25 million people free to grow and prosper in a democratic environment of free market capitalism, and the steady destruction of terrorists who are hell-bent on destroying the civilized nations of the world, especially the U.S. These benefits have made our decision of invasion well worth it.
None of these benefits have in fact been realized, and we have presented the Islamic extremists with a rare opportunity to defeat us. That’s something they cannot do on the battlefield, but if they can bring down whatever government we leave behind in Iraq and replace it with one that is sympathetic to their interests, they will win the war. That is a real possibility: our ability to influence political developments in Iraq is limited, and our rivals, particularly in Iran, are quietly building grassroots networks that they will keep hidden until we turn over power to the Iraqis.
I do not see the situation there as favorable, or anything like it. Afghanistan is worse, in many ways, despite the promising start. In both cases, we see similar problems: the US military is capable of performing assigned tasks with superb efficiency, but the political minds – to use the term loosely – assigning the tasks are incapable of accurately assessing and managing the next generation of tasks, tasks that cannot be accomplished with military force.
This view will inevitably be denounced as pessimism, but I refuse to play Pollyanna simply because the administration decrees that Pollyanna is the approved view.
You seem to assume that “doing nothing” and invading at once were the only available options. I don’t think that’s the case. I’ve never objected to the goal of removing Saddam, but I believe that if the process had been managed differently, perhaps with a little lower priority on American domestic politics and a little more thought for the future of Iraq, the prospects for the future of Iraq might be substantially different than they are today. |
