Well, duh!
Unrealistic Iraq timetable limits chances of success
According to the timetable announced in November, the Iraqi Governing Council is supposed to draft and adopt an interim constitution by Feb. 28. By May 31, the Iraqi people are scheduled to meet and hold caucuses around the country to elect members of an interim government. And by June 30, they are expected to have a new Iraqi government up and running, allowing the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority to officially go out of existence.
If that schedule sounds overly ambitious, it is. The end of June looms less than six months away, and given the circumstances on the ground in Iraq, ending our occupation by then would be little short of miraculous.
In fact, it would be foolhardy to treat the June 30 goal as a date set in concrete. Yes, we should cede control to the Iraqis as soon as possible, but if we push too much responsibility on them too early, we raise the odds of Iraqi failure. And yes, timetables have their uses -- they can focus attention and create pressure for progress -- but they can also restrict flexibility. As the Bush administration has learned, the option of changing course as circumstances demand is essential in trying to manage the crisis in Iraq.
There's another issue as well. The capture of Saddam Hussein has not slowed the rate of violence in Iraq, and military officials have been quite clear in predicting that guerrilla attacks and terrorism will remain a serious threat through June and beyond.
There is also no reasonable expectation that Iraqi police or military will be ready by then to play a significant role. In other words, even if the occupation officially ends on schedule, U.S. troops will still be patrolling the country and be responsible for security. Tens of thousands of U.S. and coalition troops will still have to enforce what amounts to American-imposed martial law.
In addition, most of the money to run the Iraqi government and to finance reconstruction will continue to come from the United States, and U.S. officials are not about to cede control of that money to the Iraqis. So even after we announce the official end of the occupation and tell the Iraqis and the world that we are no longer in charge, in truth, we will retain most of the real power.
Imagine, then, Iraq on July 1. The Iraqi people will be told that they are now self-governing, that their fate is now in their own hands. Yet when they walk out their front doors, U.S. troops will still control the streets, telling them where they can go and what they can do; U.S. bureaucrats will still control the purse strings. Under those circumstances, the promise of sovereignty cannot help but seem a cruelly false illusion.
So how can the emerging Iraqi government be seen as anything but a puppet regime? How can it be given the credibility and independence that it needs, both within Iraq and in the international community?
The answer lies with the United Nations and perhaps NATO. If U.N. officials, not Americans, are seen as making the decisions about reconstruction, and if U.S. troops are by then operating under NATO or U.N. leadership, the promise of democratic self-government would seem far more real to the Iraqis. And that, after all, is supposed to be our ultimate goal.
ajc.com
'Course the schedule was set by the reelection of GWB, more than anything else.
JMO
lurqer |
