Flaws Showing in New Iraqi Forces
Pace of Police Recruiting Leads to Shortcuts
By Ariana Eunjung Cha
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, December 30, 2003; Page A01
BAGHDAD -- The interview for aspiring police officers lasts two minutes and goes something like this: Col. Hussein Mehdi, the dean of the training academy, scans the candidate from head to toe for signs that he is shifty. He asks a question to verify his résumé. If the applicant says he studied electrical engineering, for instance, Mehdi inquires about the properties of a light bulb.
Then he gets to the heart of his probe: How do you feel about the "liberation war"?
"We want them to understand that the coalition forces are saviors, not occupiers," said Mehdi, 45. If a candidate has a different opinion, Mehdi said, he will be rejected.
As the U.S.-led governing authority in Iraq attempts to build a security force of 220,000 in the next few months, the competing priorities of speed and thoroughness have prompted shortcuts in the recruiting and training process. The consequences are starting to become apparent.
According to investigations over the past four months by a newly formed internal affairs unit at the Interior Ministry, more than 200 Iraqi policemen in Baghdad have been dismissed and dozens of others have had their pay slashed for crimes ranging from pawning government equipment to extortion and kidnapping.
In addition, roughly 2,500 people on the payroll of the Facilities Protection Service, which guards government buildings, either do not exist or have not been showing up to work, investigators say. And a number of Border Patrol officers have been disciplined for accepting bribes in exchange for allowing people without proper identification to enter Iraq.
Steve Casteel, the Coalition Provisional Authority's senior adviser to the Interior Ministry, said safeguards were built into the hiring and training process, such as checks of two computer databases to determine whether candidates served in the Iraqi security forces when Saddam Hussein was president or if they were among the thousands of convicts Hussein released from Iraqi prisons shortly before the war.
But criminal records compiled by Hussein's Baath Party apparatus, which much of the world considered criminal in its own right, are inherently ambiguous. Security and language issues, as well as resource and time constraints, make background investigations difficult. And with Iraq in transition among three governments -- a foreign-run occupation authority, an appointed Iraqi council and, if all goes according to plan, an elected Iraqi government -- defining "right" loyalties can be tricky.
In the end, those responsible for hiring the new protection forces have had little choice but to rely mostly on recruits' assurances and, as Casteel put it, an interviewer's "gut sense."
"It's a weak system," Casteel acknowledged, "but it's the best we got."
U.S. Army Capt. Jason Brandt, who assists with recruiting and vetting for Iraqi police, acknowledged: "There are probably some people on the police force who shouldn't be there."
A Lead Role for Police
The occupation authority is spending hundreds of millions of dollars from Iraqi oil production and seized assets and $3.3 billion of U.S. taxpayers' money to create five security organizations -- the police, an army, the Civil Defense Corps, the Border Patrol and the Facilities Protection Service -- plus court and prison systems. The U.S. military oversees the army, civil defense and border agencies while a new Iraqi entity, a kind of defense ministry, is created. The Iraqi Interior Ministry runs the police and shares jurisdiction over the Border Patrol with U.S. forces; other ministries individually employ the Facilities Protection Service to guard their buildings.
In the authority's plan to stabilize Iraq, the key is the police force, which is projected to number 85,000 by next year. The police already have taken a lead role in trying to secure the country, providing tips to occupation officials about planned terrorist attacks and investigating such common crimes as robberies and assaults.
"It's as simple as, when have you ever seen the police lead a coup?" Casteel explained. "If you build a strong police force, you have a republic. If you build a strong military, you have a banana republic."
In U.S. jurisdictions, police candidates typically undergo several rounds of long interviews; a written exam; background investigations that include checks of electronic records and visits with neighbors and former employers; fitness, medical and psychological evaluations; and, sometimes, polygraph tests.
In the largest U.S. cities, about 1 applicant in 100 makes it through the process. In Baghdad, about one-third of applicants are being accepted.
Casteel said the occupation authority is taking steps to minimize potential problems. While the recruiting and training process was abbreviated, new hires will be put through a four-stage probationary period designed to gradually shift them from being watched "minute by minute" to operating semiautonomously -- all over a period of 32 weeks.
At the same time, the Interior Ministry has established its first internal affairs unit. Formed in late July, after many complaints about the conduct of the police, the unit now has 183 investigators.
The first officers hired for the new police force came from the old police force. The occupation authority's policy of ridding Iraqi institutions of anyone who might have been loyal to Hussein or belonged to his Baath Party resulted in the firing or demotion of Baghdad's police chief and central police administrators. But there was no time to check up on the rank and file, who were allowed to remain in their posts as the vetting process caught up with them.
In the past few weeks, four Baghdad district chiefs and their staffs have been fired for corruption or for ties to Hussein's government. Two more will be dismissed in the coming weeks, said Muhammad Husam Din, the Interior Ministry's chief of internal affairs. He declined to provide more details.
The next question was what to do about those who were enrolled at the police training academy when the war began and Hussein was still in power. Many high-ranking Baathists used their connections to get their sons accepted, but some officials argued that barring the sons of Baathists from the academy would be akin to punishing sons for the sins of their fathers -- and that there would be practically no one left.
In the end, the academy took nearly all 1,500 students back. They are now in training, and the first batch will be deployed in February.
'It's Just a Job'
Solicitations for recruits began one evening in mid-November when U.S. military commanders showed up at district council meetings around Baghdad and asked for recommendations. Candidates had to be Iraqi citizens, at least 18 years old, have a high school degree and be able to read and write.
When do you need the names? one Iraqi representative asked. The answer: the next morning.
By dawn, word had trickled out and more than 100 men were lined up at one recruiting site, Camp War Eagle in Baghdad's Ninth of April district. Only a few had been recommended by the council members, but initially there was no way to tell who they were.
So the military interviewers treated everyone the same.
Those who showed up at War Eagle were a mostly scraggly bunch -- many with sandals, oversize coveralls and dirty faces. As the prospective recruits waited in line, more than a few talked openly about how they were not really interested in the police force but really needed a job, any job. With salaries of $154 a month -- after a hazard raise last week because of the recent bombings of police stations -- the force assures a comfortable living.
One man, who sells cigarettes from a box hung around his neck, grumbled about how he did not like the Americans. But after being out of work for months, he said, he had no choice. Another bragged about how he had been in the Iraqi army and had part of his ear cut off for running away.
"It's just a job. I will take anything," said Khudair Abbas, 19, a day laborer who said he had become bored with spending his days playing soccer and watching television.
The recruits went through a basic medical check -- eyes, ears, throat, blood pressure, pulse. Then U.S. military officers conducted interviews, meticulously going down a list of standard questions, such as "Were you/are you a member of/contributed to/been associated with any military/paramilitary group, police, special police, terrorist group or intelligence unit?" and "Are you, even remotely, potentially susceptible or vulnerable to pressure, coercion, or blackmail by any government organized group or individual?"
Everyone answered no to both.
Army Capt. John A. Womack and his unit at War Eagle had not been told about the recruiting session until the evening before and had not been able to properly schedule personnel. By about 3 p.m., Womack and the others had moved on to other duties, and the interviews were being conducted by three Iraqi interpreters, supervised by U.S. soldiers walking in and out of the room. Any candidate who was not underage, did not have a fake ID and would sign a form disavowing any ties to the Baath Party passed the test.
Within two days, the unit had screened 230 people and passed 90. The officers congratulated those who had made it and told them to pack up for training.
Occupation authorities, however, had not told the officers at War Eagle that there was a second round of interviews, which took place one day in early December at the police academy headquarters. Invitations were sent to 200 people, but only 118 showed up.
The recruits were asked to bring documentation verifying their education and to fill out forms that would be forwarded to their local police stations for comment and for checking against the criminal and military databases.
Next was a basic physical fitness test (20 sit-ups, 10 push-ups, 5 pull-ups, a 1,500-meter run and a 100-meter dash). Many had dressed in their best collared shirts and loafers for their interview, and had to strip down to boxers and bare feet for the test, which took place on a muddy field. About 90 percent passed.
Last were the two-minute-or-so interviews with Mehdi, who was head of student affairs at the police college before the Americans selected him to oversee training.
The first candidate was Allah Abbas, 22.
"What do you think of human rights?" Mehdi asked.
"It's good and helps humans," Abbas answered.
"What do you think of the other sex?"
"They are half or so of society and help men serve the community."
Mehdi nodded and scribbled some notes in the young man's file. Abbas was in.
Staff researcher Richard Drezen in New York contributed to this report. |
