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Iraqi Guerrilla Tactics
Nov 28, 2003
stratfor.biz
Summary
Iraqi guerrilla tactics include traditional insurgency tactics, suicide bombings and infrastructure attacks. The attacks of the resistance have tended to grow more sophisticated. So far, low-tech guerrilla tactics have successfully competed with the U.S. forces' high-tech firepower. Insurgents cannot militarily defeat U.S. forces, but if not adequately countered, they are sufficient to make occupation untenable for the coalition in the long run.
Analysis
The following is an analysis of Iraqi guerrilla tactics and how they are influencing the course of the war. Tactics are part of the art of war -- the other parts are military strategy and operations -- and are responsible for preparing and conducting combat on a battlefield level. Accordingly, guerrilla tactics are about preparing and conducting actions, such as guerrilla attacks, on a battlefield level.
Understanding guerrilla tactics will help explain how the war progresses, reveal important things about the guerrillas, indicate what kind of countertactics coalition forces will deploy and, taking into account all of the above, explain how the conduct and military outcome will be influenced in this war.
The best way to draw conclusions about Iraqi guerrilla tactics is to analyze first which targets the insurgents have attacked and then what types of attacks they have employed.
Targets
U.S. forces are the most valuable target for guerrilla attacks. Consistent with their strategic goal of driving the U.S.-led foreign presence out of Iraq, guerrillas attack U.S. forces wherever and whenever they can. For the guerrillas, it is a total war and they make no exception about whom they attack. Routine targets are U.S. military bases and other stationary positions, guard posts, patrols, convoys, and small groups or individual soldiers who have strayed from heavily guarded compounds. U.S. troops on the move are much more frequently and successfully attacked than those inside bases.
The headquarters of the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority, the Al-Rasheed Hotel, and the Green Zone -- the central area of Baghdad heavily fortified and protected by numerous U.S. forces -- have become the new strategic targets for guerrillas, an indication of their growing military capabilities.
Non-U.S. military forces are the second target. Except for infrequently attacking British troops in the Basra area, guerrillas rarely disturbed other non-U.S. forces until this fall. For the past three months, however, we have seen a steady stream of attacks on Italian, Polish, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Danish, Honduran and Moldovan soldiers.
Guerrillas have declared an outright war on pro-U.S. Iraqi forces, attacking members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and other local officials, pro-U.S. politicians, police and security guards. Even during the recent drop in guerrilla operations that directly targeted the coalition during the U.S. offensive in November, the insurgents have stepped up attacks against pro-U.S. local targets, CPA head Paul Bremer pointed out.
Guerrillas also are targeting civilian non-Iraqi targets with rising frequency. They mostly have been U.S. contractors and civilian government employees, but other Western contractors and journalists have been hit as well.
Infrastructure, especially in the energy sector, is an important guerrilla target. Insurgents want to create an economically untenable situation in Iraq to help push coalition forces out and prevent Washington from using Iraqi oil as it sees fit.
Traditional Guerrilla Tactics at Work in Iraq
Drive- and walk-by shootings: These have been the simplest methods of attack. Drive-by shootings have greatly outnumbered walk-by attacks, because it is harder for guerrillas to get close enough on foot to hit U.S. soldiers, who have been on a permanently elevated state of alert in efforts to pre-empt such incidents.
Sniping attacks: These have been rare in Iraq, although several U.S. soldiers have been killed at a distance -- snipers typically aim at the head when a soldier is wearing an armor vest. This suggests that the guerrillas do not have many former Iraqi special and intelligence forces snipers in their ranks. Arab military sources tell Stratfor that those Iraqi services had quite a few good snipers before the war.
Roadside bombings: This has become the most widespread method of attacking U.S. forces on the move in patrols or convoys. Such bombings have accelerated since July and have become an almost daily occurrence in recent months. Guerrillas have used industry-made landmines on only a few occasions. Their weapon of choice is an improvised explosive device (IED), which suggests two important things: First, the tens of thousands of land mines the Iraqi army had before the war are off-limits to the guerrillas, probably because only a few former top commanders are participating in the resistance. Second, it took time for the guerrillas to master IEDs. Third, creating and using IEDs so that they successfully hit the enemy -- not the creator -- is a learned art, suggesting that former Iraqi sappers are widely present in the guerrilla movement. This tactic is convenient and low-risk. The time of greatest danger is the planting of the IED, when U.S. troops might observe and destroy them -- this has happened on a few occasions.
Simple ambushes (small arms and grenade-launcher fire): Guerrillas frequently use this tactic, employing the traditional hit-and-run method. Guerrillas usually open fire, inflict losses in some cases and quickly flee the scene.
Complex ambushes (roadside bombings and small arms/grenade launcher/mortar fire): Only experienced guerrilla groups have mastered this tactic, probably one of the deadliest. When an IED detonates under a vehicle, a U.S. commander usually stops the convoy to return fire, take care of wounded and call for help. Guerrillas use this time to shower the convoy with as much firepower as possible.
Attacks on U.S. tanks: These happen only rarely because coalition tanks as a rule are too heavily armored to hit effectively. Guerrillas have destroyed only two Abrams tanks since May, either with anti-tank mines or a very powerful IED. Guerrillas also use grenade launchers and anti-tank missiles against tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
Ground-to-air attacks: These attacks recently have become a headache for the U.S. command. Not only is downing a helicopter a significant loss of materiel, but also it almost always means fatalities. Guerrillas attack U.S. helicopters, military cargo and, since recently, civilian cargo planes that cannot help but fly at low altitudes. They use Russian-made shoulder-fired missiles -- Strela-2m, Igla, grenade launchers and even small arms -- all from former Iraqi army arsenals.
Grenades/grenade launchers/small-arms attacks: Guerrillas use these to hit U.S. bases, guard posts and other fixed positions. They are more effective against smaller targets that guerrillas can approach closely for the sake of accuracy.
Missile/mortar/grenade launcher attacks: Guerrillas use these against U.S. bases and Iraqi police stations. A trend appears to be emerging with missiles and mortars being used far more often than they were during the summer months. Greater frequency has the potential to make such attacks more effective. Since the guerrillas' missiles are not precision weapons, introducing mortars -- which apparently are operated by skilled Iraqi soldiers -- is the most dangerous development for U.S. troops. The frequent mortar fire on targets inside the Green Zone creates tactical and operational risk for U.S. forces.
Terrorism-Style Tactics
Suicide attacks: These have operational and sometimes even strategic significance beyond the battlefield: Cases in point are the failed attack on U.S. headquarters in Baghdad, the death of Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) leader Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and almost 100 others in An Najaf, the deadly attack on Italian headquarters in An Nasiriyah, and the bombing of the U.N. and Red Cross headquarters in Baghdad.
Suicide bombings at U.S. checkpoints, local police stations and pro-U.S. local offices: These are employed across the country, with trucks used more often than bombers on foot. Due to the U.S. policy that troops will open fire on anyone who does not stop at a specified distance, few successful bombings have been carried out at the check points. Still, attempts will continue. And suicide bombings against Iraqi police and pro-U.S. Kurdish factions have taken a large toll.
Attacks on civilian targets: In addition to suicide bombings, guerrillas have used missiles, mortars and small-arms attacks against various civilian offices. They have killed U.S., other foreign and pro-U.S. Iraqi civilians in drive- or walk-by shooting attacks. These also include attacks on humanitarian and foreign diplomatic convoys.
Assassinations: Sometimes the resistance specifically hunts down a particular victim -- especially IGC officials, judges and security chiefs. Coalition military personnel are targeted for assassination as well. A few U.S. soldiers were killed point-blank by lone assassins while on the street or buying a newspaper. These were target-of-opportunity attacks.
Firing at civilian aircraft: This is a new tactic in the Iraqi guerrilla war and it substantiates the point that, for the guerrillas, this is total war. If it continues, it could complicate the humanitarian and overall situation in Iraq -- particularly in Baghdad -- since much of Iraq's supplies are flown into the capital.
Kidnappings: Insurgents kidnap both military and civilian targets in Iraq. In most cases, the victims end up dead. Two U.S. soldiers, a Turkoman politician in Basra and several other pro-U.S. Iraqis were kidnapped and killed by unknown assailants. In some cases, like that of the South Korean Embassy employees, the kidnap victims were released with the message that all foreigners should leave the country.
Attacks Against Infrastructure
Sabotage of U.S. military communications and supply lines: This is rare except for attacks against U.S. logistics convoys carrying fuel and other supplies for the troops. Using wireless communications helps U.S. forces keep their communications intact. However, logistics and maintenance units and infrastructure are occasional targets. Also, guerrillas blew up a train carrying troop supplies. They derailed another U.S. military logistics train in November. Some airports where U.S. military cargo and helicopters are stationed also were attacked with grenade launchers and small arms. Still, attacks on U.S. military infrastructure have not had a meaningful impact so far.
Sabotaging civilian infrastructure: This occurs frequently and has a significant bearing on the energy sector in northern Iraq and on Baghdad's supply of fuel and electricity. Seeing the Iraqi energy sector under American control, the guerrillas treat it as enemy infrastructure, blasting oil and gas pipelines. Sabotage of oil wells is rare due to their heavy protection by local and U.S. forces. On the whole, the energy infrastructure is under attack in the north only; oil facilities in the south have not come under serious attack.
Attacks on energy sector personnel and offices: This kind of attack tries to deprive the United States of the use of Iraqi oil. U.S. oil firms are the main target with their offices and hotels -- where their personnel stay -- often showered with missiles.
Nonenergy sabotage: This is limited to blowing up water mains and electric grid towers. The three-day blackout in Baghdad in November likely was collateral damage from oil sabotage of infrastructure north of Baghdad. Guerrillas have carried out few attacks on nonenergy infrastructure because they do not want to alienate the local population. If hard-pressed, they might resort to such methods.
Surprises From the Guerrillas
Traditional guerrilla tactics, terrorist-style operations and infrastructure attacks have been typical in many guerrilla wars. Still, Iraqi guerrillas sometimes employ tactics that have been rarely if ever used elsewhere. These surprises betray a high level of sophistication and have a military and psychological impact on the war.
Ambushes with ensured fight: This has come as a surprise to the U.S. command. Instead of leaving when armed convoys return fire, some resistance groups engage the U.S. forces. Moreover, some guerrillas boldly attack U.S. reinforcements -- new armor or gunships -- despite being outnumbered. Many still manage to escape.
Multiple ambushes: Fortunately for U.S. troops, these are rare. These attacks require that at least one vehicle be blown up so guerrillas can engage the gunships called in for help; when the convoy moves ahead, a second team attacks it with IEDs and small-arms fire.
Anti-helicopter ambushes: These are the most difficult. In mid-November, a guerrilla group attacked a U.S. foot patrol, hoping to do exactly this. When U.S. helicopters arrived with quick reaction teams, the insurgents fired at them from predetermined positions. One helicopter was hit and crashed into the other. Both were lost. We suspect highly trained former Iraqi special services soldiers are behind these attacks.
Timed missile attacks: This is a new tactic: U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz narrowly escaped when 29 missiles were fired at the Al-Rasheed hotel from multiple-launching ramps set on a two-wheel trailer and camouflaged as a generator.
Donkey-cart missiles: Guerrillas often use this ancient means of transport to fire timed missiles. The Palestine and Al-Rasheed Hotels were fired upon by donkey-borne missiles in November, but another donkey with the same mission and weapon was found before missiles were fired at the Italian Embassy.
Conclusion
Guerrilla tactics combine traditional insurgency methods, suicide bombing missions and infrastructure attacks. Insurgents attack both preselected and targets of opportunity.
Guerrillas cannot militarily defeat U.S. forces using their current tactics. But if not met with adequate U.S. counterattacks, the tactics will be sufficient to make the occupation untenable for the coalition.
A worrisome sign for the U.S. Command is the growing sophistication of guerrilla attacks. Many guerrillas have military experience from the former Iraqi army and they are gaining more as the war continues. Some Iraqi guerrillas employ tactics rarely seen elsewhere, which has both a military and psychological impact.
Iraqi guerrilla tactics are an asymmetric response to superior U.S. technology and firepower. The asymmetry also was present in March and April during the conventional phase of the Iraq war; it did not help the Iraqis then. Now it is different: Low-tech tactics -- down to using donkey carts to fire missiles -- so far successfully have countered the huge imbalance of forces that favors the coalition. |
