Outside View: Korean future bleak
By Matthew H. Polak
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
WASHINGTON, Dec. 29 (UPI) -- The likelihood of another round of six-party talks between China, the United States, Russia, Japan, South and North Korea remains bleak. The first meeting in August ended with little success. And though time has passed, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's desire for nuclear weapons has not.
This should come as no surprise. North Korea's highest-ranking defector, Hwang Jang Yop, noted in Washington in October 2003, "Kim Jong Il has always and will always seek nuclear weapons. ... People don't just develop (them) as toys."
One reason the August talks failed is that they could not alter Kim's nuclear rationale. Nuclear weapons are fundamental to his two overarching and interlocking goals: regime survival and Korean reunification under his control. Nuclear weapons provide Kim's regime with the best insurance against U.S. military action. From his perspective, if Saddam Hussein had had nuclear weapons, the United States would never have invaded Iraq. Thus, Kim sees nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of his regime.
Similarly, nuclear weapons support Kim's reunification goal because they would deter U.S. involvement in a war of reunification. Given Kim's motivations, convincing him of the futility of his nuclear ambitions is a daunting task.
Despite the failure of the August talks, however, multilateralism should not be abandoned; in fact, it should be strengthened to enforce tougher sanctions that limit the flow of foreign aid into North Korea and curb its exports of illegal narcotics, counterfeit money, missiles and maybe weapons of mass destruction that provide additional monetary support to Kim's regime.
Recent international efforts suggest that an agreement on a tougher stance toward North Korea is possible. For example, China temporarily stopped oil shipments to North Korea in July 2003 to demonstrate to Kim that it was serious about ending his nuclear program. In November, the Korean Energy Development Organization, a consortium of Japan, South Korea, the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community, voted to suspend construction on the light-water reactors promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework that North Korea violated after the failed August talks.
The Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, an 11-member coalition led by the United States, has also set up an air and naval patrol around North Korea to interdict weapons of mass destruction leaving North Korea. The PSI has not yet seized any weapons of mass destruction, but it has successfully intercepted narcotics shipments, a vital source of funding for Kim's regime. Thus, given Kim's continuing intransigence and the international community's resultant concern, there may be more room for a tougher sanctions regime.
Given the ideological and regime-legitimizing purposes that Kim's nuclear weapons serve, it is highly unlikely that rewards will induce him to give them up. Sticks, not carrots, are the only hope for convincing Kim to forego his nuclear dreams. Past carrots, such as foreign aid, have been channeled to Kim's political and military apparatus in North Korea, and there is little doubt that Kim will continue to deny the benefits of foreign aid to the starving North Korean population.
Limiting foreign aid is one of the few sources of leverage the international community has when dealing with North Korea, and on this front, China is key. As Hwang noted, "China is [Kim's] lifeline." In 2003, for example, China provided 50,000 tons of rice and 60 percent of the fuel that North Korea needs.
However, China's agenda is difficult to appraise. Beijing's assistance props up Kim's regime and effectively undermines potential economic levers. Yet, China is playing the part of diplomat, organizing and hosting the six-party talks -- most notably in their attempts to bring Kim to the bargaining table for a second time.
China's behavior is ambivalent because it simultaneously wants to preserve a communist buffer between itself and South Korea with its American allies, but it also realizes that a nuclear-armed Kim Jong Il is in no one's best interest.
At the next round of six-party talks, the United States should encourage China to make clear to Kim that his ability to threaten the world and be rewarded with aid is gone. Ultimately, Kim must get the message that, if his nuclear gambit persists, tomorrow will be bleaker than today, and China is the best bearer of that message.
If Kim believes China, and sees that it is serious about denuclearization, then he will have to rethink his bargaining strategy because his regime cannot survive without China's support. The reality is that Kim may never give up his nuclear program, but prolonging the status quo will certainly not change his mind. |
