financialsense.com
War Watch #6
by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.
December 2, 2003
On November 6, President Bush in a major policy address said, “Our commitment to democracy in the Middle East must be a focus of American policy for
decades to come. Iraqi democracy will succeed, and the success will send forth the news from Tehran to Damascus. The United States has adopted a new
policy: a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. Freedom is the calling of our time. It is the calling of our country. It is the right and capacity of all
mankind.” (Emphasis added.)
President Bush evidently believes it is the U.S. destiny to replace totalitarian regimes throughout the Middle East with democracy. By
‘democracy,’ he seems to imply a political environment within which people are free to advance different ideas and trade with people of
other nations. This is without question a direct challenge to authoritarian and theocratic governments everywhere, with special emphasis
directed to the Middle East.
Within the Middle East, the President’s speech is likely to be taken as an announcement of exactly what Lt. Gen. Boykin was criticized for
saying; namely, that the war on terrorism is a religious war. The opening of the Middle East to different ideas and trade is clearly
recognized as an opening for Christian missionaries, Western ideas and products, and neo-Western culture, all of which are in direct
confrontation with Islam. (Neo-Western culture, in particular, will constitute a lethal attack on Islamic culture in the same sense that it has
constituted a successful attack on Christianity in the United States over the past ninety years. An insightful look at this process in recent
years is contained in Rabbi Daniel Lapin’s 1999 book, America’s Real War. As Lapin shows, America is no longer a Christian nation
because of these neo-Western cultural forces.)
In his speech, President Bush, while not mentioning it by name, makes it clear that he is the new leader of ‘The Project for a New
American Century,’ which, simply put, is a new American imperialism. The ideas contained within this project pre-emption, attack on
totalitarian regimes, imposed democracy, ‘freedom’ for all, and a global American police force, have come increasingly under attack over
the past year, especially during the attack on Iraq and its aftermath. These same concepts were incorporated into the U.S. National
Security Strategy that President Bush approved on September 16, 2002.
The war on terrorism continues, but with Iraq now called the front line in the battle against terrorism. This portrayal of the war in Iraq is
under attack by several former U.S. officials, including counter-terrorism experts, who point out that the attack on Iraq has diverted needed
efforts and capabilities from the war on terrorism as proclaimed following 9-11.
President Bush’s war on terrorism is not intended to be a short war. Every month since the war on terrorism began in the latter days of
September, 2001, senior Administration officials, beginning with President Bush himself, have stated with the utmost clarity that this would
be a long war. It will last for decades. It will extend beyond many of our lives. This point was reiterated by President Bush in his November
6 speech in which he stated that the battle to implant democracy in the Middle East alone would be a decades-long battle. What is clearly
presented to Americans and the world is a permanent war led by the United States. What is amazing is that this policy has not been
challenged or subject to any meaningful public debate.
(For further insight into what is happening, it is useful to consider the primary conclusion reached by a small, but extremely powerful, group
of American elitists {the board of directors of the Carnegie Foundation} beginning in 1908. The question they discussed over several years
was how to best introduce and incorporate serious social changes into a culture. Their conclusion was that changes could best and most
easily be introduced and accepted during periods of war. During war, people accept changes with minimal objection. The longer the war,
the more time people have to get used to the changes and accept them as permanent. The social changes these elitists and their
associates at other major foundations {especially the Rockefeller Foundations} with whom they cooperated were socialism, globalism,
taxation, and, in general, the foundational beliefs adopted during founding of the American republic as set forth in the Constitution and Bill
of Rights. This glimpse of U.S. elitist thinking was uncovered by the Reece Congressional investigation of 1952-1953. For further
information see their 1954 Final Report or its analysis, The Foundations, by William McIlhany.)
Two top priority elements of White House policy that have become increasingly evident over the past month have been the over-riding
importance of getting President Bush re-elected in 2004 and the need to press forward with the political agenda that is set forth in ‘The
Project for a New American Century.’ The big dilemma is how to pursue both at the same time. (See ‘Iraq Policy Crossroads’)
As the public agreement with President Bush’s policies fell below 50 percent in November, attention increasingly has been focused on the
President’s 2004 election campaign and the growing need to generate new public support for his policies. Suddenly, it became crucial to
turn the problems in Iraq over to the Iraqis as soon as possible without, of course, loosing behind-the-scenes control. There has also been
an increase in propaganda to stop the decline in President Bush’s approval ratings. The two most important events in this respect are his
highly publicized November 6 speech on the need to help people gain their freedom throughout the world (beginning in the Middle East),
a freedom that is the ‘right and capacity of all mankind,’ and his Thanksgiving visit to the U.S. troops in Baghdad.
Another evident consideration affecting the war planning process is a belief that Americans are unlikely to dump a President in the middle
of a war. This is not true, however, if there is substantial public dissatisfaction with the war coupled with adverse economic conditions.
‘Public dissatisfaction’ is a mis-labeling of reality because, aside from adverse economic conditions such as inflation or unemployment,
public satisfaction and dissatisfaction is subject to heavy manipulation by the news media, especially television. Barring the emergence of
some presently unknown new factor, President Bush would be unbeatable in the next election if there were a popular war going on and
there were no seriously overriding negative economic factors.
It is worth recalling that those who brought us the war on terrorism and the Iraq war took the first step in Afghanistan where they knew war
could be sold as a matter of popular opinion after 9-11 and where a quick victory there was seen as an excellent opening to attack Iraq.
Documents found by various investigative reporters and scholars have shown that Iraq was a high priority target before 9-11. Following
9-11, interest in attacking Iraq was as strong as interest in attacking Afghanistan. The attack proceeded against the Taliban and al-Qaeda
in Afghanistan because attacking them was more understandable to the public and once that attack had succeeded, attention could be
shifted to initiating a war in Iraq. Moreover, the attack in Iraq was also only a preliminary move. The plan was Iraq first, then Syria,
Lebanon, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East. Since the beginning of the Iraq war, the stage has been set for war against
Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia through propaganda. War in Iraq was never an end in itself, only a beginning of the effort to introduce
political and social change throughout the Middle East, with the war on terrorism being the cover. This can also be seen in President
Bush’s November 6 speech.
The only bugaboo in expanding the war seems to be pubic opinion. However, from all indications, the news media (with the assistance of
their army of academic and retired military experts who helped make the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq popular wars) would quickly support
a broader war to expand political and social change throughout the Middle East. All that is required is to bring into place a situation that
‘demands’ an expansion of the ongoing war. In this respect, note a broadening of the rhetoric from ’keeping the peace’ and ‘building a
new Iraq’ to include winning the war on terrorism, the front-lines of which are in Iraq. That is, Iraq is pictured as only the immediate tactical
battle line in the broader war on terrorism, not as an independent ‘war’ in its own right.
It has also become increasingly evident that almost all the assumptions and statements of what would happen following the U.S. invasion
of Iraq are now widely recognized as grossly out of touch with reality. Official documents that recently have made their way into the public
domain have shown that these assumptions and calculations used to support the decision to attack Iraq were not shared by the
government experts (as distinct and different from the policy makers) who had predicted and warned against precisely the problems that
now plague the U.S. military forces in Iraq. The reason for this dichotomy is that those who dominated the war planning process apparently
were not interested in information that did not support their agenda, except to make certain that it did not see the light of day. It is not that
the experts and decision-makers disagreed. Rather, the decision-makers simply viewed anything that posed a threat to their agenda as a
plague to be quarantined, discredited, bypassed, or destroyed.
The result has been a steady stream of misrepresentations and duplicity from the top levels of the U.S. government since the morning of
9-11. Data and facts associated with 9-11, the anthrax letters, and threat Iraq posed have been hidden in safes, not because their
release would jeopardize national security, but because they would be politically embarrassing. Logic and words have been manipulated
to support decisions already made, not to shape better decisions. Even the rationale for the war on Iraq seems to change every few
months, in search of more acceptable political winds.
Those who once stood out because of their evident reluctance to be part of the group think (such as Secretary of State Powell) now seem
to be 100 percent behind the group think. It would seem that the greatest risk to the Administration policy is the possible self-deception of
the policy makers as they begin to believe their own propaganda and group think. Now more than ever before it seems unlikely that a calm
presence might survive while trying to inject an element of caution respecting certain assumptions. Moreover, the advertised strengthening
of the economy may well be seen (in the group) as the result of war and defense expenditures, thus strengthening the arguments of those
who believe a further expansion of the war would lead to further economic growth and cement in the President’s re-election prospects, as
FDR experienced. However, there is a great difference between then and now. Most of U.S. industry that is important in an economic
recovery is now overseas. This was not the case in the 1940s. Similarly, the U.S. debt load today is enormous in all respects, personal
debt, corporate debt, state debt, national debt, and a gross trade deficit, with a great deal of U.S. obligations in the hands of foreign
countries whose interests may turn out to be considerably different from those of the United States.
Further, two additional negative factors seem to be emerging: a strong popular rejection of a new military draft (current efforts to reinstate
the draft are triggered by the obvious realization that we need more foot soldiers than we have to expand the war) and a possible need for
justification rhetoric to expand the war that is different from that used to justify going to war in Iraq. The war in Iraq has become
increasingly unpopular as casualties and deaths following the ‘end of the war’ exceed those suffered during the war. Unpopularity has also
grown as people have begun questioning the ‘justification’ for going to war and the conditions encountered after the war, which have
revealed serious weaknesses in the U.S. leaders understanding of the culture of the occupied country and the emergence and nature of
the guerrilla war. These same difficulties have also been recognized by other countries and organizations that have quickly imposed
restrictions on their own support and activities in Iraq (for example, the UN, Red Cross, Turkey, Spain, and, increasingly, diplomats and
foreign contractors in Iraq). The same political propaganda tactics that were used to launch the war in Iraq (the WMD bogeyman and how
happy the people will be with their new freedom) may not serve to enable an expansion of the war to other countries. At present, it is close
to inconceivable that the United States would launch an attack on Syria or Iran, notwithstanding all the Bush and Sharon bluster.
There are also two more negative factors that seem to be ignored or swept under the rug. First is bin Laden’s pronouncement following the
collapse of the Twin Towers that the way to defeat the United States is to attack the U.S. pocketbook, the dollar. A renewal of effective
terrorist strikes in the United States could have serious economic repercussions, as were felt following 9-11. The terrorist use of WMD
(weapons of mass destruction, nuclear warheads, or chemical/biological warfare agents) in the United States could be disastrous
(especially if U.S. intelligence were unable to credibly pinpoint the source of the attack, as in the still unsolved case of the anthrax letters).
Second are the similarities between the increasing guerrilla operations against the United States and her allies in Iraq and the guerrilla
operations in the early stages of the Vietnam War that led into a gradual expansion of that war. What makes this similarity worth serious
attention is the direct statements by certain officials in Communist countries (for example Cuba, which had a major terrorism coordination
role during the last three decades of the Cold War) that what was needed (perhaps to counter The Project for a New American Century)
was to get the United States involved in several more Vietnams.
It would seem that the thing to watch for would be increased terrorism of such a nature that will increase the popular perception that the
United States has to take a stronger stance, to become more aggressive; that is, to adopt an even more ‘forward’ strategy than is in place
today. The recent mutilation of the bodies of U.S. servicemen in Iraq is the type of event that can be used to justify a re-escalation of
military activity (such as Iron Hammer) or, conversely, to pull out, as happened in Mogadishu, and, earlier in Beruit. Today, it seems clear
that the response to any atrocities of that nature will be to escalate the war (such as Iron Hammer), hence the importance of watching for
increased terrorism and the way in which such events are handled by the news media and especially the White House. An increase in
terrorism can easily lead to a serious expansion of the war, triggered in reaction to a perceived popular desire to see us hit back.
A final factor of unrecognized and probably incalculable importance is the interest and response of international organized crime. What
has organized crime to do with the war on terrorism? The answer is obvious, once the linkages are exposed.
International organized crime, also known as global criminal capitalism (perhaps a better descriptor), now exceeds $2 trillion annual
revenues. It is probably as high as $3 trillion. In just the past ten years it has more than doubled in size. The interest alone on their profits
over the past decade is now estimated at $1 trillion!
These revenues mean that organized crime has become one of the most powerful global forces in business, finance, law, government,
and politics. International organized crime is gigantic. They have the money and respect needed to buy the best lawyers, financial experts,
government officials, intelligence officials, and politicians. Organized crime is so successful because it is so well connected and politically
protected.
Nor is all this money, compromise, corruption, and influence divided among a whole slew of different and independent, often competing,
criminal groups, from mom and pop operations, to cottage industries, to a dozen different ‘mafias.’ No. Rather, beginning in the early
1980s, the criminal groups started organizing cooperation and coordination. Today, they work together, plan together, and help each
other like never before. Unlike the past, today major components are actually run by state intelligence agencies. Their total capital
investment likely is in excess of $50 trillion. They dislike losing and tend to bet on sure things.
Most important, there are many connections between organized crime and terrorism. Both are heavily financed by illegal drugs. Most drug
trafficking organizations are into terrorism and vice versa. Organized crime’s second biggest money maker is illegal arms, munitions, and
explosives and the terrorists have been good clients. One of the main components in the war on terrorism, announced by President Bush
right at the start, is a war on the terrorists’ financial support mechanisms, which means money laundering. This covert financial support
system, money laundering, is the heart and soul of international organized crime.
International organized crime is probably more interested and more informed about the war on terrorism than the Pentagon, albeit from a
respectable distance. They are also more powerful and not answerable to any Congress or Parliament. They have world-class advisors
and intelligence sources that are unmatched by any state intelligence service. It is safe to assume that if high-level representatives wanted
to confer with bin Laden or Saddam Hussein, or any other terrorist or head of state, they could. They are very interested in the war on
terrorism because it amounts to a war in which very important parts of their organization are at risk, such as money laundering, drug
trafficking, and illicit arms transfer. International organized crime is not only interested in the war on terrorism but, we must assume,
involved.
International organized crime has three dominant interests. One interest is to keep their own operations and organization out of the
spotlight. A second is to safeguard their own ill begotten gains. The third is to increase their profits and power. The war on terrorism, as in
the case of wars in general, is an unparalleled opportunity to make money and open new markets, all done under the cover of war and
covert intelligence operations. They should be expected to be in favor of an intensification of the war on terrorism provided they believe
they can keep it contained and insure that their own losses are acceptable. The men at the top probably see the Middle East as a lot of
sand on top of a lot of black gold. Who runs the country or what political system governs is more or less irrelevant. What counts is how they
can profit. As a prominent global financier once said, “I don’t care who makes the laws so long as I control the money.” International
organized crime would welcome President Bush efforts to democratize the Middle East if they could walk away with a substantial share of
the oil revenues in the process.
Thus, the vast majority of the powerful financial and political forces stand to benefit through the expansion of the war on terrorism, so long
as they are sufficiently coupled into the process that they can profit by the opportunities (that abound in the chaos that is part of war) and
do not unduly risk their own assets.
In other words, the only evident serious concern that might militate against an enlargement of the ‘war on terrorism’ are the President’s
popularity polls and limitations on the abilities of White House spin artists to orchestrate new foreign initiatives in a manner that will justify
the enlargement and propel the popularity polls upwards.
© 2003 Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.
December 2, 2003 |
