The London-based Control Risks Group said last week that al-Qaida's network has been largely dismantled and is leaderless.
This is a good thing, but not a reason to relax. As I’ve said before, the guys that scare me are not the leaders whose pictures are on Bush’s desk, but the ones we haven’t heard of yet. New leaders will emerge, and new organizations, and they will all want to make a mark.
The ability to stage major attacks on US soil has certainly been compromised, but since we have generously provided them with an abundance of American targets outside US soil, they no longer have the overwhelming need to stage such attacks. The overriding purpose of 9/11, as far as I can see, was to bait the Americans into the position that the Russians occupied in Afghanistan, that of an occupier who has taken something he cannot hold. That is the kind of war the Muslim radicals like, and the kind of war they believe they can win. They know they will never be able to invade America, or defeat American forces in open combat, but they believe – and not without reason – that if we are occupying static positions in territory friendly to them, they can impose unacceptable damage, force early withdrawals, and successfully undermine the governments we leave behind. I think they also believe that the anti-American backlash precipitated by American actions in Iraq can be manipulated to undercut pro-American governments in key nations with populations that are largely sympathetic to Islamist objectives.
These objectives are by no means unachievable. The American position in Afghanistan and Iraq is terribly vulnerable. The overthrow of an American sponsored government by an Islamic movement in either country would be an overt defeat for the US, and is by no means unimaginable: we will not stay in those places forever, and the governments we leave behind will not be strong.
Our biggest problem, though, is in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Both are plum prizes, one because of its oil, the other because of its nuclear arsenal. Both governments have weak governments that are nominally but ineffectively allied to the US. In both cases the existing governments are highly vulnerable, and the likely successors will be Islamic radicals. In both cases the existing governments have been pushed way out on a limb by their support of unpopular American initiatives. America’s ability to influence the political process in either place through any means short of outright invasion – which is what the Islamists want us to do – is very limited. There are no good solutions in either case: we are committed to supporting bad, unpopular governments who show little likelihood of getting any better, simply because the alternative is unthinkable.
In short, we’ve strutted into the trap, and I don’t think our position is stronger than it was a year ago. In many ways, it’s weaker.
In the end, more inclusive, inter-faith and inter-civilizational initiatives will likely prove to be the most effective means to reach out to and mobilize the middle of Arab and Muslim public opinion against the false prophets of the bin Laden and Zawahiri variety.
Very true, but for this to work we will also have to convince the middle of Arab and Muslim public opinion that we are not a bunch of strutting crusaders out to prove that our god is bigger than theirs. We have not done a terribly good job of that so far. |
