Bolivarian revolution;
Quispe advocates seizing power through armed revolution. Both
leaders are virulently anti-American: Their political demands on
Mesa include kicking the United States out of Bolivia
permanently, aborting the U.S.-backed coca eradication program,
renationalizing all privatized strategic energy and mining
industries, rejecting the proposed FTAA and aligning Bolivia with
Cuban leader Fidel Castro.
Both Morales and Quispe receive substantial political support
from Havana. Morales recently took part in a forum held in
Havana, during which he called on Latin America's poor to unite
in a regional popular revolt against "neo-liberalism," which is
the word all Latin Americans use to describe U.S.-centric free-
market economic and trade policies. Morales also vowed, during a
recent speech in Havana at a forum hosted by Cuban leader Fidel
Castro, to turn Latin America into a new Vietnam for Washington.
Radical Leftist Groups and Legitimate NGOs: Same Bed, Different
Causes
In addition to his leftist, would-be revolutionary credentials,
Morales also is the elected leader of an organization called the
Andean Council of Coca Leaf Producers (CAPHC). The group claims
to represent the legitimate interests of Bolivian coca growers
who have cultivated coca for thousands of years. CAPHC argues
that coca is a central element of Andean indigenous culture and
religion. However, the CAPHC appears to be a front organization
for coca growers that supply drug traffickers with the raw
material from which cocaine is made.
The CAPHC is officially headquartered in the Bolivian capital
city of La Paz and the coca-growing Chapere valley region, but
its affiliated member groups extend geographically from the
Chapare as far north as southern Colombia. It has affiliated
members in Peru's Apurimac and Ene coca-growing regions where the
insurgent group Shining Path still roams freely. Its members also
include groups in Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia, mainly located in
regions where coca is cultivated or where major drug-trafficking
routes cut geographically through the interior of South America.
In all, the CAPHC claims to represent more than 1 million people
who derive their income in some way from the cultivation of coca,
most of which is sold to drug traffickers for export as refined
cocaine to the United States and Europe. The Peruvian component
of the CAPHC also claims it can tap the support of up to 240,000
armed local peasant self-defense fighters that were set up in the
late 1980s by Peru's government to combat Shining Path.
Morales says the CAPHC is concentrated in the Chapare valley
region and is controlled by Bolivians. However, the organization
appears to be funded and controlled by a regional and
international network of NGOs -- including some with legitimate
environmental or humanitarian agendas -- and extreme-left
political groups. The unifying feature of these member- or
support groups is active resistance to the U.S.-funded drive to
eradicate coca. Groups allied with the CAPHC include the Peruvian
Peasant Federation (CCP), which is linked to ultra-left
Mariategui Unified Party (PUM). Another member group is the
United Left (IU), a Peruvian political party that is a founding
member of the Sao Paulo Forum. The forum is an umbrella
organization of Latin American leftist political parties and
insurgent groups like Colombia's rebel organizations, that was
established in 1990 jointly by Cuban leader Castro and current
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva.
Legitimate NGOs with institutional ties to the CAPHC reportedly
include the Society for Endangered Peoples, the South American
Indian Council, Cultural Survival-USA, the U.S.-based Drug Policy
Foundation, the New York-based anthropological Wenner Gren
Foundation and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). In effect, the
composition of the CAPHC's members and known supporters
illustrates the manner in which radical leftist groups with links
to drug-trafficking organizations in the Andes region have
misappropriated the environmental or humanitarian agendas of NGOs
like the WWF for political purposes. This theft of legitimate NGO
agendas by radical groups seeks ultimately to replace the
region's 15-year experiment in capitalist democracy with
centrally planned regimes that likely would be authoritarian.
Bolivian Ripple Effects
Bolivia appears to be ground zero for a sustained popular revolt
by self-described revolutionary groups seeking to install
socialist democracies or authoritarian regimes with Marxist
tendencies. However, the process is being replicated to different
degrees in other countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and
Mexico. For example, Peru's Toledo faces a nascent revolt by coca
growers, and Ecuador's Gutierrez faces imminent national
demonstrations by indigenous groups that don't grow coca but are
determined to evict capitalist democracy from their country. In
southern Mexico, the Zapatista leadership has started to create
autonomous local indigenous governments.
Moreover, in all of these cases, indigenous groups appear to be
seeking autonomous self-government and titled land ownership that
eventually could escalate into secessionist drives that could
balkanize some countries. In Bolivia for example, lowland areas
like Santa Cruz and natural gas-rich Tarija already are demanding
autonomy from the highland regions, where La Paz is located. The
Bolivian lowlanders, who are mainly of European descent but also
include indigenous groups, want to disassociate themselves from
radical highland indigenous leaders who would establish an
indigenous form of communistic government that existed in before
the Spanish conquest.
In southern Colombia, the FARC has demanded complete political
control over the coca-growing departments of Caqueta and Putumayo
as a condition for even considering peace talks with the
government of President Alvaro Uribe Velez. In southern Mexico,
Zapatista leaders are openly discussing the eventual secession of
Chiapas in favor of creating a new indigenous nation that would
include northern Guatemala, which also has a large indigenous
population with a 40-year history of armed violence against the
central government in Guatemala City.
U.S. policymakers in Washington say that the only way to end
these popular revolts is to incorporate marginalized indigenous
and other ethnic groups into mainstream society while deepening
free-market reforms and joining a U.S.-centric FTAA. Ultimately,
however, the solution to the region's spreading popular revolts
might not be found in Washington, but rather in Brazil. Da
Silva's government is trying to stay the course with orthodox
free-market policies while finding ways to close the huge
socioeconomic gap between millions of poor Brazilians and the
wealthy minorities that have controlled Brazil's wealth and
political institutions for centuries.
If Washington and Brasilia don't find common ground in upcoming
venues like the FTAA meeting in Miami on Nov. 20 and 21, da
Silva's chances of closing the gap between the rich and poor
likely will shrink significantly. More important, if Brazil's
poor blacks lose faith in da Silva, who has experienced near-
starvation first-hand, the rural indigenous and peasant uprisings
that have destabilized several Andean countries in recent years
could merge into urban revolts by poor blacks and mestizos in
countries like Brazil. This could bring more authoritarian
figures to power in several countries, or it could lead to civil
conflicts like the one Colombia has suffered for nearly four
decades. |
