"facing the "world war," knowing that our intelligence
apparatus gave us completely bogus information about WMD
capacity in Iraq."
I disagree with that assertion.
I'd like to see you state a few specific instances of what
you perceive to be "completely bogus information about WMD
capacity in Iraq". Could you cull a few from the
following for me?
President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat
whitehouse.gov
President Delivers "State of the Union"
whitehouse.gov
Secretary Colin L. Powell's Briefing to the UN Security Council: Iraq - Failing to Disarm
globalsecurity.org
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
fas.org
IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
fas.org
STATEMENT BY DAVID KAY ON THE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP (ISG)
fas.org
Powell Says Kay Report Confirms Iraq Defied U.N. Res. 1441
usinfo.state.gov
Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction
Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet
odci.gov
US official stands by Iraq weapons report
07 January 2004
Message 19665958
Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths <from the CIA>
odci.gov
Strategic Choices, Intelligence Challenges
Robert Hutchings - Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Message 19669942
False myths surround Iraq document
Stuart A. Cohen, who has been with the CIA for 30 years, was acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was published.
Message 19572722
Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants
odci.gov
Clinton believed Iraq had WMD
Fri 9 Jan 2004
Message 19674178
SECRETARY POWELL:
....."I knew exactly the circumstances under which I was presenting that speech to the UN on the 5th of February: the whole world would be watching, and there would be those who would applaud every word, and there would be those who were going to be skeptical of every word.
That's why I took the time --- -- I took the time to go
out to the agency and sit down with the experts. And
anything that we did not feel was solid and multi-sourced,
we did not use in that speech.
What the Carnegie report, which I have not read, but I'm familiar with it from press accounts this morning, it said that there was that capability within Iraq and they were doing these kinds of things. And they believe that we, perhaps, overstated it, but they did not say it wasn't there.
The fact of the matter is, Iraq did have weapons of mass
destruction, and programs for weapons of mass destruction,
and used weapons of mass destruction against Iran and
against their own people. That's a fact.
Now, that's back in 1988 when they used it against their own people. But throughout the '90s, when they had every opportunity to come clean, make the declarations, and get right with the international community, they had the chance to respond to every one of those UN resolutions during the '90s, when they were threatened by President Clinton in 1998 with a bombing and they still didn't come clean, and then they caused the inspectors to have to be forced out of the country, there is, I think, a solid case that has been made to many governments by their intelligence agencies, and that has been the consistent view of UN inspectors and of the United States intelligence community, that this was a danger we had to worry about.
Now, in terms of intention, he always had it. And anybody who thinks that Saddam Hussein, last year, was just, you know, waiting to give all of this up, even though he was given the opportunity to do so, he didn't do it. What he was waiting to do was see if he could break the will of the international community, get rid of any potential for future inspections, and get back to his intentions, which were to have weapons of mass destruction. And he kept the infrastructure. He kept the programs intact.
Where the debate is, is why haven't we found huge
stockpiles, and why haven't we found large caches of these
weapons. Let's let the Iraqi Survey Group complete its
work. There has been the movement out of some of the
individuals from the group. I presume that their
particular job is finished.
But I am confident of what I presented last year. The
intelligence community is confident of the material they
gave me; I was representing them. It was information they
presented to the Congress. It was information they had
presented publicly, and they stand behind it. And this
game is still unfolding."....
...."Were there other ways to solve this problem? I think the
President gave the international community every
opportunity to solve this problem another way. The
international community gave the Iraqis 12 years to solve
this problem any other way.
The President took the case to the international community
and said: For 12 years, you have been defied. What are you
going to do now? It's time for us to act.
And the President, after a reasonable period of time -- inspectors were still being thwarted, we got an incorrect, ridiculous declaration from the Iraqi Government in response to Resolution 1441 -- and after waiting a sufficient period of time, the President decided he had to act because he believed that whatever the size of the stockpile, whatever one might think about it, he believed that the region was in danger, America was in danger, and he would act and he did act.
And he acted with a large number of countries who felt likewise, and he acted under the authority that we were absolutely sure we had because we negotiated it that way in UN Resolution 1441.".....
state.gov |
